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Nowadays the communication networks have acted as nearly the most important
fundamental infrastructure in our human society. The basic service provided by the
communication networks are like that provided by the ubiquitous public utilities.
For example, the cable television network provides the distribution of information
to its subscribers, which is much like the water or gas supply systems which dis-
tribute the commodities to citizens. The communication network also facilitates the
development of many network-based applications such as industrial pipeline control-
ling in the industrial network, voice over long-term evolution (VoLTE) in the mobile
network and mixture reality (MR) in the computer network, etc. Since the communi-
cation network plays such a vital role in almost every aspect of our life, undoubtedly,
the information transmitted over it should be guarded properly. Roughly, such in-
formation can be categorized into either the communicated message or the sensitive
information related to the users. Since we already got cryptographical tools, such
as encryption schemes, to ensure the confidentiality of communicated messages, it is
the sensitive personal information which should be paid special attentions to. More-
over, for the benefit of reducing the network burden in some instances, it may require
that only communication information among legitimated users, such as streaming
media service subscribers, can be stored and then relayed in the network. In this
case, the network should be empowered with the capability to verify whether the
transmitted message is exchanged between legitimated users without leaking the
privacy of those users. Meanwhile, the intended receiver of a transmitted message
should be able to identify the exact message sender for future communication. In
order to cater to those requirements, we re-define a notion named conditional user
privacy preservation.
In this thesis, we investigate the problem how to preserve user conditional pri-
vacy in pubic key encryption schemes, which are used to secure the transmitted
information in the communication networks. In fact, even the term conditional
privacy preservation has appeared in existing works before, there still have great
differences between our conditional privacy preservation definition and the one pro-
posed before. For example, in our definition, we do not need a trusted third party
(TTP) to help tracing the sender of a message. Besides, the verification of a given
iii
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encrypted message can be done without any secret.
In this thesis, we also introduce more desirable features to our redefined notion
user conditional privacy preservation. In our second work, we consider not only the
conditional privacy of the message sender but also that of the intended message
receiver. This work presents a new encryption scheme which can be implemented in
communication networks where there exists a blacklist containing a list of blocked
communication channels, and each of them is established by a pair of sender and
receiver. With this encryption scheme, a verifier can confirm whether one ciphertext
is belonging to a legitimated communication channel without knowing the exact
sender and receiver of that ciphertext. With our two previous works, for a given
ciphertext, we ensure that no one except its intended receiver can identify the sender.
However, the receiver of one message may behave dishonest when it tries to retrieve
the real message sender, which incurs the problem that the receiver of a message
might manipulate the origin of the message successfully for its own benefit. To tackle
this problem, we present a novel encryption scheme in our third work. Apart from
preserving user conditional privacy, this work also enforces the receiver to give a
publicly verifiable proof so as to convince others that it is honest during the process
of identifying the actual message sender. In our forth work, we show our special
interest in the access control encryption, or ACE for short, and find this primitive can
inherently achieve user conditional privacy preservation to some extent. we present
a newly constructed ACE scheme in this work, and our scheme has advantages over
existing ACE schemes in two aspects. Firstly, our ACE scheme is more reliable
than existing ones since we utilize a distributed sanitizing algorithm and thus avoid
the so called single point failure happened in ACE systems with only one sanitizer.
Then, since the ciphertext and key size of our scheme is more compact than that of
the existing ACE schemes, our scheme enjoys better scalability.
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List of Notations
Some notations used throughout this thesis are listed below, other special ones will
be defined when they are first appeared.
` A security parameter;
1` The string of ` ones;
∀ For all;
∃ There exists;
Z The set of all integers;
Z+ The set of all positive integers;
Zp The set consists of the integers modulo p;
Z∗p The multiple group of integers modulo p;
G A set G or a group G when the binary operation is specified
in the context;
|G| The cardinality of the set G or the order of the group G;
{u} a set with elements including u;
ε(`) A negligible function on `;
ord(a) The order of an element a in a group specified in the context;
a||b The concatenation of the string a and the string b;
a
R← G, a ∈R G a is selected from G uniformly at random;
A(x)→ y y is computed by running the algorithm A on input x;
a ∈ A (a /∈ A) a is (not) in the set A.
A
⋃
B The union of sets A and B;
S The simulator in the security model;
C The challenger in the security proof;
A The adversary in the security model;
O One oracle in the security proof;
Pr[E] The probability when event E occurs;
AdvA The advantage of A when it wins the game.
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List of Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used throughout this thesis, other special ones will
be defined when they are first used.






GDDHE General Decision Diffie-Hellman Exponent;
k-CCA k-Collision Attack Assumption
s-RSA Strong RSA;
ZPK Zero-knowledge Proof;
ZKPK Zerok-knowledge proof of Knowledge;
PKE Public Key Encryption;
PKG Private Key Generator;
IND-CCA2 Indistinguishability against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext At-
tacks;
IND-CPA Indistinguishability against Adaptive Chose Plaintext At-
tacks;
EU-CMA Existentially Unforgeable under Chosen-message Attacks;
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Communication Network. Basically, a communication network is a set of nodes,
electrical devices mainly, connected by various types of transmission medium such
as twisted pair, fiber optic and even the air. Examples of such communication
networks include telephone networks, computer networks, and also the Internet.
Since the nodes in a communication network are interconnected with great flexibility
and reasonable redundancy, it allows information to be transmitted successfully
among nodes located in various geographical points and thus facilitates the flow
of information. The communication network provides two primary functionalities
for users, one is to gather a large volume of information efficiently, and another
is to share their information easily. Those two functionalities form the basis of
many existed network-based services, such as e-mail and FTP, and therefore nourish
an unlimited number of future network-based applications such as mixture reality
(MR), tele-surgery, etc.
Public Key Encryption. Introduced by Diffie and Hellman in [DH76], the no-
tion of public key encryption, PKE for short, provides us with new direction when
we find tools to keep the transmitted information confidential in the communica-
tion network. Unlike the symmetric key encryption, or secret key encryption, the
two keys, the public key and secret key respectively, in the PKE are not the same.
The public key can be published publicly and the secret key should be kept private.
Furthermore, it is infeasible to compute the secret key from its corresponding public
key. In a PKE scheme, a message sender encrypts a message under its communi-
cator’s public key , which is received from and authenticated by the PKI. Then,
the generated ciphertext is sent to the receiver. Latter, the receiver can recover
the plaintext from the given ciphertext using its own secret key. PKE relieves the
key distribution and management problems existed in symmetric key encryption.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
However, the execution of a PKE algorithm is more costly comparing to that of a
symmetric key encryption algorithm, and it takes immerse expense to maintain a
robust PKI in the public key encryption scheme. Thus, in practical applications,
the PKE is usually used to transmit secret keys confidentially between parties and
the symmetric key encryption is latter applied to exchange a bulk of data, such kind
of encryption mode is thus called hybrid encryption.
Some standard PKE schemes, such as the RSA encryption [RSA83], the ElGamal
encryption [Gam85] and the Cramer-Shoup encryption [CS98a], can only provide the
functionality of message confidentiality. There also exists some PKE schemes which
preserve extra functionalities. For example, the broadcast encryption scheme [FN93]
enables a message sender to send a encrypted information to multiple recipients.
The identity-based encryption scheme [Sha84, BF01] allows users to use unique
information about the identity of the receiver as the pubic key rather than to receive
authenticated public key from the PKI. The public-key encryption with keyword
search scheme [BCOP04] empowers one user with the capability to search encrypted
keywords from the original encrypted data without compromising its confidentiality.
The signcryption scheme [Zhe97] combines the functionalities of both the public key
encryption and digital signature in a logical single step, it enjoys extra benefits
with respect to computational costs and communication overheads comparing to
the traditional sign-then-encrypt approach.
Research Problem. In many network applications, keeping the exchanged mes-
sage confidential may be the primary concern but is not the only concern. For
example, in e-voting or e-cash systems, the user privacy of the participants should
also be protected. We introduce a new notion named conditional privacy preser-
vation in this thesis. Unlike the conventional user privacy definition which only
focuses on protecting users’ personal information from being leaked, our conditional
one requires that not only one user’s privacy is preserved but also its legitimation
can still be publicly verified. Also, the anonymity of this user can only be revoked
by its corresponding communicator. One obvious benefit of our new notion is that it
enables some entities in the communication network to act as a cryptographic “fire-
wall” to filtrate information not sent from legitimated users, which further reduces
the communicational and computational cost in the network. Thus, we think our
conditional privacy preservation definition is more desirable than the conventional
one in practice.
Our conditional privacy preservation property is different from that mentioned
in [RH07, LLZ+08, ELO13, HBCC13] even they are all named conditional privacy
preservation and they all require anonymous message authentication. The main dif-
ference is that the ones in previous papers all need a trusted third party (TTP) to
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trace the private information, e.g., position, of one certain user. However, in our def-
inition, it is the corresponding receiver of a message who has the capability to trace
the personal information of the message sender. Thus, comparing to the conditional
privacy preservation property defined before, our one should be more realistic since
it is usually hardly and costly to maintain a TTP. Moreover, we extend our condi-
tional privacy preservation property to capture more desirable features. For exam-
ple, in our paper [YMY17], the communication blacklist checking is included in that
property, it enables a node to check whether the communication channel between
the sender and intended receiver of a given message is blocked without breaching
the users’ conditional privacy. In [YM19], the receiver’s capability is enhanced to
not only trace the exact sender of a message but also convince anyone that it is
well-behaved during the process of finding that user without leaking its privacy. In
[YM18], we gave an unique ACE construction which provides message confidential-
ity and user conditional privacy to some extent. In this work, the intended receivers
of an ACE ciphertext can ascertain that the sender of that ciphertext is coming
from a group but cannot identify it exactly. Besides, our construction also enjoys
high reliability and scalability comparing to existing ACE schemes because of the
distributed sanitizing algorithm and hierarchical structure of user keys respectively.
Communication schemes which preserve the two security properties, message
confidentiality and user conditional privacy preservation, simultaneously are useful
in many real-life network applications. For example, in the camera surveillance
system, the location of one specific camera should be kept private to resist certain
location-based network attacks. Additionally, this camera’s legitimation should be
verifiable to enable it to send encrypted information to the server. Besides, the server
should be empowered with the capability to retrieve the locations of the cameras
to index all the received encrypted information. And also in the DNA database
system, one searcher may not want to leak either any of its personal information or
its searched content to anyone except the database manager during searching the
database. Also, it should be able to authenticate itself to the database manager to
be ascertained that it has the privilege to access the database. Furthermore, since
the database manager may charge the searcher for this database service, it should
have the capability to trace the exact sender of each encrypted query.
In this thesis, we are aiming at proposing encryption schemes implemented
in communication networks which provide the functionality of conditional privacy
preservation as explained before, and we find there exists no PKE schemes with such
functionality before our works.
The Research Gap. We studied some existed primitives and found they all have
deficiencies in solving our research problem. For instance, the primitive group sig-
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nature [CvH91] provides the user with the capability to authenticate its legitimation
among a group of users including itself, that is, it guarantees the user privacy during
the authentication. However, the group manager in the scheme is the only authority
which can revoke the anonymity of the actual signer of a signature, and the revoca-
tion phase needs the participation of the trusted authority. The ring signcryption
[HSMZ05a] provides properties such as message confidentiality, user authentication
and user privacy, but it is infeasible for the receiver to retrieve the actual sender of a
ciphertext in this primitive. Latter, some techniques [FS07, LASZ14, LLM+07] have
been proposed to address the issue how to trace the signer in the ring signature.
However, those techniques can hardly be applied in the ring signcryption schemes.
Besides, in most existing ring signcryption schemes, the legitimation of the signer of
a given ciphertext is not publicly verified and can only be checked by its intended
receiver, which further makes this primitive inadequate to be a promising solution
to our research problem.
The Access Control Encryption(ACE) scheme, first proposed in [DHO16], pro-
vides another approach to maintain the two properties, message confidentiality and
user conditional privacy preservation, simultaneously. In one ACE scheme, the in-
formation flow is controlled in such a manner that only specified parties are allowed
to communicate freely according to the given access control policy, even when some
of them are misbehaving. With this primitive, the message sent from one party is
confidential to parities who is not its communicators, and the intended receivers of a
message can only confirm that the sender of that message is eligible to communicate
with them, but can hardly identify that party. The cryptographic primitive ACE
seems like a promising solution to our research problem, while existing ACE schemes
have deficiencies in the aspects of system reliability and scalability.
Explicitly, there must exist a sanitizer in existing ACE schemes [DHO16, FGKO17,
TZMT17] to ensure that the access control strategies can be enforced successfully,
thus the security of the sanitizer should be considered carefully and thoroughly. In
previous works, the minimum security requirement of the sanitizer is that it should
be semi-trusted. We argue that the sanitizer should also be extremely reliable, other-
wise, none of the access control policies of the ACE scheme would be guaranteed fur-
ther. Furthermore, existing ACE constructions can hardly be implemented directly
in large-scale networks since none of their ciphertext size is compact. For example,
the complexity of the ciphertext size of the ACE schemes in [DHO16, FGKO17] are
exponential and polylogarithmic respectively in terms of the numbers of identities
n in the system under standard cryptographic assumptions.
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1.2 Contribution of This Thesis
The main contributions of our thesis are made to the following aspects.
1. Communication Schemes with User Conditional Privacy. In our first work, we
formalize the notion of user conditional privacy preservation and propose a
privacy preserving source-verifiable encryption scheme which maintains mes-
sage confidentiality and user conditional privacy concurrently. We also give a
server-aided variant of the construction of our scheme.
In the second work, apart from discussing user conditional privacy, we consider
a more complex scenario where a user should be able to prove the legitima-
tion of the communication channel between it and its communicator without
leaking their privacy. We find such scenario is realistic when there exists a au-
thority in the system which maintains a publicly published blacklist to block
communication channels between specific message senders and receivers. We
present a group-based source-destination verifiable encryption scheme with
blacklist checking which can be used in the scenario. Our construction utilizes
the zero-knowledge proof of membership and also zero-knowledge of inequality
techniques to handle the two aforementioned issues.
Our two aforementioned works all give answers to the problem how to pre-
serve the user conditional privacy, however, those two solutions have the same
insufficiency. Namely, since the receiver in the proposed schemes is the only
parity which can revoke the anonymity of the sender of a given ciphertext,
and no one else in the system has the capability to verify whether the receiver
behaves honestly during revealing the identity of the sender, it can manipu-
late the origination of one ciphertext successfully. We address this issue in
our third work. We develop a secure communication scheme applied between
the surveillance camera and the server. With our scheme, the server can give
a proof to convince others the origination of a ciphertext without leaking its
content. Such property enables the server to build a searchable database using
the camera’s identifier as index and also enables the message auditor to check
the ciphertext and its origination stored in the database without any dispute.
2. Access Control Encryption. The newly proposed primitive Access Control En-
cryption, ACE for short, provides data confidentiality and also user conditional
privacy to some extent. Namely, the sanitizer, which is an indispensable party
in the ACE system, is in charge of the communication channel and ensures
that only a legitimated user from one layer can send encrypted messages to
users in the upper layer. Moreover, it cannot identify the exact identity of the
sender but find the specific layer this user lays in.
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In our fourth work, we give the first ACE scheme construction where the ci-
phertext size is compact. Moreover, the resulted scheme keeps not only the
ciphertext size but also the key size of each users in the ACE compact. One
more significant contribution of this work is giving a decentralized implementa-
tion of the sanitizer in ACE system to restrain its capability and also increase
its reliability. Unlike previous scheme with only one sanitizer, our construction
distributes the sanitizing functionality of the origin ACE among n sanitizers,
it is impossible for one of the sanitizers in our construction to produce a new
access policy, so our construction imposes restriction on the capability of the
sanitizer. Besides, as one message sender in our ACE construction can choose
t out of n sanitizers itself to collaboratively produce a valid sanitized cipher-
text, even some of the n sanitizers cannot provide service or off-line, the whole
ACE system can never encounter the single-point-failure and still work as nor-
mal. So, our construction improves the reliability of the sanitizer and even the
robustness of the whole ACE system.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, we first summarize the miscellaneous notations used throughout
this thesis. Then, we introduce some basic knowledge about the abstract algebra
such as group, field and bilinear maps. Furthermore, we review the computational
complexity theory and some well studied complexity assumptions. Finally, we de-
scribe some basic cryptographic tools such as hash functions, zero-knowledge proofs
used as building blocks in our proposed schemes presented in the thesis.
In Chapter 3, we propose a privacy-preserving source verifiable encryption scheme
guaranteeing message confidentiality and user conditional privacy simultaneously in
communication networks. Furthermore, we define three models to capture the desir-
able properties preserved by our scheme and prove its security in the random oracles
model.
In Chapter 4, we consider user conditional privacy preservation in a more com-
plex scenario. Namely, apart from keeping user conditional privacy, we also try to
address the issue of how to prove the legitimation of the communication channel
between a message sender and its intended communicator. We present a encryption
scheme and define security models for it, latter we prove its security with the help
of random oracle.
In Chapter 5, we explore the security issues existed in security surveillance
systems, we propose important and desirable security and privacy features that
should be achieved by such systems. Latter, to achieve all the security goals, we
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present a secure communication scheme applied between the surveillance camera and
the server. We present formal security models to define these security requirements
and give formal security proofs in the random oracle model.
In Chapter 6, we present an access control encryption (ACE) scheme which
enjoys advantages over previous works in several aspects such as key and cipher-
text size. Our scheme is also believed to be the first implementation of ACE with
decentralized sanitizers. We also define our extended no-write rule model to allow
the corruption of some sanitizers in our ACE system. We prove the security of our
scheme under models define in this chapter.
We conclude our thesis in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
To make our thesis self-contained, we introduce miscellaneous notations, basic no-
tions including abstract algebra, computational complexity and assumptions, and
cryptographic tools which will be used throughout this thesis in this chapter. For
more detailed cryptography theory, readers are recommended to the books [Mao03,
LK14].
2.1 Miscellaneous Notations
In this thesis, a set, usually denoted by a capital, is a collection of distinct elements,
if the number of elements in that set is finite, we call it a finite set, otherwise, it is
an infinite set. For a finite set X, the two notations x
R←− X, x ∈R X can all be used
to denote that x is selected randomly and uniformly from the set X, so we can use
them interchangeably. We use the notation |X| to represent the cardinality of set
X, which equals to the number of elements in X. Conventionally, the blackboard
bold is used to represent some special sets of numbers. For example, the set of all
prime numbers, all natural numbers, all integers and all real numbers are denoted
by P,N,Z and R respectively. Given a positive integer p, the notation Zp denotes
a set consisting of integers modulo p, that is Zp = {0, 1, 2, · · · , p − 1}, by [p], we
denote a set of integers {1, 2, · · · , p}. Given two strings a, b, we denote by a||b the
concatenation of the string a and b.
We denote by ` the security parameter and 1` the string of ` ones. A function
ε : Z → R is said to be negligible if for all k ∈ Z, there exists one element z ∈ Z
such that ε(x) ≤ 1
xk
for all x > z. Unless otherwise specified, by ε, we always
denote a negligible function. By p(x)
R← Zp[x], we denote the polynomial p(x) is
randomly selected from the polynomial ring Zp[x] consisting of the polynomials that
coefficients are from the finite field Zp.
8
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2.2 Abstract Algebra
In this section, some basic abstract algebra structures including groups, rings and
bilinear maps are reviewed.
2.2.1 Groups
Definition 2.1 (Group) A group, usually denoted by (G, ◦), consists of a non-
empty set G and a binary operation ◦ over elements in G, it should satisfy the
following four properties.
• Closure: ∀a, b ∈ G, a ◦ b ∈ G.
• Associativity: ∀a, b, c ∈ G, (a ◦ b) ◦ c = a ◦ (b ◦ c).
• Identity: ∃e ∈ G, ∀a ∈ G, a ◦ e = e ◦ a = a ∈ G.
• Inverse: ∀a ∈ G, ∃a′ ∈ G, a ◦ a′ = a′ ◦ a = e.
The order of one group (G, ◦) is defined as the number of elements in G and thus
denoted by |G|. (G, ◦) is a finite group if its order is finite, otherwise, it is infinite.
For simplicity, a group (G, ◦) can be denoted as G when the binary operation ◦
is specified in the context. Namely, we say G is an additive group if the binary
operation ◦ is specified as addition +, an example of the additive group is Zp. While
G is a multiplicative group when the binary operation ◦ is specified as multiplication
·, a simple multiplicative group is Z∗p.
For the benefit of differentiating the two types of groups, we use different nota-
tions to represent the identity and inverses in them. When G is an additive group,
the additive identity e is denoted as 0 and the inverse of a ∈ G is denoted as −a.
When G is a multiplicative groups, the multiplicative identity e is denoted as 1 and
the inverse of a ∈ G is denoted as a−1.
Definition 2.2 (Abelian Group) A group (G, ◦) is an abelian group if the fol-
lowing property is satisfied.
• Commutativity: ∀a, b ∈ G, a ◦ b = b ◦ a.
Definition 2.3 (Order of A Group Element) By ord(a), we denote the order
of a in (G, ◦). Given a group (G, ◦) with identity e and an element a ∈ G, let
ai = a ◦ a · · · a ◦ · · · a︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
, if there exists a positive integer j satisfying aj = e and al 6= 1
for all positive integers l < j, then we say j is the order of a in (G, ◦), that is,
ord(a) = j. If there exists no positive integers j such that aj = e, then we say the
order of a in (G, ◦) is infinite.
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES 10
Definition 2.4 (Cyclic Group) A group (G, ◦) is a cyclic group if there exists an
element g ∈ G, for every h ∈ G, there exists a positive integer i such that gi = h.
The element g can then be called as a generator of (G, ◦), and the group (G, ◦) can
be represented as 〈g〉, or we say the group (G, ◦) is generated by g.
Notice that definition 2.4 also applies to groups with other operations, such as
addition.
2.2.2 Rings and Fields
Definition 2.5 (Ring) A ring, usually denoted by (G,+, ·), consists of an abelian
group (G,+) and a binary operation · over elements in R, it satisfies the following
four properties.
• Closure under multiplication: ∀a, b ∈ G, a · b ∈ G.
• Associativity of multiplication: ∀a, b, c ∈ G, (a · b) · c = a · (b · c).
• Multiplicative identity: ∃e ∈ G, ∀a ∈ G, a · e = e · a = a ∈ G.
• Distributivity: ∀a, b, c ∈ G, a·(b+c) = (a·b)+(a·c), (a+b)·c = (a·c)+(b·c).
Definition 2.6 (Communicative Ring) A ring (G,+, · ) is communicative if the
following property is satisfied.
• Commutativity of multiplication: ∀a, b ∈ G, a · b = b · a.
Definition 2.7 (Field) A communicative ring (G,+, · ) is a field if (G \ {0}, · )
forms a group.
2.2.3 Bilinear Maps
Let G1, G2 and Gτ be three multiplicative cyclic groups with the same large prime
order p. Let g, h be the generators of G1,G2 respectively. A bilinear map is a map
e : G1 ×G2 → Gτ satisfying the following properties.
• Bilinearity: ∀a, b ∈ Zp,∀x ∈ G1,∀y ∈ G2, e(xa, yb) = e(x, y)ab
• Non-Degeneracy: e(g, h) 6= 1Gτ , where 1Gτ represents the identity of Gτ .
• Computability: ∀x ∈ G1,∀y ∈ G2,, the element e(x, y) in Gτ can always be
efficiently computed.
Definition 2.8 (Bilinear Groups) A bilinear group system, denoted by (G1,G2,
Gτ , e), consists of three multiplicative cyclic groups G1,G2,Gτ and a bilinear map
e : G1 × G2 → Gτ . This group also requires the group action in G1, G2 can be
computed efficiently and |G1| = |G2| = |Gτ | = p.
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2.3 Computational Complexity and Complexity
Assumptions
Since the security of cryptographic schemes constructed in modern cryptography are
mainly based on the computational complexity, in this section, we first introduce
some important notions in this area and then present some intractable assumptions.
More details about the complexity theory can be found in book [Gol03].
2.3.1 Turing Machine and Algorithm
In complexity theory, a Turing machine, first presented by Alan Turing in 1936, is
a hypothetical machine which can be used to simulate any computer algorithm no
matter how complicate it is. An algorithm works like a manual which clearly specifies
the instructions needed to solve a class of problems. Once executed, it starts from
an initial state and input, proceeds through a number of successive states and finally
terminates at the end state and produces an output. An algorithm is deterministic if
its outputs are always the same when the same particular input is given in multiple
executions. If the algorithm employs a certain degree of randomness such as using
random bits as its auxiliary input during the execution, it is called a randomized
algorithm or a probabilistic algorithm. In this case, either the running time or
the output of this algorithm are random variables defined by the involved random
bits. A Turing machine is deterministic if it simulates a deterministic algorithm,
otherwise, it is a probabilistic Turing machine.
A probabilistic algorithm is efficient if its running time is bounded by a polyno-
mial p(·) defined by the length of its input. In this case, it is called a probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm. In our thesis, all algorithms involved in the
schemes should be PPT algorithms. Besides, the security models defined in our
thesis also model the adversaries and oracles as PPT algorithms.
2.3.2 Problem Complexity Classes
Definition 2.9 (P Problem) L is a P problem if it is solvable in polynomial time.
That is, there exists a deterministic Turing machine M and a polynomial p(·) such
that
• on input a problem instance x, M halts after at most p(|x|) steps, and
• M(x) = 1 if and only if x ∈ L.
P is the collection of all problems that can be solved in polynomial time.
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Definition 2.10 (NP problem) L is a NP problem if L has solutions which can
be efficiently tested for validity in polynomial time. That is, given a Boolean relation
RL ⊂ {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗ in which each of its elements is a pair consisting of a problem
instance of L and its solution, there exists a deterministic Turning machine M and
a polynomial p(·) such that
• on input a problem instance and its solution pair (x, y) such that |y| ≤ p(|x|),
M halts after at most p(|x|) steps, and
• M(x, y) = 1 if and only if x ∈ L, (x, y) ∈ RL. Here y is also called a witness
of membership of x ∈ L.
NP is a problem set consisting of all problems whose solutions can be tested for
validity in polynomial time.
Definition 2.11 (NP-complete problem) A problem is said to be NP-complete
if it is in NP and every problem in NP is polynomially reducible to it. A problem
L is polynomial reducible to another problem L′ if there exists a polynomial-time
computable function f such that x ∈ L if and only if f(x) ∈ L′.
Even the answer to the problem whether the two problem sets, N andNP , are equal
is still uncertain at present, it is widely believed that P 6= NP . In that case, every
algorithm trying to solve a problem L ∈ NP will have a super-polynomial running
time in the worst case. Since NP-complete problems are harder than problems in
NP , so NP-complete problems have definitely super-polynomial-time complexity
in the worst case. That is to say, there exists no PPT algorithm which can solve
a NP or NP-complete problem. For simplicity, we say the NP or NP-complete
problems are hard to any existed algorithms when P 6= NP .
2.3.3 Computational and statistical indistinguishability
One important notion in complexity theory is the indistinguishability of two prob-
ability distributions. Given two probability distributions Ω1(`) and Ω2(`) which
are defined over the same finite set Ω and the same security parameter `, this two
distributions are said to be computational indistinguishable if there exist no PPT
distinguisher which can tell the difference between them. We say they are statisti-
cally indistinguishable if no distinguisher, even with infinite computational power,
can tell them apart. In this part, we give formal definitions of this two notions.
Definition 2.12 (computational indistinguishability) We say that two proba-
bility distributions Ω1(`) and Ω2(`) defined above are computationally indistinguish-
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able if, for all PPT algorithms A,∣∣∣∣ Prx∈Ω1(`)[A(x) = 1]− Prx∈Ω2(`)[A(x) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε(`).
Definition 2.13 (statistical indistinguishability) We say that two probability
distributions Ω1(`) and Ω2(`) defined above are statistically indistinguishable if
∑
z
∣∣∣∣ Prx∈Ω1(`)[x = z]− Prx∈Ω2(`)[x = z]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε(`).
Conventionally, if two probability distributions are statistically distinguishable, they
are computationally distinguishable. Unless otherwise specified, by indistinguisha-
bility, we mean that it is computationally indistinguishable.
2.3.4 Hard Problems and Complexity Assumptions
In this part, we summarize some hard problems and their related complexity as-
sumptions which are pervasively used in the security proofs given in this thesis.
Definition 2.14 ( Discrete Logarithm(DL) Assumption [Odl84]) Let G = 〈g〉
and G(1`) → (p,G) where ` is the security parameter. Given (g, y) ∈ G2, we say
that the discrete logarithm assumption holds on G if there exists no PPT adversary
A which can compute a x ∈ Zp such that y = gx with non-negligible advantage, that
is
AdvDLA = Pr [y = g
x, x =: A(p, g, y,G)] ≤ ε(`),
where ε is a negligible function defined before, the probability is taken over the random
choice of y ∈ G and the bits consumed by the adversary A.
Definition 2.15 (Computational Diffie-Hellman(CDH) Assumption [DH76])
Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order p where |p| = ` and ` is the
security parameter. Let a, b ∈R Zp, and g ∈R G. Given g, ga and gb, we say the
CDH assumption holds on G if there exists not PPT algorithm A which can compute
gab with non-negligible advantage, that is
AdvCDHA = Pr[g
ab =: A(g, ga, gb)] ≤ ε(`),
where ε is a negligible function defined before, the probability is taken over the random
choices of a, b ∈ Zp and the bits consumed by the adversary A.
In [Mau94], the relationship between the DL assumption and CDH assumption
is discussed in detail. There also exists a decisional variant of the CDH problem
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named DDH problem, and many encryption schemes such as the ElGamal encryption
scheme [Gam85] and Cramer-Shoup encryption schemes [CS98a] are based on this
problem.
Definition 2.16 (Decisional Diffie-Hellman(DDH) problem [Bon98]) Let G
be a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order p where |p| = ` and ` is the secu-
rity parameter. Let a, b ∈R Zp, and g, Z ∈R G. Given two probability distributions
DDDH = {(g, ga, gb, gab)} and DR = {(g, ga, gb, Z)}, we say the CDH assumption
holds on G if there exists not PPT algorithm A which can distinguish the two dis-
tributions DDDH and DR with non-negligible advantage, that is
AdvDDHA = |Pr[1 =: A(D ∈R DDDH)]− Pr[1 =: A(D ∈R DR)]| ≤ ε(`),
where ε is a negligible function defined before, the probability is taken over the random
choices of a, b ∈R Zp, g, Z ∈R G and the bits consumed by the adversary A.
Definition 2.17 (k-Collision Attack Assumption(K-CAA)[MSK02]) Let G
be a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order p where |p| = ` and ` is the security
parameter. For an integer k, and one element x randomly chosen from Zp, gx ∈




x+h2 , · · · , g
1
x+hk ∈ G as inputs, the
problem solver needs to output element g
1
x+h for some h /∈ {h1, h2, · · · , hk}. We say
the k-CCA holds in G if there exists no PPT algorithm A which can solve the k-CCA
problem with non-negligible probability, that is
Advk−CCAA = Pr[g
1




x+h2 , · · · , g
1
x+hk )] ≤ ε,
where h /∈ {h1, h2, · · · , hk} and the probability is over the random choice of the
generator g in G, the random choice of h1, h2, · · · , hk ∈ Zq and the random bits
consumed by A.
Definition 2.18 ((f, g, F )-GDDHE Assumption [Del07]) Given a bilinear group
system B = (p,G1,G2,GT , e(·, ·)) and let f, g be two co-prime polynomials with pair-
wise distinct roots, of respective orders t and n. Let g0, h0 be one generator of G1
and G2 respectively. the (f, g, F )-GDDHE problem is, given the tuple










0 ) ∈ G1,








0 ) ∈ G2 and
T ∈ GT
to decide whether T is equal to e(g0, h0)
k·f(γ) ∈ GT or is a random element in GT .
We say the (f, g, F )-GDDHE Assumption holds if there exists no PPT algorithm A
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which can solve the (f, g, F )-GDDHE problem with non-negligible probability, that
is
AdvGDDHEA (f, g, F ) = |Pr[e(g0, h0)k·f(γ) =: A(f, g, F )]−
Pr[T ∈ GT/{e(g0, h0)k·f(γ)}, T =: A(f, g, F )]| ≤ ε(`)
The probability is taken over the random choice of all the group elements in G1,G2
and all the random bits consumed by A.
Definition 2.19 (Strong RSA(s-RSA) Assumption [FO97]) Let ` be the se-
curity parameter and G(1`) be a group generator whose output is a group with
composite order which has length ` and consists of two prime factors of length
(` − 2)/2. The strong RSA problem is, given G ← G(1`), z ∈ G/{±1}, to find
a pair (u, e) ∈ G × Z such that ue = z and e > 1. We say the strong RSA as-
sumption holds if there exists no PPT algorithm A which can find a solution to the
problem with non-negligible probability, that is
Advs−RSAA = Pr[z = u
e ∧ e > 1 : A(G, z) = (u, e)] ≤ ε(`)
The probability is taken oven all the random bits using by A,G` and the uniformly
random choice of z.
Definition 2.20 (Generalized Diffie-Hellman(GDH) Problem [BBR99]) Let
` be the security parameter and FG be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
which takes 1` as input and outputs N = PQ where P,Q are two n-bit prime num-
bers and P ≡ Q ≡ 3(mod 4), let ~a =< a1, a2, · · · , ak > be any sequence of k ≥ 2
elements of [n]. Given N ← FG(1`), one quadratic-residue g ∈ Z∗N and a k-bit input












for any x′ = x′1x
′
2 · · ·x′k ∈ {0, 1}k/{x} is known.
Definition 2.21 (GDH Assumption [BBR99]) Given a generalized Diffie-Hellman
problem instance (N, g, x, {hRN,g,~a}) where N, g, x,~a are predefined above and {hRN,g,~a}





=1 ai(mod N) for any x′ = x′1x
′
2 · · ·x′k
∈ {0, 1}k/{x}, there exists no polynomial time algorithm A which can find a solution
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to such instance with non-negligible probability, that is
AdvGDHA = Pr[A(N, g, x, {hRN,g,~a}) = g
∏
xi=1
ai(mod N)] ≤ ε(`)
The probability is taken over the random choice of all the group elements and the
random bits using by A,FG
Definition 2.22 (CDH in Composite Group (CDHCG)) When k = 2,~a =
(a, b), x = 11, the GDH assumption can be valued as the Computational Diffie-
Hellman assumption in composite group(CDHCG). That is,
AdvCDHCGA = Pr[A(N, g, ga, gb) = gab(mod N)] ≤ ε(`).
The probability is taken over the random choice of the group elements and the random
bits using by A,FG.
Definition 2.23 (Diffie-Hellman Decision Assumption(DHD)[ACJT00a])
Let ` be
the security parameter and G(1`) be a group generator which generates groups with
composite order n such that |n| = `. Given one group G ∈ G(1`), n′ be the divisor
of G’s order of length `− 2. Define the following two sets
DH(G) := {(g1, y1, g2, y2) ∈ G4|
ord(g1) = ord(g2) = n
′, logg1 y1 = logg2 y2}
Q(G) := {(g1, y1, g2, y2) ∈ G4|
ord(g1) = ord(g2) = ord(y1) = ord(y2) = n
′}
of Diffie-Hellman and arbitary 4-tuples, respectively.
The DHD assumption states that given a specific G =< g > where (g|n) = 1, a
4-tuples T ∈ G4, there exists no probabilistic polynomial time algorithms A which
can discover whether T ∈ DH(G) or T ∈ Q(G) with non-negligible advantage over
random guess for sufficiently large `. Namely,
AdvDHDA = Pr[1 := A(T ∈R DH(G))]− Pr[1 := A(T ∈R Q(G))] ≤ ε(`).
The probability is taken over the random choice of all the group elements and the
randomness used by A.
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES 17
2.4 Cryptographic Tools
In this section, we review some basic cryptographic tools used in the constructed
scheme and the security proofs presented in our thesis.
2.4.1 One-way Function and Cryptographic Hash Function
When we say a function f is a one-way function, it means that f is computationally
easy to compute but computationally hard to invert. Explicitly, for the one-way
function f , there exists a PPT algorithm which can compute f(x) efficiently when
given one input x chosen from the co-domain of f . However, when given a image y
chosen from the domain of f , there exists no PPT algorithm which can find a x such
that f(x) = y successfully with non-negligible probability, where the probability is
taken over the choices of y and the randomness consumed by the algorithm. Since
the existence of one-way functions always imply the existence of efficient processes
which is hard to inverse, and the security of many cryptographic schemes are basing
on those processes, the one-way function plays an important role in modern cryp-
tography. One promising candidate of the one-way function is the hash function.
Introduced by Carter and Wegman in [CW79], the universal classes of hash
functions can be divided into tree types. Basically, a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}λ is a deterministic function which maps a bit string with any length to another
bit string with fixed length λ. According to [Mao03], a hash function should preserve
the following three properties:
1. Mixing Transformation. Given any input, the output of H should be computa-
tionally indistinguishable from any uniform binary string in {0, 1}λ;
2. Pre-image Resistance. Given an output y ∈ {0, 1}λ, it is computationally
infeasible to find its corresponding pre-image x such that y = H(x);
3. Collusion Resistance. It is computationally infeasible to find x1 6= x2 such that
H(x1) = H(x2).
The cryptographic primitive hash function works as a indispensable ingredient in
modern cryptography and has been used as a building block in many cryptographic
tools such as encryption scheme [FOPS01], digital signature scheme [BR93], message
authentication code (MAC) scheme [BCK96].
2.4.2 Random Oracle Model
The main topics of modern cryptography are about defining security notions and
proposing schemes which are proven to be secure regarding to those notions. In some
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instances, it is more desirable to construct schemes and then prove their security in
more idealized computation models. The well-known random oracle is one of such
models.
A random oracle, usually denoted by O, can be viewed as a powerful and ide-
alized hash function which preserves three properties: efficient, deterministic and
uniform output. Explicitly, given any input to a random oracle, its correspond-
ing output is efficiently computable. When provided with the same input multiple
times, the random oracle would always output the same result. Furthermore, the
output of a random oracle is uniformly distributed over its output space.
Formalized by Bellare and Rogaway in [BR93], the notion of random oracle
model is an idealized model of cryptography hash functions where all parties have
the privilege to access to it. In this model, the hash functionH is modeled as a magic
box where the hash value H(x) is completely random and unknown before querying
the oracle when given an input x. More precisely, in a security proof, the simulator
S maintains a hash list H of pairs {(w, h)}, which is initially empty, to answer hash
queries made by the adversary A. When A wants to “see” the hash value of x, it
has to ask S with this query. When the simulator receives x, it first searches the
list to find whether there already exists such an entry (w, h) that x = w. If yes, S
responds A with the hash value h, otherwise, S randomly uniformly chooses a value
h as the hash value H(x) of x and sends it back to A, then it appends the newly
created pair (x, h) to the list H for later use.
When we are proving the security of a scheme in the random oracle, we still
need to construct a so-called security reduction. It shows you how to construct an
algorithm to break one certain well-studied computational assumption by interacting
with an adversary A which can break the scheme. During the proof, the random
oracle can be simulated by S as part of the reduction. Since the random oracle is
fully controlled by S, it can be programmed to answer A with any input as long
as the outputs are uniformly randomly distributed. Such simulation enables the
simulator to embed the hard problem into the random oracle and thus makes the
security proof more simple. As a result, the schemes designed in the random oracle
model are much more efficient than those designed in the standard model.
Notably, once the random oracle is initialized with a concrete hash function, the
aforementioned advantages would not be preserved further. Canetti et al. [CGH04]
have shown that cryptosystems proven secure in the random oracle model are not
necessarily secure in the stand model.
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2.4.3 Zero-knowledge Proofs
In general, a zero-knowledge proof (ZPK), introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and
Rackoff [GMW86], is a two-party interactive protocol which is applied between one
prover P and one verifier V . It can be used by a prover to convince a verifier
that a statement is true without leaking any extra information except the validity
of the statement. Similarly, when a prover holds a secret and wants to prove its
ownership of the secret without revealing it, the prover can use a zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge (ZKPK) to convince a verifier of the truth without leaking any
extra information about the secret. Zero-knowledge proofs have been introduced
and defined formally in [FFS88].
Definition 2.24 Let (P ,V) be an interactive proof system where the interactive
machine P and V model the prover and verifier respectively. (P ,V) is said to be a
zero-knowledge protocol for proof of membership in a language L if it satisfies the
following conditions:
1. Completeness: For all language elements x ∈ L, the honest prover P will
convince the honest verifier V to accept, except with negligible probability.
2. Soundness: For all x /∈ L, any cheating prover P∗ will be unable to convince
the honest verifier to accept, except with negligible probability known as the
soundness error. Depending on the types of cheating for which this guarantee
is made, we have different notions of soundness.
3. Zero-Knowledge: For all x ∈ L, for every PPT interactive verifier V∗, there
exists a PPT algorithm S known as the simulator, such that for every x ∈ L
the two variables < P ,V∗ > (x) and S(x) are indistinguishable to a distin-
guisher or the environment. Where < P ,V∗ > (x) denotes the output of the
interactive machine V∗ after interacting with P on common input x and S(x)
the output of the machine S on input x. Depending on the classes of environ-
ments against whom these random variables remain indistinguishable, we have
different notions of zero-knowledge.
According to [GMW86], all languages in NP should have zero-knowledge proofs
assuming the existence of one-way functions.
In this part, we also describe some zero-knowledge proof systems of the discrete
logarithm. Our description follows the
∑
-protocol [CDS94] manner. That is, when
the prover wants to show its knowledge on some discrete logarithm statements to
the verifier, the two parties involve in the following 3-move interaction:
1. The prover commits itself to a commitment t and sends it to a verifier.
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2. Upon receiving t, the verifier sends back a challenge c to the prover.
3. The prover finally responds a response s to the verifier .
To empower the prover with the capability of producing such proof system itself or,
literally, make such proof system non-interactive, the Fiat-Shamir transformation
[FS86] can be applied in the second step of the proof system. Namely, the prover
can produce the challenge c itself with the only constraint that the commitment t
should be properly produced in advance.
Conveniently, we use the notation ZPK{(x1, x2, · · · , xn) : st}, introduced by
[JM97], to denote a zero-knowledge proof system. This notation shows that the
prover has the knowledge of a tuple of values (x1, x2, · · · , xn) such that the statement
st holds. Obviously, here the elements listed in the round bracket are those only
known to the prover and being proved, while other parameters in st are known to
both the prover and the verifier. By using such notation, we give the following
several zero-knowledge proof systems of some discrete logarithms statements:
* Proof system 1. ZPK{(a, b) : H1, (g, h, Z1, Z2) ∈ G4;Z1 = ga ∧ Z2 = hb}
[CS03a]
For the prover, to prove the knowledge of two integers a, b such that Z1 = g
a
and Z2 = h
b, it computes the following values:
1. w1, w2
R←− Zp, t1 = gw1 , t2 = hw2 ,
2. c = H1(g||h||t1||t2),
3. s1 = w1 − c · a, s2 = w2 − c · b.
Finally, ZPK{(a, b) : H1, (g, h, Z1, Z2) ∈ G4;Z1 = ga ∧ Z2 = hb} = (c, s1, s2).




s2Zc2 and accepts the given proof if and
only if c = H1(g||h||t′1||t′2).
* Proof system 2. ZPK{(a) : H2, l1, l2, (g, y) ∈ G2; y = ga ∧ (a ∈ {2l1 , · · · , 2l1 +
2l2})} [CFT98, FO97, Bou00]
For the prover, to prove the knowledge of a such that y = ga and also a lies
in the interval {2l1 , · · · , 2l1 + 2l2}, it computes the following values:
1. w
R←− {0, 1}l2+k, t = gw
2. c = H2(g||y||t),
3. s = w − c(a− 2l1).
Finally, ZPK{(a) : H2, l1, l2, (g, y) ∈ G2; y = ga ∧ (a ∈ {2l1 , · · · , 2l1 + 2l2})} =
(c, s).
For a verifier, it computes t′ = gs−2
l1cyc and accepts the given proof if and
only if c = H2(g||h||t′).
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* Proof system 3. ZPK{(x) : H3, (g, h, y, z) ∈ G4; y = gx, log gy 6= log hz}
[CS03a]
For the prover, to prove the knowledge of x such that y = gx and log gy 6=
log hz, it does the following procedures;
1. It chooses a
R←− Zp and then sets α = a, β = ax.







3. It chooses w1, w2




4. It computes the challenge c = H3(g||h||y||z||t1||t2).
5. It generates the corresponding responses as s1 = w1 − cα, s2 = w2 − cβ.
ZPK{(x) : H, (g, h, y, z) ∈ G4; y = gx, log gy 6= log hz} = (st1, st2, c, s1, s2)
For a verifier, to verify such a given proof, it first checks whether st1 =










Notably, the group G used in aforementioned proof systems is generated by a group
generator G(·) on input the security parameter `. It is not specified and its group
order p can be either a prime or a composite number, the only restriction is that
the discrete logarithm problem should be hard in G. Also, for simplifying the
description, the hash functions used in above proof systems are not clearly defined,
in case of any dispute happened to it, we state that three hash functions used in
the above proof systems can be H1 : {0, 1}∗ → ZP ,H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l2+k,H3 :
{0, 1}∗ → ZP respectively.
2.4.4 Shamir’s Secret Sharing
Given a secret s, Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [Sha79] enables the secret holder to
divide it into n pieces (s1, . . . , sn) using a k− 1 degree polynomial, the secret holder
can then distribute the n pieces among n users so that each of the users only has
a unique secret piece. The Shamir’s secret sharing scheme ensures that the origin
secret s can only be recovered using polynomial interpolation when at least k users
join together, and it is infeasible to reveal any information about x when knowing
at most k−1 secret pieces. This is the reason why this scheme is also called a (k, n)
Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme. Mathematical details about how to recover s are
given as follows.
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Given a user group S = {U1, . . . , Un}, let Fq be a finite field of order q where
q > n and n is the number of users in S. Assuming each user in S is associated
with a public unique element ui ∈ Fq. To share a secret s among users in S, the




where aj ∈R Fq. Then each user in S is given a secret share si = p(ui). When k












, then we can recover the secret
s = p(0).
2.4.5 Public-Key Encryption
Similar to the symmetric encryption scheme, the public-key, or asymmetric, encryp-
tion (PKE) scheme can also be used to ensure message confidentiality in unreliable
communication channels. Unlike the symmetric encryption scheme where the en-
cryption and decryption key are the same, the two keys in the PKE are different
and usually relative. However, it is infeasible to compute the decryption key from
the public encryption key.
Definition 2.25 (PKE) Formalized by [DH76], a public key encryption (PKE)
scheme can be defined by the following four algorithms.
• Setup(1`). On input 1`, this setup algorithm outputs the public parameters
params.
• KeyGen(1`). Taking 1` as input, the key generation algorithm outputs a secret-
public pair (sk, pk).
• Enc(params, pk,m). On input params, pk and a message m chosen from the
message space specified in params, the encryption algorithm outputs a cipher-
text CT .
• Dec(params, sk, CT ). The decryption algorithm takes params, sk and the ci-
phertext CT as input and outputs the original message m.





Dec(params, sk, CT )→ m KeyGen(1`)→ (sk, pk);
Enc(params, pk,m)→ CT
 = 1,
where the probability is taken over the randomness consumed by all algorithms in
the scheme.
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Definition 2.27 (IND-CCA2) The indistinguishability against adaptive chosen
ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) [RS91] is a strong standard security notion for the
PKE scheme. It can defined by the following game executed between a challenger C
and an adversary A.
• Setup. Taking the security parameter ` as input, C executes Setup(1`) to gen-
erate the public parameters params, then it sends parames to A.
• KeyGen. C also executes KeyGen(1`) to generate a secret-public key pair (sk, pk),
then it sends the public key pk to A.
• Phase 1. In this phase, A can query the decryption oracle adaptively multiple
times. When A submits a ciphertext CT to C, C responds A with the origin
message m when CT = Enc(param, pk,m), otherwise, it responds A with
nothing.
• Challenger. When A decides to complete the Phase 1, it randomly chooses
two messages m0 and m1 from the message space such that |m0| = |m1|, and
then submits them to C. Upon receiving the two messages, C randomly selects
b ∈ {0, 1} and computes CT ∗ = Enc(params, pk,mb). Finally, C sends the
challenge ciphertext CT ∗ to A.
• Phase 2. In this phase, A can still query the decryption oracle adaptively.
While the only restriction is that A cannot query the challenge ciphertext CT ∗
in this phase.
• Guess. A outputs its guess b′ on b and wins the game if b′ = b.
A PKE scheme is (T, q, ε(`))-indistinguishable against adaptive chosen ciphertext
attacks, or IND-CCA2 secure, if there exists no PPT adversary A making q decryp-
tion queries which can win the aforementioned game with non-negligible advantage,
that is,
AdvIND−CCA2A =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε(`),
where ε(`) is a negligible function with input ` and the advantage is taken over all
the randomness consumed in the game.
The indistinguishability against adaptive chosen plaintex attacks (IND-CPA) is an-
other security notion for PKE which is weaker than IND-CCA2. Those two models
are similar and the only difference between them is that A is not allowed to query
the decryption oracle in the IND-CPA game. Here, we omit the description of the
detail of this model and only give the conclusion.
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Definition 2.28 (IND-CPA secure) A PKE scheme is (T, ε(`))-indistinguishable
against adaptive chosen plaintext attacks, or IND-CPA secure, if there exists no PPT
adversary A which can win the aforementioned IND-CPA game with non-negligible
advantage, that is,
AdvIND−CPAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε(`).
Where A’s advantage is taken over all the random bits consumed in the aforemen-
tioned game.
2.4.6 Digital Signature
Similar to the handwritten signature which provides user authentication and non-
repudiation in our daily life, the digital signature, first proposed by Diffie and Hell-
man in [DH76], can provide those properties in the network communication. Explic-
itly, one user can authenticate itself to anyone by issuing a valid digital signature on
certain public message using its own signing key. Besides, when a signature on one
message is generated already, the signer of that signature cannot deny this behavior
forever.
Definition 2.29 (Digital Signature) Formalized by [GMR88], a digital signature
can be defined by the following four algorithms.
• Setup(1`). On input 1`, this setup algorithm outputs the public parameters
params.
• KeyGen(1`). Taking 1` as input, the key generation algorithm outputs a secret-
public pair (sk, pk).
• Sign(params, sk,m). The signature algorithm takes params, sk and a message
m chosen from the message space as input, and outputs a signature σ on m.
• Verify(params,m, pk, σ). On inputs params,m, pk, σ, the verification algo-
rithm outputs True if Sign(params,m, sk)→ σ, otherwise, it outputs False.




Verify(params,m, pk, σ)→ True KeyGen(1`)→ (sk, pk);
Sign(params, sk,m)→ σ.
 ≥ 1− ε(`)





Verify(params,m, pk, σ)→ False KeyGen(1`)→ (sk, pk);
Sign(params, sk,m)→ σ.
 < ε(`),
where ε(`) is a negligible function with input the security parameter ` and the prob-
ability is taken over all the random bits consumed in the scheme.
Definition 2.31 (EU-CMA) One basic security notion for the digital signature is
existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attacks (EU-CMA) [GMR88].
This security model can be formally defined by the following game executed between
a challenger C and an adversary A.
• Setup. Taking the security parameter ` as input, C executes Setup(1`) to gen-
erate the public parameters params, then it sends parames to A.
• KeyGen. C also executes KeyGen(1`) to generate a secret-public key pair (sk, pk),
then it sends the public key pk to A.
• Query. In this phase, A can query the signing oracle adaptively. When A
queries C with the message m, C executes Sign(params, sk,m) to generate a
signature σ on m and responds A with σ.
• Output. When A decides to complete the Query phase, it outputs a message-
signature pair (m∗, σ∗). A wins the game if Verify(params,m∗, pk, σ∗) →
True and m∗ has never appeared as queried message in the previous Query
phase.
A digital signature scheme is (T, q, ε(`))-existentially unforgeable against adaptive
chosen message attacks, or EU-CMA secure, if there eixsts no PPT adversary A
which can win the aforementioned game with non-negligible advantage, that is,
AdvEU−CMAA = Pr [Verify(params,m
∗, pk, σ∗)→ True] ≤ ε(`),
where the advantage of A is taken over all the random bits consumed in the game.
Definition 2.32 (SEU-CMA) There also exists a more strong security notion
named strongly existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message attack
(SEU-CMA) for digital signature scheme. It is defined by the following game exe-
cuted between a challenger C and an adversary A.
• Setup. Taking the security parameter ` as input, C executes Setup(1`) to gen-
erate the public parameters params, then it sends parames to A.
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• KeyGen. C also executes KeyGen(1`) to generate a secret-public key pair (sk, pk),
then it sends the public key pk to A.
• Query. In this phase, A can still query the signing oracle adaptively. Assuming
A queries the signing oracle q times, each time when it sends a message mi
chosen randomly from the message space to C, it gets a signature σi on mi as
response for i = 1, 2, · · · , q.
• Output. A outputs a message-signature pair (m∗, σ∗). A wins the game if
(m∗, σ∗) /∈ {(m1, σ1), (m2, σ2), · · · , (mq, σq)} and Verify(params,m∗, pk, σ∗)→
True.
A digital signature scheme is (T, q, ε(`))-strongly existentially unforeable against
adaptive chosen message attacks, or SEU-CMA secure, if there exists no PPT ad-
versary A which can win the above game with non-negligible advantage, that is,
AdvSEU−CMAA = Pr [Verify(params,m
∗, pk, σ∗)→ True] ≤ ε(`),
where the advantage of A is taken over all the random bits consumed in the game.
2.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the fundamental knowledge in cryptography includ-
ing basic notions, miscellaneous notations and general cryptographic tools which
are widely used throughout this thesis. For readers who still feel confusing with
the meaning of one certain notation or abbreviation when it is encountered in the
following chapters, they are more recommended to refer to the List of Notations or
List of Abbreviations part for a quick review. We will present our published works
one by by from the next chapter.
Part I
Communication Schemes with





It is critical to guarantee message confidentiality and user privacy in communica-
tion networks, especially for group communications. We find previous works seldom
consider the two aspects at the same time and some trivial solutions cannot remain
secure under strong security models. In order to address the aforementioned prob-
lem properly, we propose a privacy-preserving source-verifiable encryption scheme.
With our scheme, the sender can convince anyone of its legitimation among a set
of users chosen by itself without leaking its privacy. Moreover, only the intended
receiver can retrieve the original message and the identity of the sender from a given
ciphertext. Considering the security of our scheme, we define three security models
which capture the message confidentiality, the user privacy and the user imperson-
ation resistance respectively. We prove that our scheme maintains all the three
aforementioned properties under the random oracles model.
3.1 Introduction
There are many practical network scenarios where content of messages and privacy
of users should be protected concurrently during the communication. For example,
in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) [RLL09], due to the mobility of communi-
cation nodes and the nature of wireless communications, user privacy and message
confidentiality are essential requirements for mission critical communications. An-
other mobile scenario, where the above two security considerations should be taken
into account, is the mobile phone sensing application [ZCZ16]. In order to provide
customized services, a typical mobile sensing application may need to aggregate
sensitive information from users for analysis. A simple example is the health-care
sensing application which collects information including physical location, health in-
28
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dices such as weight, heart rate and blood pressure from users. Obviously, protecting
user privacy is the most important task for that application. Message confidentiality
and user privacy issues also exist in data mining systems [Zha08] and the on-line
navigation systems [CYHL14] during the user data collection stage. As shown above,
a solution which can address the message confidentiality and user privacy simulta-
neously is desirable in many real-life applications.
Preventing content of messages from being eavesdropped or modified can be
achieved using cryptographic tools such as encryption and digital signature. Also,
there are cryptographic primitives that can provide user privacy properly, such as
the ring signature [RST01], the group signature [ACJT00b], etc. It seems that our
problem can be solved by simply combining two cryptographic primitives which
provide the message confidentiality and user privacy respectively. However, below
we present an example to illustrate that maintaining the message confidentiality and
the user privacy at the same time is not a trivial task.
Assuming there is a ring signature scheme RIN and an IND-CCA2 secure en-
cryption scheme EN , where the signing and verification algorithms of the RIN are
denoted by Sig and Ver respectively, the encryption and decryption algorithms of the
EN are denoted by Enc and Dec respectively. Let the public key of the receiver be
pk and the signing key of user Ui as ski, then user Ui computes c1 = Encpk(m), c2 =
Sigski(c1), and sends the message tuple (c1, c2) to the receiver. According to the
properties provided by RIN and EN , any party within the group can compute
a ring signature and anyone can check the validity of this ring signature without
knowing the actual signer. In addition, it is hard for anyone to create a valid ring
signature on any message for any group without knowing a secret key which belongs
to a user of that group. It seems that this solution maintains the message confiden-
tiality and user privacy properties. However, such a scheme cannot achieve message
confidentiality in the IND-CCA2 model [BDPR98a]. When the challenge ciphertext
(c1, c2) is sent to the adversary, it can use another signing key skj of user Uj in the
ring to sign c1, which is the first component of the given challenge. That is, the
adversary generates c2
′ = Sigskj(c1). The adversary then gets a new tuple (c1, c2
′).
When it provides this tuple to the decryption oracle, it can definitely guess which
message is encrypted with probability 1 in the IND-CCA2 game. Hence, this solu-
tion cannot achieve IND-CCA2 security towards the message confidentiality. From
the above example, we can say that simply combining two schemes with message
confidentiality and user privacy cannot work.
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3.1.1 Related Work
To solve user privacy problems in ad hoc groups, Dodis, Kiavias, Nocolosi and Shoup
[DKNS04] proposed anonymous identification schemes in multi-user setting. Their
schemes allow participants from a user population to form ad-hoc groups, and then
prove membership anonymously in such groups. They also provided a formal model
for their scheme and designed a generic scheme based on any accumulator with one-
way domain as well as an efficient implementation of such accumulator based on
the Strong RSA Assumption. Their anonymous identification schemes have some
salient features, one of them is that their schemes can be generally and efficiently
amended in order to allow the recovery of the signer’s identity by an authority, if
it is desired. Besides, by using the Fiat-Shamir transformation, they also obtained
constant-size, signer-ambiguous group and ring signatures (provably secure in the
random oracle model) from their identification schemes.
In Eurocrypt 2015, Groth and Kohlweiss [GK15] constructed one-out-of-mangy
proofs to address the user privacy problem in multi-user environment. Their proof
is actually a 3-move public coin special honest verifier zero-knowledge proof, or
∑
-
protocol, for a list of commitments having at least one commitment that opens to
0. It is not required for the prover to know openings of the other commitments.
The proof system is efficient, particularly, in terms of communication requiring only
the transmission of a logarithmic number of commitments. The authors used their
proof system, by applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation, instantiate both ring
signatures and zerocoin, a novel mechanism for bitcoin privacy. They used the
proposed
∑
-protocol as a linkable ad-hoc group identification scheme where the
users have public keys where are indeed commitments and demonstrate knowledge
of an opening for one of the commitments to unlinkably identify themselves (once).
Some more concrete solutions to the user privacy problem can be found in
[RLL09, ZCZ16, Zha08, CYHL14]. In [RLL09], Ren et al. proposed a novel uncon-
ditionally secure source anonymous message authentication scheme (SAMAS) that
enables messages to be released without relying on any trusted third parties. While
providing source privacy, the proposed scheme also provided message content au-
thenticity. The author then proposed a novel communication protocol for MANET
that can ensure communication privacy of both communication parties and their
end-to-end routing. For solving user privacy issues in mobile phone sensing, Zhang,
Chen and Zhong [ZCZ16] presented an efficient protocol that allows an untrusted
data aggregator to periodically collect sensed data from a group of mobile phone
users without knowing which data belongs to which user. Assuming there are n
users in the group, their protocol achieved n-source anonymity in the sense that
the aggregator only learns that the source of a piece of data is one of the n users.
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Besides, they also considered a practical scenario where users may have different
source anonymity requirements and provided a solution based on dividing users
into groups. Zhan [Zha08] provided solutions for privacy-preserving collaborative
data mining problems, in particular, the author illustrated how to conduct privacy-
preserving naive Bayesian classification which is one of the data mining tasks. In
[CYHL14], Chim et al. made use of the idea of the anonymous credential to ensure
that all driver’s privacy cannot be breached.
We find the above works towards the user privacy problem seldom consider
keeping the message confidentiality property at the same time. Besides, almost
all the proposed solutions ensure no one in the system can compromise the users’
privacy. Privacy-preserving solutions of this kind would incur problems in reality.
One of the problems is that users can deny their previous behavior during the
communication for nobody can identify them, moreover, as the message receiver
cannot ascertain who is the actual sender, it is inconvenient for him to directly
send his message back to the sender securely when a response is needed. From what
we have discussed, we consider that the conditional user privacy-preserving property
should be more realistic in real-life applications, which means that a message sender’s
privacy can only be revealed by the intended message receiver.
The cryptographic primitive verification encryption is often used to deal with
privacy problems. After the notion of verifiable encryption was invented by Stadler
[Sta96], many concrete schemes have been constructed [BFPV11, Ate04, CS03b,
CD00, Bao00]. The verifiable encryption scheme can be used as a building block
to solve many problems, such as [HM12, Fuc10], where the realization of practical
revocable anonymous credentials using verifiable encryption was discussed. Also in
[GDM02, PCS03, TV09], the authors used verifiable encryption to solve variants of
the fair-exchange problem, and in [KPW97, CD00], verifiable encryption was applied
to build separable group signatures and signature sharing schemes. The verifiable
encryption can also be used in key escrow systems [Mao97] and file-sharing systems
[HP10] to provide desirable properties.
However, we cannot derive a solution from a verifiable encryption scheme for
the reason that, in a verifiable encryption scheme, we encrypt the identity of the
user rather than the message which we want to keep absolutely confidential. Besides,
when we extend the verifiable encryption into group setting by applying the one-out-
of-many proof system [GK15], we need to consider the impersonation attack where
an unauthorized user may masquerade as one member of the legitimated group.
3.1.2 Contribution
In this chapter, we make the following contributions.
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1. To maintain message confidentiality and user privacy concurrently, we propose
a privacy preserving source-verifiable encryption scheme. Our scheme provides
conditional privacy for message encryptors, which means that the message
encryptor’s identity cannot be disclosed by other users except the intended
receiver. We find this kind of user privacy is more practical in many real
applications. Besides, a prover can prove its legitimation in a set of users
chosen by itself. Our scheme is flexible and efficient when the size of the
chosen set is small.
2. Further, we analyze the security of our scheme in detail. For message confi-
dentiality, we prove our scheme is IND-CCA2 secure under the random oracle
model. Besides, we also define the security models for the user privacy and
impersonation resistance respectively, and prove that our scheme maintains all
the aforementioned security properties under our models.
3.1.3 Chapter Organization
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, we give the formal def-
inition of our privacy-preserving source-verifiable encryption scheme, we also define
three security models in this section for the purpose of proving the security of our
scheme. Our concrete construction of the scheme is presented in detail in Section
3.3. In Section 3.4, we prove the security of our scheme under the previously defined
models respectively. We also give a short discussion of a server-aided variant of our
scheme in Section 3.5. At the end of this chapter, we make our conclusion and point
out our future work.
3.2 Definitions and Security Models
Definition 3.1 (Privacy-preserving Source-verifiable Encryption) Our pri-
vacy preserving source-verifiable encryption scheme, consisting of a list of polynomial
time algorithms (Setup, Gen, Enc, Ver, Dec), is described as follows.
• Setup(1k): On input 1k, it outputs a system parameters PM. As PM is regarded
as default input to all the following algorithms, we omit it.
• Gen(·): For a user Ui, he runs the key generation algorithm, on input PM, to
get his unique identity IDi, a secret si and a public-private key pair (pki, ski).
Assuming all users’ identities and public keys can be distributed properly among
others in the group, Ui would finally get a user identity set ID and a public
key set PK.
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• Enc(m, IDi, si, pkj, IDi): For an encryptor who holds his own identity IDi
and an identity set ID, if he wants to send a message securely to Uj, he
first chooses a subset IDi from ID, note that IDi should include IDi and
|IDi| ≥ 2. Ui encrypts a message m chosen from the message space M by
executing the Enc algorithm, which takes (m, IDi, pkj, IDi) and IDi’s secret
si as inputs. Finally, the encryptor gets the ciphertext ct.
• Ver(ct): Everyone can be a verifier in our scheme upon knowing PM and receiv-
ing a ciphertext ct. The verification algorithm Ver is deterministic, after the
execution of it, a verifier outputs accept if ct satisfies certain rules, otherwise,
it outputs reject.
• Dec(ct, skj): The decryption algorithm should only be executed by the decrytor
and is also deterministic. Before the decryptor retrieves m and the encryptor’s
identity IDi from a given ciphertext ct, he first executes Ver to verify the
validity of it, and only when Ver outputs accept, the decryptor then continues
to decrypt ct.
We require that a privacy-preserving source-verifiable encryption scheme should have
the following three security properties: message confidentiality, user privacy and
user impersonation resistance. In order to capture those requirements, we define
the following three security models.
Definition 3.2 (Modified IND-CCA2) Setting the security parameter as k,
given our privacy-preserving source-verifiable encryption scheme, a polynomial n(·),
a PPT adversary A and a challenger S, let’s consider the following game played
between A and S:
• Setup: First, Setup, which takes 1k as input, is run by S to produce the system
parameter PM. Given a polynomial n(·), S runs Gen, with PM as input, n(k)
times. After all executions are properly finished, S gets a public key set PK, a
private key set SK, a user secret set S and an identity set ID, where |PK| =
|SK| = |ID| = |S| = n(k). The adversary A is given PM, ID and PK.
• Corruption phase: In order to make A more powerful, he is permitted to corrupt
users from the identity set ID. Namely, A can get the secret of a user after
taking the identity of that user as the queried message.
• Decryption phase 1: A can also ask decryption queries adaptively to S, when
A provides S a valid ciphertext, S needs to return the corresponding plaintext
of this ciphertext to A.
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• Challenge phase: A chooses two messages m0,m1 from M, two identities IDi,
IDj from ID as the sender and receiver’s identity respectively and a subset
IDi from ID such that IDi ∈ IDi, |IDi| ≥ 2. A then sends them to S.
Upon receiving those information, S randomly chooses a bit b from {0, 1} and
encrypts mb using the encryption algorithm of our scheme, which takes m,
IDi, secret si of IDi, pkj, IDi as inputs. The corresponding ciphertext is
given to A as the challenge ciphertext.
• Decryption phase 2: After receiving the challenge ciphertext, A can still query
the decryption oracle with the only restriction that the queried ciphertext must
be different from the challenge one.
• Guess phase: At the end of the game, A outputs the guess b′ from {0, 1} about
b. If b′ = b, then A succeeds in the game, otherwise A fails.
Remark: A is allowed to ask hash queries under the random oracle model.
According to the defined model, let Adv denote the probability that A wins the
above game over random guess, then Adv =
∣∣Pr [b′ = b]− 1
2
∣∣.
Definition 3.3 (User Privacy) Setting the security parameter as k, then given
our privacy-preserving source-verifiable encryption scheme, a PPT adversary A and
a challenger S, let’s consider the following game played by A and S:
• Setup phase: First, the algorithm Setup, which takes 1k as input, is run by S
to produce a system parameter PM. Given a polynomial n(·), S runs Gen, with
PM as input, n(k) times. After all executions are properly finished, S gets a
public key set PK, a private key set SK, a user secret set s and an identity
set ID, where |PK| = |SK| = |ID| = |s| = n(k). The adversary A is given
PM, ID and PK.
• Corruption phase: In order to make A more powerful, he is permitted to corrupt
users from the identity set ID. Namely, A can get the secret of a user after
taking the identity of that user as the queried message.
• ID extraction phase 1: When A makes such kind of query, he submits a cipher-
text to S, then he gets the identity of the original encryptor of the submitted
ciphertext when the queried ciphertext is valid, otherwise, he gets nothing.
• Challenge phase: A chooses one message m, a subset IDi, an identity IDj /∈
IDi as the receiver’s identity and sends them to S, S randomly chooses a index
inx from the indexes of the chosen subset IDi, and encrypts m by taking IDinx,
sinx, PKj of IDj and IDi as inputs. The corresponding ciphertext is given to
A.
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• ID extraction phase 2: After receiving the challenge ciphertext, A can still ask
ID extraction queries adaptively with the constraint that the queried ciphertext
must not be identical to the challenge one.
• Guess phase: At the end of the game, A outputs his guess inx′ from the indexes
of the chosen subset IDi about inx. If inx′ = inx, then A succeeds in the game,
otherwise A fails.
Remark: Under the random oracle model, A is allowed to ask hash queries.
According to the defined model, let Adv denote the probability that A wins the
above game over random guess, then Adv =
∣∣∣Pr [inx′ = inx]− 1|IDi| ∣∣∣.
Definition 3.4 (User Impersonation Resistance) Setting the security parame-
ter as k, then given our privacy-preserving source-verifiable encryption scheme, a
polynomial n(·), a polynomial probabilistic time (PPT) adversary A and a challenger
S, let’s consider the following impersonation game played by A and S:
• Setup phase: First, the algorithm Setup, which takes 1k as input, is run by S
to produce a system parameter PM. Given a polynomial n(·), S runs Gen, with
PM as input, n(k) times. After all executions are properly finished, S gets a
public key set PK, a private key set SK, a user secret set s and an identity
set ID, where |PK| = |SK| = |ID| = |s| = n(k). The adversary A is given
PM, ID and PK.
• Corruption phase: In order to make A more powerful, he is permitted to corrupt
users from the identity set ID. Namely, A can get the secret of a user after
taking the identity of that user as the queried message. Here let CID denote
the corruption set.
• Encryption query phase: In this phase, we denote the uncorrupted user set as
UID, while UID = ID − CID. The adversary A chooses a message m from
M, two identities IDi, IDj from UID as the sender and receiver’s iden-
tity respectively and a subset UID′ from UID such that IDi ∈ UID′, IDj /∈
UID′, |UID′| ≥ 2, and then sends them to S. After receiving those informa-
tion, S takes m, IDi, si,PKj,UID′ as inputs of the Enc algorithm and sends
the generated ciphertext ct to A.
• Forgery phase: In this phase, A chooses a message m∗, an identity ID∗j as the
receiver and a subset UID∗ of UID, then it tries to forge a corresponding valid
ciphertext ct∗. It is required that (m∗,UID∗) cannot appear in any previous
encryption query.
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If the forgery produced by A in the forgery phase can be accepted by the verification
algorithm of our scheme, then A wins this game. Let Adv denote the probability
that A wins the predefined game, then Adv = Pr[Ver(ct∗) = 1].
3.3 Our Privacy-preserving Source-verifiable En-
cryption Scheme
With our scheme, only a group of legitimated users can encrypt the message taking
the receiver’s public key, its own secret and a chosen identity subset as inputs. Also
this encryptor can prove his legitimation to others. Upon receiving the ciphertext,
which includes a proof of the encrytor’s identity, a verifier can verify the legitimation
of the source of this ciphertext without decrypting it. Only the decryptor can retrieve
the origin message and the identity of the user who encrypts this message from the
ciphertext.
Setting the security parameter as k, we give a concrete construction of our
privacy-preserving source-verifiable encryption scheme as follows:
• Setup(1k): On input 1k, it produces a cyclic group G of large prime order p
with generator g. This algorithm also outputs a description of the message
space M = {0, 1}q and a ciphertext space C. G, p, g,M, C are considered as
the system parameter PM and default inputs to all the following algorithms.
• Gen(·): For one user Ui, when executing Gen(·) which takes 1k as input, he
himself randomly chooses his own secret si and private key SKi = xi from Zp
respectively and keeps them unknown to others, Ui then calculates IDi = g
si
and PKi = yi = g
xi . Assuming the identity and public key of each user can
be distributed properly to all other users. Finally, Ui gets an identity set
ID = {ID1, . . . , IDn} and a public key set PK = {y1, . . . yn}, where n is the
number of members in the legitimated group. Each time when a new member
joins the group, ID, PK would be updated. Our scheme also applies three
collision-resistance hash functions: H1 : {0, 1}q ×G3 → Zp, H2 : G→ {0, 1}q,
H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp, where q denotes the length of the message.
• Enc(m, si, yj, IDi): When Ui wants to send a message m ∈ M to Uj, he
first chooses a identity subset IDi from ID. Note that IDi ∈ IDi, IDj /∈
IDi, |IDi| ≥ 2 should include his own identity. Ui takesm, si, PKj = yj, IDi
as inputs and does the following calculations:
r1
R←Zp, r2 = H1(m, gr1 , gsi , yr1j ),
C1 = g
r1 , C2 = g
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After (C1, C2, C3, C4) is generated, Ui executes the following procedures to
generate a proof:
– Ui chooses wi randomly from Zp and sets ai = gwi ,bi = ywij .
– For each identity, say gst , in IDi except gsi , Ui chooses ct, zt randomly
from Zp and sets at = gzt(gstC2)ct , bt = yztj (C3)ct .
– Ui sets c = H3(αi, βi, C1, C2, C3, C4), where αi = (. . . , ai, . . . , at, . . . ),
βi = (. . . , bi, . . . , bt, . . . ) and |αi| = |βi| = |IDi|.
– Ui sets ci = c −
∑
gst∈IDi except gsi
ct and zi = wi − ci(si + r2). Ui keeps the
tuple ({ci}, {zi}) where
{ci} = (. . . , ci, . . . , ct, . . . ), {zi} = (. . . , zi, . . . , zt, . . . ).
Ui appends the identity of the receiver, IDj, to IDi as its last element, and
then gets a new identity set IDij. Eventually, Ui gets the ciphertext ct =
(C1, C2, C3, C4, {ci}, {zi}, IDij).
• Ver(ct): A verifier executes the following verification algorithm to check the va-
lidity of a received ciphertext. In fact, everyone who holds the system parame-
ter PM can be a verifier. Upon receiving a ciphertext ct = (C1, C2, C3, C4, {ci},
{zi}, IDij), a verifier V does as follows:
– V first gets the subset IDi and the receiver’s identity IDj from IDij.
As V knows the public key set PK and user identity set ID, obviously,
he knows the corresponding public key yj of IDj, so he can re-compute
ai = g
zi(gsiC2)
ci as well as bi = y
zi
j (C3)
ci from {ci}, {zi}, C2, C3 for each
identity gsi ∈ IDi to get the two sets αi, βi.




– If all the above checks are successfully completed, then V can make sure
that the encryptor of the received ciphertext is a legitimated user. Oth-
erwise, the verifier rejects the received ciphertext.
• Dec(ct, xj): When given a ciphertext ct = (C1, C2, C3, C4, {ci}, {zi}, IDij), one
user can easily find out whether he is the intended receiver by checking the
last identity in IDij. Uj, after finding out he is the decryptor, would do as
follows:
– Uj first executes the verification algorithm Ver to check whether the given
ciphertext is generated by a legitimated user, if not, Uj rejects it, other-
wise Uj continues.
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– Uj computes w = C3
1
xj /C2 and checks whether w is listed in IDi. If not,
Uj rejects the ciphertext, otherwise he continues.
– Uj calculates m
′ = C4⊕H2((C1C2)xj) and then checks whether the equa-
tion C2 = g
h1(m′,C1,w,(C1)
xj ) holds, it not, Uj rejects the given ciphertext.
When all the above checks are successfully finished, Uj finally outputs w and
m′ as the sender’s identity and original message respectively.
3.4 The Security Proofs of Our Scheme
Theorem 3.1 Our privacy-preserving source-verifiable encryption scheme main-
tains message confidentiality under the previously defined modified IND-CCA2 model
assuming the DDH problem is hard in G when hash functions H1, H2, H3 are mod-
eled as random oracles. Concretely, if there is an adversary A which can break our
scheme with non-negligible probability ε, supposing A makes at most qH1,qH2,qH3
queries to the H1, H2, H3 hash oracles respectively, and qD queries to the decryption
oracle, then we can construct another algorithm B that solves the DDH problem in




)ε, where k is the security parameter and n is a
constant.
Proof. We show how to construct an algorithm B that solves the DDH problem by
interacting with an adversary A of our scheme under our predefined model.
• Setup phase: On input 1k, B runs the Setup algorithm of our scheme to pro-
duce system parameters PM which includes G, p, g,M, C. B is given a DDH
tuple (ga, gb, Z). For a given polynomial n(·), set n = n(k). B runs the
key generation algorithm Gen(·) n times, except that B sets PKj = ga for
a randomly chosen j ∈ [1, n] and does not have the corresponding private
key xj. Namely, B gets an identity set ID = {ID1, . . . , IDn}, a user secret
set s = {s1, . . . , sn}, a public key set PK = {PK1, . . . , PKn} and a private
key set SK = {x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xn}. B chooses three collision-resistance
hash functions: H1 : {0, 1}q × G3 → Zp, H2 : G → {0, 1}q, H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp
and sends them to A, H1, H2, H3 are fully controlled by B and are modeled as
random oracles. Finally, B gives A PM, ID and PK.
• Corruption queries: To make A more powerful, we first allow A to corrupt some
users of ID. Namely, when A wants to corrupt a user Ui of ID and sends IDi
to B, B needs to respond A with the corresponding secret si.
• H1-queries: A can issue queries to the hash function H1. In order to respond
those queries, B keeps a hash list H list1 .
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When A asks the hash value of the v-th message tuple < mv, grv1 , gsvx , yrv1i >,
where gsvx ∈ ID and yi ∈ PK. B checks whether this tuple has appeared
before, :
– If yes, B responds A with the record h1v = H1(mv, grv1 , gsvx , yrv1i ).
– Otherwise, B chooses a random value h1v from Zp, and sets this value as
the hash of the queried message tuple, B responds A with h1v and adds
this message and hash value pair to the H list1 . Further, B fills the third
column of this query row with value yh1vi y
rv1
i , B fills the forth column of
this query row with the symbol Φ, which denotes empty.
One row of H list1 should be like:
(mv, g





where v ≤ qH1 .
• H2-queries: A can also ask H2 hash queries. To answer this kind of query, the
algorithm B maintains a H list2 table which has two columns.
When the u-th query yru2j y
ru1
j is made, B checks whether this tuple has ap-
peared before:
– If yes, B responds A with the corresponding record h2j = H2(yru2j y
sux
j ).
– Otherwise, B chooses a random value h2u from {0, 1}q, where q is the
length of the message inM, and sets this value as the hash of the queried
message tuple, B responds with h2u and adds this message and hash value
pair to the H list2 .




Where u ≤ qH2 .




2 tables whenever H
list
1 or
H list2 is updated. The process of updating T3 is as follows:




j in the first
column of the H list2 table from the first to the last row.
– If the value yrv1i y
h1v
i in the third column of this new row is not empty and
there exists such a row in the H list2 that making the aforementioned two
values equal, then we replace the corresponding H2 hash value Φ in the
H list1 with the corresponding H2 value h2u in the H
list
2 . Further, we add
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such a row to the T3 table, and then delete the corresponding row from
the H list1 and also the H
list
2 .
– Otherwise, the three tables keep unchanged.





third column of the H list1 from the first to the last row.
– If yru2j y
ru1
j in the first column of the new row is not empty, and there
exists such a row in H list1 that making the aforementioned two values
equal, then we replace the corresponding H2 hash value Φ in the H
list
1
with the corresponding H2 value h2u in the H
list
2 . Further, we add such
a row to the T3 table, and then delete the corresponding row from the
H list1 and also the H
list
2 .
– Otherwise, the three tables keep unchanged.
....... ...... ...... ......
(mu, g





....... ...... ...... ......
(mf , g
rf1 , gsfx , y
rf1





We can maintain such a table T3 as below, where yi, yj ∈ PK and gsux , gsfx ∈
ID. We denote the size of T3 as |T3|
As the H1 query and H2 query can be asked in an interleaving manner, so,
each time when H list1 or H
list
2 is updated, T3 would be updated by executing
the previous procedures.
• H3- queries: A can ask H3 queries. B creates a hash table H list3 to respond
this kind of query. For the t-th query tuple (αt, βt, C1t, C2t, C3t, C4t), B acts as
following:
– B first check whether this tuple has appeared before, if yes, B responds
with the existing value h3t = H3(αt, βt, C1t, C2t, C3t, C4t) to A.
– Otherwise, B chooses a random value h3t from Zp , and sets it as the hash
value of the queried message tuple. B responds A with h3t and adds this
message and hash value pair to the H list3 .
• Decryption queries phase 1: A can make decryption queries adaptively to B. If
a queried cihpertext received by B is (C1w, C2w, C3w, C4w, {ci}w, {zi}w, IDij),
B would first check whether the intended receiver is the user of which B does
not know the private key, here the user with identity IDj, by extracting the
receiver’s identity from IDij:
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– If no, B knows the receiver’s private key, he can decrypt the given cipher-
text by using the Dec algorithm and return the corresponding plaintext
to A.
– If yes, as B does not know the receiver’s private key, B would use T3 and
H list3 to simulate the decryption process. B first executes the verification




∗ whether the tuple (αw, βw, C1w, C2w, C3w, C4w) has been asked in the
H3 phase;
∗ whether the H3 hash value of (αw, βw, C1w, C2w, C3w, C4w) equals to




If either of the above two checks fails, B rejects. Otherwise, B turns to
the following step,
Step 2.
B checks each row of the T3 table and tests whether there exists an i-th
row that can make the following four equations hold.
C1w = g




j , C4w ⊕mi = h2i, C2w = gh1i .
if B can find such a row satisfying the above equations, B outputs the
message mi which can be found in the first column of the T3 table. Oth-
erwise, B rejects this query.
Remark: We use the component (C2w, C3w, {ci}w, {zi}w) of the cipher-
text in step 1 checking, and the component (C1w, C2w, C3w, C4w) in step
2 checking, so we use all parts of the given ciphertest to simulate the
decryption process when we do not know the intended receiver’s private
key.
Remark: We should note that, when the intended receiver’s private key is
unknown to us, there may be some valid ciphertexts which would be rejected
by our aforementioned decryption simulator. Here a valid ciphertext means,
when it appears, the decryptor of our scheme can decrypt it correctly and
return a valid message, while our decryption simulator cannot.
Assuming there are qD decryption queries asked during the decryption phase 1
and decryption phase 2. According to the encryption algorithm of our scheme,
a ciphertext is not valid until it is generated after querying all the three hash
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functions, and obviously, this kind of ciphertext can definitely be decrypted by
our decryption simulator correctly. However, if at least one of the three hash
functions is not asked when producing a ciphertext, this ciphertext may still
have probability to be a valid one while our decryption simulator would reject
it, the probability that it is still a valid ciphertext is at most 1
2k
, where k is
the security parameter. Let us consider the event that at least one of the qD
queried ciphertexts is valid but is rejected by our decryption simulator. Let
symbol fail denotes this event and symbol r(i) denote the event that the i-th
queried ciphertext is rejected but actually is a valid one, where 1 ≤ i ≤ qD.
Then the probability of this event, Pr[fail], is:
Pr[fail] = Pr[r(1) ∪ r(2)∪, . . . ,∪r(qD)]




Namely, with probability at most qD
2k
, the decryption simulator would reject
valid ciphertext(s). That is, with probability at least 1 − qD
2k
, B would do a
perfection simulation in the decryption phases.
• Challenge phase: After the decryption queries are properly answered, A chooses
two messages m0,m1 fromM, two identities IDi, IDj from ID as the sender
and receiver’s identity respectively and a subset IDi from ID such that IDi ∈
IDi, |IDi| ≥ 2, then sends them to B. Upon receiving those information, B
would first check whether the receiver’s identity is IDj, that is, the one B
does not know the corresponding private key. If not, B aborts the game
and outputs a random bit, otherwise B randomly chooses c ∈ {0, 1} and
encrypts mc using the Enc algorithm of our scheme. Namely, B asks H1 query
about the message tuple (mc, g
b, gsi , Z) to get r∗2 , asks H2 query about the
message tuple Zy
r∗2
j to get h2, asks H3 query for the purpose of generating
the proof tuple ({ci}∗, {zi}∗), and sets the ciphertext as (gb, gr
∗
2 , ysij y
r∗2
j ,mc ⊕




2 = H1(mc, g
b, gsi , Z). B sends
the generated ciphertext to A as the challenge ciphertext. Then B adds the
message tuple ((mc, g
b, yA, Z), r∗2, Zy
r∗2 , h2∗) as a row to the T3 table.
• Decryption queries phase 2: In this phase, A can still ask decryption queries
with the only constraint that A cannot use the challenge ciphertext as one
of his queried messages. B answers the decryption queries using the same
procedures stated in the previous decryption queries phase 1.
• Guess phase: After the decryption queries phase 2 is finished, A would make
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a guess c′ ∈ {0, 1} about c, and sends his guess to B. B outputs 1 if and only
if c = c′, otherwise, it outputs 0.
Let’s consider the probability that our algorithm B would output 1, that is, A
succeeds in the previous game. We analyze this probability under the following two
different cases:
1. When Z 6= gab, easily, the probability Pr[c = c′] in this case should be 1
2
for
the reason that the challenger ciphertext is a random element from the view
of A, A cannot get any useful information from it.
2. When Z = gab and also the intended receiver’s identity is IDj, we find that
the challenge ciphertext produced by B is valid. According to our previous
analysis, our simulator would reject valid given ciphertext(s) with probability
at most qD
2k
during simulating the decryption process, which means that with
probability at least 1− qD
2k
, B would do a perfect simulation during the previous
game played by A and B. Also, with probability 1
n
, A would choose IDj as the
receiver’s identity. As A can break our scheme with non-negligible probability
ε, the challenge ciphertext is valid when the given tuple is a DDH tuple and















Theorem 3.2 Our privacy-preserving source-verifiable encryption scheme holds u-
ser privacy under the previously defined model assuming the DDH problem is hard
in G when hash functions H1, H2, H3 are modeled as random oracles. Concretely,
if there exists such an adversary A which can break our scheme with non-negligible
probability ε, supposing A makes at most qH1,qH2,qH3 queries to the H1, H2, H3 hash
oracles respectively, and qID ID extraction queries, then we can construct another





where n is a constant.
Proof. We show how to construct an algorithm B that solves the DDH problem
by interacting with A under our predefined model. For the sake of simplifying the
description of this proof, we omit the procedures identical to those in the previous
security proof.
• Setup phase: This phase is the same as that in the previous security proof.
• Corruption queries: This phase is also identical to the corruption phase in the
previous security proof, let CID denote the set including all the identities of
the corrupted users.
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• H1,H2,H3-queries: When answering those three hash queries, B does the same
as in the previous message confidentiality proof, so we omit them.
• ID extraction queries phase 1: This phase is almost the same as the decryp-
tion queries phase 1 described in the previous message confidentiality security
proof except that B returns the identity of the user who generates the given
ciphertext. From what we have discussed before, if B knows the private key
of the receiver of a given ciphertext, he can definitely return the encryptor’s
identity to A, when B does not know the receiver’s private key, he can still find
the encryptor’s identity because our simulated decryption process can return
plaintext and identity of the encryptor of a given ciphertext. In this phase,
we still need to calculate the probability that B would make a perfect decryp-
tion simulation. From the previous calculation in the proof of the message
confidentiality, we know that this probability is at least 1− qID
2k
.
• Challenge phase: After the ID extraction queries are properly answered, A
chooses one message m, an identity Uj as the receiver’s identity and a subset
SID of the set ID, assuming the number of elements in SID is u. A sends
them to B, B randomly chooses a index inx from the indexes of the chosen
subset SID, and encrypts m using the public key of Uj and the secret of the
sender who has the chosen index inx. B asks H1 query about the message tuple
(m, gb, gsinx , Z) to get r2∗ , asks H2 query about the message tuple Zy
r2∗
j to get
h2∗ . and encrypts m as (g
b, gr2∗ , ysinxj y
r2∗
j ,m⊕h2∗), B asks the H3 function for
the purpose of generating the proving tuple ({ci}∗, {zi}∗), B appends IDj to
SID as its last element and gets a new set SID∗. We represent the generated






4 , {ci}∗, {zi}∗,SID∗) for A. Then B adds the message
tuple ((m, gb, gsinx , Z), r2∗ , Zy
r2∗ , h2∗) as a row to the T3 table.
• ID extraction queries phase 2: In this phase, the algorithm B interacts with
A in the same way as we described in the decryption queries phase 2 of the
previous security proof.
• Guess phase: After finishing the ID extraction phase 2, A would make a random
index guess inx′ from the indexes of the chosen subset about the challenge
index inx, and sends his guess to B. Algorithm B outputs 1 if and only if
inx = inx′, otherwise, it outputs 0.
Let’s consider the probability that our algorithm B would output 1, that is, A
succeeds in the previous game. We assume the chosen subset SID has u identities,
we analyze this probability under the following two different cases:
1. When Z 6= gab, the probability Pr[inx = inx′] in this case should be 1
u
for the
reason that the challenger ciphertext is random from the view of A, A cannot
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get any useful information from it, the best choice for him is to make a random
guess.
2. When Z = gab and also the intended receiver’s identity is IDj, we can find that
the challenge ciphertext produced by B is valid. According to our previous
analysis, our simulator would reject valid given ciphertext(s) with probability
at most qID
2k
during simulating the ID extraction process, which means that
with probability at least 1 − qID
2k
, B would do a perfect simulation during
the previous game played by A and B. Also, with probability 1
n
, A would
choose IDj as the receiver’s identity. As A can break our scheme with non-
negligible probability ε, the challenge ciphertext is valid when the given tuple
is a DDH tuple and the receiver’s identity is IDj, in this condition, the prob-







As ε is non-negligible, B can determine whether the given tuple is a valid Diffie–





Theorem 3.3 Our privacy-preserving source-verifiable encryption scheme has user
impersonation resistance under the previously defined security model assuming the
DL problem is hard in G. That is, if there is an adversary A which can break our
scheme with non-negligible probability ε, then we can construct another algorithm





where p is the order of group G and n is a constant.
Proof. We show how to construct an algorithms B that solves the DL problem in G
by interacting with the adversary A under our previously defined model.
• Setup phase: On input 1k, B runs the Setup algorithm of our scheme to produce
system parameters PM which includes G, p, g,M, C. B is given a DL problem
instance (g, ga). For a given polynomial n(·), set n = n(k). B runs the
key generation algorithm Gen(·) n times, except that B sets IDj = ga for a
randomly chosen j ∈ [1, n] and does not have the corresponding user secret
sj. Namely, B gets an identity set ID = {ID1, . . . , IDn}, a user secret set
s = {s1, . . . , sj−1, sj, . . . , sn}, a public key set PK = {PK1, . . . , PKn} and a
private key set SK = {x1, . . . , xn}. B chooses three collision-resistance hash
functions: H1 : {0, 1}q × G3 → Zp, H2 : G → {0, 1}q, H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp
and sends them to A, H1, H2, H3 are fully controlled by B and are modeled as
random oracles. Finally, B gives A PM, ID and PK.
• Corruption phase: In order to make A more powerful, A is permitted to corrupt
some users of the given set ID with the only restriction that A cannot corrupt
the user with the identity ga. Namely, A can get the secret of certain user
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after submitting the identity of that user as the queried message. However,
when the queried message is ga, B abort. Let CID denote the set containing
all the identities of the corrupted users, the uncorrupted user set UID can be
expressed as UID = ID − CID.
• Encryption queries phase: In this phase, A can issue encryption queries for
multiple, say qe, times. For each query, A randomly chooses a message m, a
subset SID of the UID and a identity gsu from SID, and submits them to
B, B can then do the encryption for A and return the corresponding cipher-
text to A. We should notice that when B do the encryption, the three hash
functions H1, H2, H3 act the same as what we have described in our message
confidentiality proof. During this phase, we consider the following two cases:
– When gsu 6= ga, as B knows the corresponding secret sx of the chosen
identity, he can choose IDv satisfying IDv ∈ UID, IDv /∈ SID as the
receiver’s identity and easily generate a ciphertext (C1, C2, C3, C4, {ci},
{zi},SID′) and send it to the adversary A as the response.
– When gsu = ga, the given message is m, in order to respond this query,
B chooses an identity IDv satisfying IDv ∈ UID, IDv /∈ SID as the
receiver’s identity, and then does the following simulation:
r1
R←G,
r2 = H1(m, g








After (C1, C2, C3, C4) is generated, B executes the following procedures
with the inputs (C1, C2, C3, C4) and the system parameters PM to simu-
late a proof for this ciphertext.
∗ For each identity gsi in SID, B chooses ci,zi randomly from Zp
and sets ai = g
zi(gAiC2)
ci , bi = y
zi(C3)
ci , B gets four sets, {ai} =
(. . . , ai, . . . , au, . . . ),{bi} = (. . . , bi, . . . , bu, . . . ), {ci = (. . . , ci,
. . . , cu, . . . ), {zi} = (. . . , zi, . . . , zu, . . . )




∗ B returns ({ci}, {zi}) as the proof value.
B appends IDv to SID as its last element and still denotes this new user
set as SID. Eventually, B sends (C1, C2, C3, C4, {ci}, {zi},SID) to A as
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the response. We can easily find that such a cipher-text can pass the
verification algorithm of our scheme.
• Forgery phase: In this phase, A chooses a message m′ and a subset UID′ of













,UID′) be the forgery, then A sends this
forgery, m‘ and the subset UIDS ′ to B.
We assume this forgery can be accepted by the verification algorithm of our scheme
with probability ε. From the construction of our scheme, we can find that the














We consider the adversary algorithm A as a turning machine with random tape R′.
Now, for algorithm B, B rewinds the algorithm A with the same random tape R′,
that is, in the second time, B would do the same as A until the H3 query is asked
by A to generate the proof value in the forgery phase. According to the Forking
Lemma [PS96], if we give another different H3 response to A, A would generate
another valid tuple of proof values ({ci}∗, {zi}∗) with non-negligible probability. As
the same random tape R′ is used in the two rounds until the H3 response, the
generated ciphertexts should be the same after the execution of the two rounds.






















{zi}∗,UID′). Let |{ci}′| = |{ci}∗| = |{zi}′| = |{zi}∗| = |UID′| = l
From the conclusion given in [PS96], if the probability that A could make a correct
forgery is ε, then the probability that the forking lemma executes successfully should
be large than (ε− 1
p
)2, where p is the order of the chosen group G.


















3 6= H∗3 , definitely, there exists at least one index i such
that c
′
i 6= c∗i .
With probability 1
n
, we have IDj ∈ UID′ and c′j 6= c∗j , then we have
z
′
j = w − c
′
j(a+ r2j)
z∗j = w − c∗j(a+ r2j)




j − c∗j)−1 − r2j, where r2j can be found
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3.5 The Server-aided Variant of Our Scheme
According to our scheme, every involved parties needs to handle amount of mod-
ular exponentiation computations when executing the specified algorithms, which
restrains the scheme from being used by nodes with low capability. In order to
make our scheme more applicable to resource-constraint devices to which costly
computations such as modular exponentiations are unaffordable, we utilize the idea
of cut-and-choose technique and modify the scheme to a server-aided one. For the
ease of describing our server-aided variant, we first propose a server-aided modu-
lar exponentiation algorithm, our server-aided scheme simply takes the server-aided
modular exponentiation algorithm as subroutine.
3.5.1 The Server-aided Modular Exponentiation Scheme
Before describing our scheme, we assume the server is honest but curious. That
is, the sever behaves honest when do what the client tells it to do, but it also
wants to get more information than what the client gives it. Our server-aided
modular exponentiation scheme involves two parties, a client and server precisely,
and contains the following four polynomial time algorithms;
• SysSetup: Given a security parameter k as input, this algorithm outputs a
cyclic group G with large prime order q, where G is a subgroup of Z∗p, p is a
secure prime and q|p− 1.
• CPreCom: When a client is asked to compute Ua, where U ∈ G and a ∈ Z,
he first randomly chooses λ elements r1, r2, . . . , rλ ∈ Zp. For each element
ri in set {ri}, the client chooses l → {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, if l = 0, he copies ri
to a new set named CheckingSet, otherwise ri is kept intact. Additionally,
the client computes two elements rλ+1 = 1 −
∑
ri∈CheckingSet




ri mod p and then copies them to sets {ri}, CheckingSet re-
spectively. Finally, the client permutes {ri} randomly and gets another set
{r′i}
• SerCom: Upon receiving the message tuple (U, {r′i}), the server computes Ri =
U r
′
i for each r′i ∈ {r′i} and then sends sets {r′i}, {Ri} back to the client.




Ri and checks whether U = U




Ri, otherwise, the clients outputs a symbol
of false and drops the received values.
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3.5.2 Implementation Considerations of The Server-aided
Modular Exponentiation Scheme
Our server-aided modular exponentiation scheme embeds a subset sum problem,
which is defined previously, to make the result computing from the received val-
ues correct and checkable. That is, it enforces attackers to first solve the subset
sum problem when they intend to get more information from the transcript of the
interaction between the client and the server.
Form what we mentioned above, the first problem we need to consider is the
average number of times an attacker needed to solve a modified-Knapsack instance,
which is determined by parameter λ. Here we denote the average number of times
with the symbol NUM and assume the attacker only executes brute-force attack.
Assuming there are λ + 2 elements in set {ri} of our scheme and there are at least

















Clearly, when the security parameter is k, to make the brute-force attack infeasible,
the parameter λ should be chosen reasonably large, for example, as close as k.
After considering the choice of λ, we further evaluate the computational effi-
ciency of our scheme comparing to modular exponentiation computation without
server-aided technique. Assuming a client is trying to compute Ua using our server-
aided technique, the client still has to calculate (|CheckingSet|+1) times of multipli-
cation utilizing our scheme, form the previous scheme we can find the average value
of |CheckingSet| should be λ
6
. When a user uses the fast multiplication technique,
the range of the number of times of multiplication needed by the client should be
[|a| − 1, 2(|a| − 1)] where |a| denotes the length of a’s binary representation. Here,
the average value should be 3(|a|−1)
2
. Through simple comparison, we find our server-
aided modular exponentiation scheme should be more efficient as long as |a| > λ
9
,
and we think this condition is easy to satisfy in the implementation.
CHAPTER 3. PRIVACY PRESERVING SVE 50
3.5.3 The Security of The Server-aided Modular Exponen-
tiation Scheme
Our server-aided modular exponentiation scheme holds two security properties, cor-
rectness and checkability respectively. We declare that the security of our server-
aided modular exponentiation scheme is based on the subset sum problem. Here,
we give a sketch of the description of the proof.
Proof. Our proposed scheme can do checkable and correct modular exponenti-
ation assuming the subset sub problem is hard. Namely, if there is an adversary
A which can break our scheme with non-negligible probability ε in polynomial time,
then it can itself compute U1 from the two sets {r′i}, Ri with ε in polynomial time.




with probability ε in polynomial time. So given the set {r′i}, the target 1 and an
adversary A to our scheme, we can easily construct another PPT algorithm to solve
an instance of the subset sum problem with the same non-negligible probability ε as
that of A to our scheme. As the subset sum problem is NP-complete and there is no
PPT solution that can solve it, so our scheme is also secure.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we consider the problem of maintaining message confidentiality
and user privacy in communication networks. We show that achieving both security
properties simultaneously is not a trivial task if we aim to maintain a strong security
level for both properties. Moreover, we propose a new notion named conditional
privacy which requires that the intended receiver is able to recover the sender’s
identity. We argue that it is important in network communications when the receiver
wants to send a response to the sender. We define three security models to capture
the three security properties, message confidentiality, user conditional privacy and
user impersonation resistance respectively, and propose a concrete scheme that is
proven secure under the random oracle model.
We only considered the sender’s conditional privacy in this work. A natural
extension is to also consider the receiver’s conditional privacy. Here, by saying
receiver’s conditional privacy, we mean a message sender can convince others that
it is eligible to communicate with its corresponding communicator without leaking
the privacy of that user. We argue that this property is reasonably helpful when
where there may exist some access policies to prohibit some communication channels,





In this chapter, we first consider the message sender and receiver’s conditional pri-
vacy in a more complex scenario where there exists a communication blacklist. Un-
like the full privacy preservation problem, our conditional one ensures that the
message sender’s as well as the intended receiver’s privacy are well preserved while
their legitimation can still be publicly verified. Besides, the actual sender of a en-
crypted message can only be identified by the intended receiver. Furthermore, when
numbers of communication channels are blocked by the authority, we also address
the issue of proving the legitimation of the communication channel between a sender
and its intended communicator. To the best of our knowledge, previous works only
solve partial of our former problem and there exists no thorough solution capturing
our aforementioned two problems simultaneously. With this chapter, we present a
encryption scheme which keeps not only the transmitted message confidential but
also the user conditional privacy preserved, our scheme also empowers the message
sender the capability to give a proof of the legitimation of the communication chan-
nel. We provide several security models for our scheme and prove its security with
the help of the random oracle.
4.1 Introduction
Background. The security concerns of the public key encryption are mainly fo-
cused on the secrecy of the encrypted data. Some well studied security models,
indistinguishably, or non-malleability, under chosen plaintext, or ciphertext attacks
(IND/NM-CPA/CCA) [DDN91, GM84, RS91], are examples catering to different
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security requirements of the encrypted data. However, since encryption schemes
are deployed in various hostile environments, the user privacy preservation prob-
lem should be considered seriously when attackers are more interesting in the exact
parties participated in the communication.
In fact, the user privacy preservation problem have been the subject of for-
mal studies in cryptographic literature, for example, the primitives ring signature
[RST01] and group signature [CvH91] are ideal tools to protect one message sender’s
privacy while still keeps it authenticated. In the area of basic public key encryption
(PKE), since the sender privacy preservation is thought to be an inherent prop-
erty, literature related to user privacy preservation are mainly about key-privacy
[BBDP01], or anonymity, which are notions the same as the receiver privacy preser-
vation property mentioned here. In this chapter, we particularly show our interest
on the user conditional privacy preservation property in PKE, which is different
from the conventional one. The conditional privacy preservation notion keeps not
only the privacy of the message sender but also its communicator well preserved.
Furthermore, it also ensures that the legitimation of both the message sender and
the receiver can be publicly verified. Besides, it also requires that only the intended
message receiver of a ciphertext can discover the actual message sender.
Apart from that, We take one step further by considering a more complex sce-
nario where the authority is allowed to block communication channels between spe-
cific message senders and receivers, and those blocked channels are publicly pub-
lished as blacklist by the authority. Under such condition, the message sender
should be empowered with capability to prove the legitimation of the communica-
tion channel between it and its communicator without leaking their privacy.
There exists primitive which can solve partial of our former problem. For exam-
ple, the ring signcryption [HSMZ05b] can keep the transmitted message confidential
and the legitimation of the message sender publicly verified but cannot maintain the
conditional privacy preservation property of the message receiver. However, there
is no thorough solution tackling all the two aforementioned problem properly.
Our Contribution. In this chapter, we present a group-based source-destination
verifiable encryption scheme with blacklist checking. Our solution utilize the zero-
knowledge proof of membership and also zero-knowledge of inequality technique to
handle the two previously mentioned problem respectively.
Considering the security concerns of our scheme, we define three security mod-
els, which capture the message confidentiality, the sender privacy preservation, the
receiver privacy preservation accordingly. We then give security proofs under our
predefined models with the help of the random oracle.
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Related Work. Among all the existed primitives, the most promising one related
to our problem is the ring signcryption, which was first proposed by Huang et al.
[HSMZ05b]. As it inherits properties from both the ring signature [RST01] and
public key encryption, this primitive provides anonymity, authenticity of the sender
along with the message confidentiality. Following works [DC06] of this primitive also
consider protecting the receiver’s privacy in the multi-recipient setting. Although
some ring signcrypiton schemes have been proven to be insecure latter, this primitive
remains to be a potential candidate when deals with problems about maintaining
message confidentiality and user privacy simultaneously. However, because of the
inherent property of the ring-based construction, this primitive always considers the
complete anonymous of the message sender rather than the user conditional privacy
preservation.
The user conditional privacy preservation is a more practical and attractive re-
search problem in real world applications comparing to the complete privacy preser-
vation and many existing works have considered it in some concrete scenarios. In
[LLZ+08], the authors addressed the issue on anonymous authentication for messages
with traceability between the on-board-units (OBUs) and roadside units (RSUs) in
vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), this conditional privacy preservation protocol
relies on the authority to trace the origin of the authenticated messages. Another
similar authentication with conditional privacy example can be found in [HBCC13],
where the authors considered not only user conditional privacy but forward user
revocation in wireless networks. In [ELO13], pseudonym techniques are used to
construct conditional privacy preservation methods protecting the privacy of users
in the NFC electronic payment environment.
The receiver privacy preservation, or key-privacy, problem was first formalized
by M. Bellare et al. in [BBDP01] and latter extended in [ABC+08]. In their paper,
the receiver’s privacy means that an eavesdropper, even in possession of a given
ciphertext and a list of public keys, can not tell which specific key is the one used
to generate the given ciphertext, this is the reason why they call this property key-
privacy or anonymity. The authors define practical security models about the key-
privacy and further state that although some classical encryption schemes, such as
the El Gamal scheme [Gam85] and the Cramer-Shoup scheme [CS98b], have already
provided such key-privacy property, encryption schemes with careless construction,
especially for those schemes with ciphertexts including the receivers’ public keys
such as broadcast encryption [GSY99], still cannot hold this requirement. Key-
privacy requirement is always considered in multi-receiver settings where multiple
intended receivers are conventionally included in the generated ciphertext for the
benefit that they can be easily identified by the message sender. In [HCW13] and also
[ZM15], the authors discussed key-privacy in multi-receiver encryption scheme and
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used extended receiver sets which include users who are not the intended receivers
to hide the real receiver set. The anonymous broadcast encryption in [BBW06] is
the first work considering receiver’s privacy in broadcast encryption schemes, where
a broadcast encryption scheme was constructed achieving anonymity and IND-CCA
security against static adversaries from a key-private, IND-CCA secure PKE scheme,
however, their technique is only analyzed in Random Oracle Model. Latter, Libert
et at. in [LPQ12] propose an anonymous broadcast encryption scheme with adaptive
security in the Standard Model.
Chapter Organization. The rest of Chapter 4 is organized as follows: Section 4.2
presents the formal definition of our source verifiable conditional privacy preserving
encryption scheme, this part also defines four security models for the purpose of
proving the security of our scheme. Our concrete construction of the scheme is
presented in detail in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we prove the security of our scheme
under the previously defined models respectively. At the end of this chapter, we give
a conclusion and describe our future work.
4.2 Definitions and Security Model
4.2.1 Definition of the GSVEBC
In a group-based source-destination verifiable encryption with blacklist checking
(GSVEBC) scheme, there are three types of participants, the message sender, ver-
ifier and receiver, involved. The sender creates and sends encrypted messages, or
ciphertexts, to its intended receivers, the verifier is a party which holds some block
rules, and it is the verifier that can verify whether a given ciphertext comes from
a given legitimated sender set and goes to a given legitimated receiver set without
knowing the exact sender and receiver of that ciphertext. Besides, the verifier can
also check whether the communication channel between the sender and receiver of
a given ciphertext is blocked basing on the its block rules, also without knowing
both of them. The receiver of a ciphertext is the only party who can decrypt that
ciphertext and recover the original message. We give a definition of our GSVEBC
scheme as follows;
Definition 4.1 (GSVEBC) A group-based source-destination verifiable encryp-
tion scheme with blacklist checking (GSVEBC) scheme consists of the following
polynomial time algorithms.
• Setup(1k): Taking 1k as input, this algorithm outputs the public parameter PM.
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• KeyGen(PM): For each user, this algorithm, on input PM, outputs a public key
pair (pk, sk). In order to make the notation more clear, let (pks, sks) denotes
a sender’s key pair and (pkr, skr) be a receiver’s key pair.
• Enc(PM,m, sks, pkr,PKS,PKR): This polynomial time algorithm can be exe-
cuted by every message sender. Given a message m,PM, two users’ public key
sets PKS,PKR, the message sender’s private key sks and the receiver’s public
key pkr, this algorithm outputs a GSVEBC ciphertext C.
• Ver(PM, C): The verification algorithm is deterministic. Taking PM and a
given PKESDVBRC ciphertext C as inputs, that algorithm would first check
whether the ciphertext comes from a given legitimated sender set and is sent
to a given legitimated receiver set. Note that the given legitimated sender and
receiver set can be included in the ciphertext C. After that, this algorithm
can also check whether the communication between the sender and receiver of
that given ciphertext C is permitted according to the block rules, which may
be included in PM or can be given by an authority to the verifier separately.
This algorithm returns a symbol ”True” if and only if all the above checks
are successfully complete, otherwise, it returns a symbol ”False”. For privacy
consideration, this algorithm is executed without the knowledge of the exact
sender and receiver of the ciphertext C.
• Dec(PM, C, skr): The decryption algorithm Dec is deterministic and executed
by the intended receiver. When a receiver gets C, he would first execute the
previous verification algorithm Ver, if Ver returns ”False”, he just drop this
message. Otherwise, the receiver executes Dec, which takes PM, C and the
receiver’s private key skR as inputs, and recovers the original message m.
Definition 4.2 (Message Confidentiality) To capture the message confidential-
ity property, considering the following game between a simulator S and an adversary
A:
• Setup phase: At the setup phase, the Setup algorithm of the scheme, which
takes 1k as input, is first run by S to produce the system parameter PM. Given
a polynomial n(·), S runs KeyGen, with PM as input, n(k) times. After all
executions are properly finished, S gets a public key set PK, a private key set
SK, where |PK| = |SK| = n(k). The adversary A is given PM and PK.
• Decryption phase 1: A can also ask decryption queries adaptively to S. That
is, when A provides S a valid ciphertext, S needs to return the corresponding
plaintext of this ciphertext to A.
CHAPTER 4. GBSD 56
• Challenge phase: A chooses two messages m0,m1 fromM, two public keys pks,
pkr from PK as the sender and receiver’s public key respectively, two subsets
PKS,PKR from PK such that pks ∈ PKS, pkr ∈ PKR, |PKS| ≥ 2, |PKR| ≥ 2,
and then sends them to the simulator. Upon receiving those information, S
randomly chooses a bit b from {0, 1} and encrypts mb using the encryption
algorithm of our scheme, which takes mb, sks,pkr,PKS,PKR as inputs. After
that, the generated ciphertext is given to A as the challenge ciphertext.
• Decryption phase 2: After receiving the challenge ciphertext, A can still query
the decryption oracle adaptively with the only restriction that the queried ci-
phertext must be different from the challenge one.
• Guess phase: At the end of the game, A outputs the guess b′ from {0, 1} about
b. If b
′
= b, then A succeeds in the game, otherwise A fails.
Remark: A is allowed to ask hash queries under the random oracle model.
According to the defined model, let AdvIND-CCAA denote the probability that A wins
the above game over random guess, then
AdvIND-CCAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [b′ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣
Definition 4.3 (Sender Anonymity) Setting the security parameter as k, then
given our scheme PKESDVBRC=(Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Ver, Dec), a polynomial n(·),
a polynomial probabilistic time (PPT) adversary A and a simulator S, let’s consider
the following game, which captures the sender privacy property, played by A and S:
• Setup phase: At the setup phase, the Setup algorithm of the scheme, which
takes 1k as input, is first run by S to produce the system parameter PM. Given
a polynomial n(·), the simulator runs KeyGen, with PM as input, n(k) times.
After all executions are properly finished, S gets a public key set PK, a private
key set SK, where |PK| = |SK| = n(k). The adversary A is given PM and
PK.
• Sender extraction phase 1: When A makes such kind of query, he submits a
ciphertext to S, then he gets the public key of the original encryptor of that
ciphertext when it is valid, otherwise, he gets nothing.
• Challenge phase: A chooses one message m from M, pkr from PK as the
receiver’s public key and two subsets PKS,PKR from PK such that pkr ∈
PKR, |PKS| ≥ 2, |PKR| ≥ 2, then sends them to S, S randomly chooses a
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public key pks from the chosen subset PKS, and encrypts m by taking pks,
sks,pkr, PKS,PKR as inputs. The corresponding ciphertext is given to A as
challenge ciphertext.
• Sender extraction phase 2: After receiving the challenge ciphertext, A can still
ask sender extraction queries with the only constraint that the queried cipher-
text must not be identical to the challenge one, and the simulator behaves the
same as in the sender extraction phase 1.
• Guess phase: At the end of the game, A outputs his guess pk′s about the public
key of the sender from the chosen subset PKS. If pk′s = pks, then A succeeds
in the game, otherwise A fails.
Remark: Under the random oracle model, A is allowed to ask hash queries.
According to the defined model, let AdvSender-AnonymityA denote the probability that A
wins the above game over random guess, then
AdvSender-AnonymityA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [pk′s = pks]− 1|PKS|
∣∣∣∣ ,
where |PKS| represents the size of the subset PKS
Definition 4.4 (Receiver Anonymity) Setting the security parameter as k, then
given our scheme PKESDVBRC=(Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Ver, Dec), a polynomial n(·),
a PPT (polynomial probabilistic time) adversary A and a simulator S, let’s consider
the following game, which captures the receiver privacy property, played by A and
S:
• Setup phase: At the setup phase, the Setup algorithm of the scheme, which
takes 1k as input, is first run by S to produce the system parameter PM. Given
a polynomial n(·), the simulator runs KeyGen, with PM as input, n(k) times.
After all executions are properly finished, S gets a public key set PK, a private
key set SK, where |PK| = |SK| = n(k). The adversary A is given PM and
PK.
• Receiver extraction phase 1: In this phase, when A submits ciphertext to S,
S needs to send back the public key of the receiver of that ciphertext to A as
response when it is valid. Otherwise, A gets nothing.
• Challenge Phase: In the phase, A randomly chooses a message m from M,
pks as the sender’s public key and two public key sets PKS, PKR such that
pks ∈ PKS, |PKS| ≥ 2, |PKR| ≥ 2. A then sends those information to S. S
randomly chooses pkr ∈ PKR as the receiver’s public key and encrypts message
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m using algorithm Enc, which takes m, sks, pks, pkr,PKS,PKR as inputs. S
sends the generated ciphertext as response to A.
• Receiver extraction phase 2: After the challenge phase, A can still ask S to
extract the public key of the receiver of a valid ciphertext for him adaptively,
the only restriction is that A cannot use the challenge ciphertext as a queried
message in this phase.
• Guess phase: At the end of the game, A would make a guess pk′r about the
receiver’s possible public key from the subset PKR. If pk′r = pkr, then A
succeeds in the game, otherwise A fails.
Remark:A is allowed to ask hash queries under the random oracle model.
According to the defined model, let AdvReceiver-AnonymityA denote the probability that
A wins the above game over random guess, then
AdvReceiver-AnonymityA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [pk′r = pkr]− 1|PKR|
∣∣∣∣ ,
where |PKR| represents the size of the chosen subset PKR.
4.3 Our Concrete Construction
We first give a group-based source-destination verifiable encryption scheme but with-
out blacklist checking, then we extend this scheme to one with blacklist checking.
4.3.1 A Simple Construction without Blacklist Checking
Setting the security parameter as k, our scheme works as follows;
• Setup(1k): On input 1k, it produces a cyclic group G of large prime order q
with generator g, where G is a subgroup of Z∗p and q|p − 1. This algorithm
also outputs a description of the message spaceM = {0, 1}q and a ciphertext
space C. G, q, g,M, C are considered as the system parameter PM and default
inputs to all the following algorithms. PM also includes two collision resistance
hash functions: H1 : {0, 1}q ×G3 → Zq, H2 : G→ {0, 1}q.
• KeyGen(·): For one user, Ui for example, he randomly chooses xi ∈ Zq as
his private key and computes yi = g
xi ∈ G as his corresponding public key.
Assuming the public key set PK contains all user’s public key.
• Enc(m, sks, pkr,PKS,PKR): When a sender, Ui, wants to send a message
to a receiver, Uj, for the purpose of illustrating our scheme more clear, lets
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Si,Ri denotes the sender Ui and receiver Uj’s secret key sks, skr respectively,
accordingly, the sender and receiver’s public key should be pks = g
Si and
pkr = g




r1 , C2 = g
Si·r1 , C3 = g
Rj ·r1 , C4 = g
Rj ·Si
r2 = H1(m, g
Si , gRj , C1, C2, C3, C4), C5 = g
r2 ,
C6 = m⊕H2(gRj ·(r1+r2)).
After that, the sender chooses a subgroup PKS ⊂ PK, which includes the
sender’s public key gSi , and then prove its legitimation in that group. Here,
we utilize the zero-knowledge proof to deal with the group membership issue.
That is, the sender needs to do a proof like:
pf(Si : logg g
Si = logC1 C2 = loggr1 (g
Si)r1 ∧ gSi ∈ PKS).
To do such a proof, the sender does as follows;
– For each public key gxl ∈ PKS except gSi , the sender chooses challenge
and response cl, zl randomly from Zq respectively, then it computes two
commitments
αl = g
zl(gxl)cl , βl = (C1)
zl(C2)
cl .
– For the sender’s own pubic key gSi , it chooses wi ∈ Zq and sets the
commitments as
αi = g
wi , βi = (C1)
wi .
Let {α} denote commitments set {. . . αl . . . αi . . . } and {β} denote com-
mitments set {. . . βl . . . βi . . . }, where |α| = |β| = |PKS|. The sender
computes its challenge and response as:




cl, zi = wi − ciSi.
– The sender sets the challenges set as {c} = {. . . ci . . . cl . . . } the responses
set as {z} = {. . . zi . . . zl . . . }, and value this two sets {c}, {z} as the proof
value.
The sender needs still to prove to the verifier that the generated ciphertext
goes to a legitimated receiver. To do this, the sender chooses a receiver subset
PKR ⊂ PK, which includes the receiver’s public key and have to do a proof
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like:
pf(r1 : logg C1 = loggRj C3 ∧ g
Rj ∈ PKR),
the sender generates the proof as follows;
– For each public key gxt ∈ PKR except the intended receiver’s public key
gRj , the sender chooses challenge and response ĉt, ẑt randomly from Zq
respectively, then it computes two commitments
α̂t = g
ẑt(C1)
ĉt , β̂t = (g
xt)ẑt(C3)
ĉt .
– For the intended receiver’s pubic key gRj , it chooses ŵj ∈ Zq and sets the
commitments as
α̂j = g
ŵj , β̂j = (g
Rj)ŵj .
Let {̂α} denote commitments set {. . . α̂t . . . α̂j . . . } and {̂β} denote com-
mitments set {. . . β̂t . . . β̂j . . . }, where |{̂α}| = |{̂β}| = |PKR|. The sender
computes its challenge and response as:
ĥ = H3({̂α}, {̂β}, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6), ĉj = ĥ−
∑
gxt∈PKR
ĉt, ẑj = ŵj− ĉjr1
– The sender sets the challenges set as {̂c} = {. . . ĉj . . . ĉt . . . } the responses
set as {̂z} = {. . . ẑj . . . ẑt . . . }, and value this two sets {̂c}, {̂z} as the proof
value.
After the two proofs are finished, the final ciphertext should be CT = (C1, C2,
C3, C4, C5, C6,PKS, {c}, {z},PKR, {̂c}, {̂z}).
• Ver(CT ): Every user can act as the verifier. Upon receiving a given ciphertext
like the above format CT = (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6,PKS, {c}, {z},PKR, {ĉ},
{ẑ}), a verifier does the following steps to verify the validity of the ciphertext:









cl for each gxl ∈ PKS
and gets two sets {α′} = {. . . α′l . . . }, {β
′} = {. . . β ′l . . . }, then it checks
whether the equation
H3({α
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holds. If no, it returns a symbol of false and drops this ciphertext, oth-
erwise it continues to the next step.




ĉt , β̂′t = (g
xt)ẑt(C3)
ĉt for each gxt ∈ PKR.
Then it gets two sets
{̂α′} = {. . . α̂′t . . . α̂′j . . . }, {̂β′} = {. . . β̂′t . . . β̂′j . . . }.
The verifier finally checks whether the equation




holds. If no, the verifier returns a symbol of false and drops this cipher-
text, otherwise it returns a symbol of true relay this ciphertext to the
receiver set.
• Dec(CT,Rx): This decryption algorithm are executed by all the possible re-
ceivers of a given ciphertext. When given a copy of the ciphertext CT =
(C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6,PKS, {c}, {z},PKR, {̂c}, {̂z}), all possible receivers in
set PKR do as following:
– All possible receivers in PKR would first execute the verification algo-
rithm Ver of our scheme as a subroutine. If Ver returns false, they drop
CT and returns a symbol of failure, otherwise they continue to the next
step.
– Each user Ux in PKR uses its secret key Rx to check whether equation
CRx1 = C3 holds. If not, it drops CT and returns a symbol of failure,
otherwise, this user goes to the next step.
– For each of the users whose secret key satisfying the above equation, it
first gets the public key, which is denoted by gs
′
, of the original sender of





then it recover the encrypted message, denoted by m′, as
m′ = C6 ⊕H2((C1C5)Rx).
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Table 4.1: The Blocklist
< . , . >
< gS, gR >
< . , . >
After getting gs
′





holds, if yes, this user outputs gs
′
as the public key of the message sender
and m′ as the original message. Otherwise, this user drops CT and
returns a symbol of failure.
4.3.2 Our Concrete Construction with Blacklist Checking
Basing on the former scheme, We give another construction to empower our scheme
with blacklist checking capability. Here, for simplicity, a block rule can be expressed
as < pks, pkr >, where the former one is one specific sender’s and the other is one
specific receiver’s public key respectively, and is used to disable the communication
from one message sender to one receiver. Assuming the blacklist, BL for short,
includes several block rules and is publicly accessible, our scheme assures that a
verifier can check whether a given ciphertext should be rejected according to the
BL.
By applying the technique of zero-knowledge proof of inequality of two discrete
logarithms, which was proposed in [CS03a], we find a way to extend our original
scheme to a scheme with blacklist checking, which only add a set of proof values to
the original one. Because those two schemes are pretty similar, we only give explicit
description of the most different part between them.
Our public key encryption scheme with source-destination verifiability and block
rules checking (PKESDVBRC) consists of the following polynomial time algorithms.
• Setup(1k): This algorithm acts the same as the previous scheme.
• KeyGen(·):This algorithm is also identical to the aforementioned scheme.
• Enc(m, sks, pkr,PKS,PKR): Apart from the encryption process of the encryp-
tion scheme of the previous scheme, here the sender also needs to generate a
proof to convince the verifier that the generated ciphertext should not be
blocked according to the block rules. Assuming there is a blacklist like fol-
lows;
For each block rule, < gS, gR > for example in Table 4.1, in the blacklist, the
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message sender needs to prove that a ciphertext does not come form a user
with identity gS or go to a user with identity gR. That is, according to our
scheme, the message sender should produce a proof
pf((Si, r1) : logC1 C2 6= logg g
S ∨ logg C1 6= loggR C3)
for this rule. Assuming there is a message sender with identity gSi and one
ciphertext generated by that sender is sent to a receiver with identity gRj , the
message sender generates such a proof pf for that ciphertext basing on the
following different types of ciphertext;
– If logC1 C2 = logg g
S and logg C1 6= loggR C3, that is gSi = gS and gRj 6=
gR:
∗ The message sender chooses δ randomly from Zp and sets γ = Si · δ,
then it tries to give a proof like
pf((γ, δ) : St0 = g
γ/(gS)δ 6= 1 ∨ St1 = (gr1)γ/(gSir1)δ = 1).
As the above proof is to release the truth that gSi 6= gS, so the
message sender needs to simulate such a proof. That is, the message
sender first chooses a challenge CH ∈ Zq and two responses e0, e1 ∈
Zq respectively, and sets the two commitments
COM0 = St0
CH(g)e0/(gS)e1 , COM1 = St1
CH(gr1)e0/(gSir1)e1 .
∗ The message sender chooses δ̂ randomly from Zp and sets γ̂ = r1 · δ̂,
then gives a real proof
pf((γ̂, δ̂) : Ŝt0 = (g
R)γ̂/(gRjr1)δ̂ 6= 1 ∨ Ŝt1 = (g)γ̂/(gr1)δ̂ = 1).
That is, the message sender first chooses two elements ŵ0, ŵ1 ∈ Zq
and computes the two commitments
ĈOM0 = (g
R)ŵ0/(gRjr1)ŵ1 , ĈOM1 = (g)
ŵ0/(gr1)ŵ1 .
The sender then computes a hash value
X = H3(COM0, COM1, ĈOM0, ĈOM1)
and sets the challenge of this proof as ĈH = X − CH, the two
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responses should be
ê0 = ŵ0 − ĈH × γ̂, ê1 = ŵ1 − ĈH × δ̂
respectively.
∗ After all the required values are properly computed, let pf denote
the proof values, then
pf = (St0, St1, CH, e0, e1, Ŝt0, Ŝt1, ĈH, ê0, ê1).
– If logC1 C2 6= logg g
S and logg C1 = loggR C3, that is g
Si 6= gS and gRj =
gR:
∗ The message sender chooses δ̂ randomly from Zp and sets γ̂ = r1 · δ̂,
and it tries to give a proof like
pf((γ̂, δ̂) : Ŝt0 = (g
R)γ̂/(gRjr1)δ̂ 6= 1 ∨ Ŝt1 = (g)γ̂/(gr1)δ̂ = 1).
As the above proof is to release the truth that gRj 6= gR, so the
message sender needs to simulate such a proof. That is, the message
sender first chooses a challenge ĈH ∈ Zq and two responses ê0, ê1 ∈
Zq respectively, and sets the two commitments
ĈOM0 = Ŝt0
ĈH
(gR)ê0/(gRjr1)ê1 , ĈOM1 = Ŝt1
ĈH
(g)ê0/(gr1)ê1 .
∗ The message sender chooses δ randomly from Zp and sets γ = Si · δ,
then it gives a proof
pf((γ, δ) : St0 = (g)
γ/(gS)δ 6= 1 ∨ St1 = (gr1)γ/(gSir1)δ = 1).
That is, the message sender first chooses two elements w0, w1 ∈ Zq
and computes the two commitments
COM0 = (g)
w0/(gS)w1 , COM1 = (g
r1)w0/(gSir1)w1 .
The sender then computes a hash value
X = H3(COM0, COM1, ĈOM0, ĈOM1)
and sets the challenge of this proof as CH = X − ĈH, the two
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responses should be
e0 = w0 − CH × γ, e1 = w1 − CH × δ
respectively.
∗ After all the required values are properly computed, let pf denote
the proof values, then
pf = (St0, St1, CH, e0, e1, Ŝt0, Ŝt1, ĈH, ê0, ê1)
– If logC1 C2 6= logg g
S and logg C1 6= loggR C3, that is gSi 6= gS and gRj 6=
gR:
∗ The message sender chooses δ randomly from Zp and sets γ = Si · δ,
then it gives a proof like
pf((γ, δ) : St0 = (g)
γ/(gS)δ 6= 1 ∨ St1 = (gr1)γ/(gSir1)δ = 1).
That is, the message sender first chooses two elements w0, w1 ∈ Zq
and computes the two commitments
COM0 = (g)
w0/(gS)w1 , COM1 = (g
r1)w0/(gSir1)w1 .
The sender then chooses a challenge of this proof CH ∈ Zq, the two
responses should be
e0 = w0 − CH × γ, e1 = w1 − CH × δ
respectively.
∗ The message sender chooses δ̂ randomly from Zp and sets γ̂ = r1 · δ̂,
then it gives a proof like
pf((γ̂, δ̂) : Ŝt0 = (g
R)γ̂/(gRjr1)δ̂ 6= 1 ∨ Ŝt1 = (g)γ̂/(gr1)δ̂ = 1).
That is, the message sender first chooses two elements ŵ0, ŵ1 ∈ Zq
and computes the two commitments
ĈOM0 = (g
R)ŵ0/(gRjr1)ŵ1 , ĈOM1 = (g)
ŵ0/(gr1)ŵ1 .
The sender then computes a hash value
X = H3(COM0, COM1, ĈOM0, ĈOM1)
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and sets the challenge of this proof as ĈH = X − CH, the two
responses should be
ê0 = ŵ0 − ĈH × γ̂, ê1 = ŵ1 − ĈH × δ̂
respectively.
∗ After all the required values are properly computed, let pf denote
the proof values, then
pf = (St0, St1, CH, e0, e1, Ŝt0, Ŝt1, ĈH, ê0, ê1).
Assuming there are n rules in the blacklist, the message sender needs to gen-
erate n proofs accordingly using the technique we described above. Let {pf }
denote the collection of all the n proofs ,then the full ciphertext CT should be
(C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6,PKS, {c}, {z},PKR, {̂c}, {̂z}, {pf })
• Ver(CT ): During the execution of this algorithm, a verifier would first do the
same as what in the verification algorithm of the previous scheme. Further-
more, to check the block rules, for each proof (St0, St1, CH, e0, e1, Ŝt0, Ŝt1,
ĈH, ê0, ê1) in {pf } and its corresponding rule < gS, gR >, the verifier com-
putes
COM ′0 = St0











and then checks whether the equation







holds. If yes, the verifier turns to the next proof in the list {pf }, otherwise it
drops this ciphertext. The verifier would relay the ciphertext if all the proofs
in {pf } are successfully checked.
• Dec(CT,Rj): This algorithm shares no difference from that in the the previous
scheme.
4.4 Security Proofs
Theorem 4.1 Our scheme maintains message confidentiality under the previously
defined message confidentiality model assuming the DDH problem is hard in G when
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hash functions H1, H2, H3 are modeled as random oracles. Concretely, if there is an
adversary A which can break our scheme with non-negligible probability ε, supposing
A makes at most qH1,qH2,qH3 queries to the H1, H2, H3 hash oracles respectively, and
qD queries to the decryption oracle, then we can construct another algorithm B that




)ε, where k is the
security parameter and n is a constant.
Proof. We show how to construct an algorithm B that solves the DDH problem by
interacting with an adversary A of our scheme under our predefined model.
• Setup phase: On input 1k, B runs the Setup algorithm of our scheme to produce
system parameters PM which includes G, p, g,M, C and the block rule list
BRL. B is then given a DDH tuple (ga, gb, Z). For a given polynomial n(·),
set n = n(k). B runs the key generation algorithm Gen(·) n times, except
that B sets pkj = ga for a randomly chosen j ∈ [1, n] and does not have
the corresponding private key xj. Namely, B gets a public key set PK =
{pk1, . . . , pkn} and a private key set SK = {x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xn}. B
chooses three collision-resistance hash functions: H1 : M× G5 → Zp, H2 :
G → {0, 1}|M|, H3 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp and sends them to A, H1, H2, H3 are fully
controlled by B and are modeled as random oracles. Finally, B gives A PM
and PK.
• H1-query phase: A can issue queries to the hash function H1. In order to re-
spond those queries, B keeps a hash table H table1 . When A asks the hash value
of the v-th message tuple (m, gSi , gRj , gr1 , (gSi)r1 , (gRj)r1 , gSi·Rj)v, B checks
whether this tuple has appeared before, :
– If yes, B responds A with the record h1v.
– Otherwise, B chooses a random value h1v from Zp, and sets this value as
the hash value of the queried message tuple, B responds A with h1v and
adds this message and hash value pair to the H table1 .
• H2-query phase: A can also ask H2 hash queries. To answer this kind of query,
the algorithm B maintains a H table2 table which has two columns.
When the u-th query (gRj ·(r1+r2))u is made, B checks whether this tuple has
appeared before:
– If yes, B responds A with the corresponding record h2j.
– Otherwise, B chooses a random value h2u from {0, 1}|M|, where |M| de-
notes the length of the message in M, and sets this value as the hash of
the queried message tuple, B responds with h2u and adds this message
and hash value pair to the H table2 .
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• H3-query phase: A can ask H3 queries. B creates a hash table H table3 to respond
this kind of query. For the t-th query tuple < {0, 1}∗ >t, B acts as following:
– B first check whether this tuple has appeared before, if yes, B responds
with the existing value h3t to A.
– Otherwise, B chooses a random value h3t from Zp , and sets it as the hash
value of the queried message tuple. B responds A with h3t and adds this
message and hash value pair to the H table3 .
Remark: The three hash oracles can be asked interchangeably.
• Decryption query phase 1: A can make decryption queries adaptively to B. To
respond such kind of query, B itself first constructs a table H table with four
columns from H table1 table and H
table
2 table. For each queried message and hash
value pair, denoted by ((m, gSi , gRj , gr1 , gSi·r1 , gRj ·r1 , gSi·Rj), h1v), in the table
H table1 , B would process it as below until every pair in H table1 table is searched:
– B first computes gRj ·r1 · gRj ·h1v , and searches table H table2 to find whether
there exist a queried message and hash value pair in table H table2 such that
the value gRj ·r1 · gRj ·h1v computed form H table1 and the queried message
value in H table2 are equal.
– If B can find such a queried message and hash value pair, then this
queried message and hash value pair in H table1 and the corresponding
queried message and hash value pair in H table2 are first concatenated as a
new row with four elements and this new row is added to the table H table.
After that, the two queried message and hash value pairs are deleted from
their corresponding hash table respectively, then B jumps to the next row
of H table1 table and acts as above.
– If B cannot find such a queried message and hash value pair, B just jumps
to the next row of H table1 table and acts as above.
Notice that H table should be updated timely when either the H table1 or H
table
2
is changed. The updating procedure is the same as the procedure the H table is
constructed. Assuming each row of the H table has the format like ((m, gSi , gRj ,
gr1 , gSi·r1 , gRj ·r1 , gSi·Rj), h1v, g
Rj ·r1 · gRj ·h1v , h2v).
When a queried cihpertext received is (C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6,PKS, {c}, {z},
PKR, {̂c}, {̂z}, {pf }), B responds this decryption query using H table3 and H table:
– B would execute the Ver algorithm first. According to the scheme, B
needs to search the H3 list several times during the execution of the Ver
algorithm. If there exists not such values in the H3 list that making
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the received ciphertext acceptable, which means the ciphertext can pass
the Ver algorithm executed by B, B drops it and returns nothing to A.
Otherwise, B continues to the next step.
– Assuming H table has t rows, B first checks whether there exist rows in
H table such that queried messages in the first column of that row including
(C1, C2, C3, C4) part of the given ciphertext, if not, B drops it and returns
nothing to A.
– If there have rows in H table satisfying the above checking, for each of
them, B further checks whether all the following equations hold;
C5 = g
h1v ,m = C6 ⊕ h2v.
– If there exists a row that fulfilling all the above checking, then B checks
the first column of that row and sends m in this column to A. Otherwise,
B drops it and returns nothing to A.
Remark: We should note that there may be some valid ciphertexts which would
be rejected by our aforementioned decryption simulator, especially when the
intended receiver of a given ciphertext is the user with identity IDj. Here a
valid ciphertext means, when it appears, the intended receiver can decrypt it
correctly and return the corresponding plaintext, while our decryption simu-
lator cannot.
Assuming there are qD decryption queries asked during the decryption phases.
According to the encryption algorithm of our scheme, a ciphertext is not valid
until it is generated after querying all the three hash functions, and obviously,
this kind of ciphertext can definitely be decrypted by our decryption simulator
correctly. However, if at least one of the three hash functions is not asked when
producing a ciphertext, this ciphertext may still have probability to be a valid
one while our decryption simulator would reject it. Clearly, the probability
of this case should be at most 1
2k
, where k is the security parameter. Let us
consider the event that at least one of the qD queried ciphertexts is valid but
is rejected by our decryption simulator. Let symbol fail denote this event and
symbol r(i) denote the event that the i-th queried ciphertext is rejected but
actually is a valid one, where 1 ≤ i ≤ qD. Then the probability of this event,
Pr[fail], is:
Pr[fail] = Pr[r(1) ∪ r(2)∪, . . . ,∪r(qD)]
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Namely, with probability at most qD
2k
, the decryption simulator would reject
valid ciphertext(s). That is, with probability at least 1 − qD
2k
, B would do a
perfect simulation in the decryption phases.
• Challenge phase: After the decryption queries are properly answered, A chooses
two messages m0,m1 fromM, two public keys pki, pkj from PK as the sender
and receiver’s public key respectively and two subsets SPK,RPK from PK
such that pki ∈ SPK, pkj ∈ RPK, |SPK|, |RPK| ≥ 2, then sends them to B.
Upon receiving those information, B would first check whether the receiver’s
public key is pkj = g
a, that is, the one B does not know its corresponding
private key. If not, B aborts the game and outputs a random bit, otherwise
B randomly chooses c ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts mc using the Enc algorithm.
Namely, B asks H1 query about the message tuple (mc, gSi , ga, gb, gSi·a, Z, gSi·b)
to get r∗2 , asks H2 query about the message Z · gb·r
∗
2 to get h∗2, asks H3
query for the purpose of generating the proof tuples, and sets the ciphertext
as (gb, gSi·a, Z, gSi·b, gr
∗
2 ,mc ⊕ h∗2,SPK, {c}, {z},RPK, {̂c}, {̂z}, {pf }), where
h∗2 = H2(Z ·gb·r
∗
2 ), r∗2 = H1(mc, g
Si , ga, gb, gSi·a, Z, gSi·b). B sends the generated
ciphertext to A as the challenge ciphertext. Then B adds the message tuple
((mc, g
Si , ga, gb, gSi·a, Z, gSi·b), r∗2, Z · gb·r
∗
2 , h∗2) as a new row to the H
table table.
• Decryption queries phase 2: In this phase, A can still ask decryption queries
with the only constraint that A cannot use the challenge ciphertext as one
of his queried messages. B answers the decryption queries using the same
procedures stated in the previous decryption queries phase 1.
• Guess phase: After the decryption queries phase 2 is finished, A would make
a guess c′ ∈ {0, 1} about c, and sends his guess to B. B outputs 1 if and only
if c = c′, otherwise, it outputs 0.
Analysis. Let’s consider the probability that our algorithm B would output 1, that
is, A succeeds in the previous game. We analyze this probability under the following
two different cases:
1. When Z 6= gab, easily, the probability Pr[c = c′] in this case should be 1
2
for
the reason that the challenger ciphertext is a random element from the view
of A, A cannot get any useful information from it.
2. When Z = gab and also the intended receiver’s identity is IDj, we find that
the challenge ciphertext produced by B is valid. According to our previous
analysis, our simulator would reject valid given ciphertext(s) with probability
at most qD
2k
during simulating the decryption process, which means that with
probability at least 1− qD
2k
, B would do a perfect simulation during the previous
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game played by A and B. Also, with probability 1
n
, A would choose pkj as
the receiver’s public key. As A can break our scheme with non-negligible
probability ε, the challenge ciphertext is valid when the given tuple is a DDH
tuple and the receiver’s public key is pkj. In this case, the probability Pr[c = c
′]












)ε. Here we finish our proof. 
Theorem 4.2 Our proposed scheme holds sender privacy under the previously de-
fined model assuming the DDH problem is hard in G where hash functions H1, H2, H3
are modeled as random oracles. Concretely, if there exists such an adversary A
which can break our scheme with non-negligible probability ε, supposing A makes at
most qH1,qH2,qH3 queries to the H1, H2, H3 hash oracles respectively, and qse sender
extraction queries, then we can construct another algorithm that solves the DDH





Proof. We show how to construct B which solves the DDH problem by interacting
with A under our predefined model. For the sake of simplifying the description
of this proof, we omit the procedures identical to those in the previous message
confidentiality security proof.
• Setup phase: This phase is the same as that in the previous security proof.
• H1,H2,H3-queries phase: When answering those three hash queries, B does the
same as himself in the previous security proof.
• Sender extraction queries phase 1: This phase is almost the same as the de-
cryption queries phase 1 described in the previous security proof except that
B returns the identity of the user who generates the given ciphertext. As
what we have discussed before, we still need to calculate the probability that
B would make a perfect decryption simulation in this phase. From the pre-
vious analyze in the proof of the message confidentiality, we know that this
probability is at least 1− qID
2k
.
• Challenge phase: After the sender extraction queries are properly answered, A
chooses one message m fromM, pkj from PK as the receiver’s public key and
two subsets SPK,RPK from PK such that pkj ∈ RPK, |SPK|, |RPK| ≥ 2.
A sends them to B. Upon receiving those information, B would first check
whether the intended receiver is the user with public key pkj = g
a, if not, B
aborts the game and returns a random bit. Otherwise, B randomly chooses a
index inx from the indexes of the chosen subset SPK, and encrypts m using
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public key pkj and the secret of the sender who has the chosen index inx. B
asks H1 query about the message tuple (m, g
Sinx , ga, gb, gSinx·a, Z, gSinx·b) to get
r∗2, asks H2 query about the message Z ·gb·r
∗
2 to get h∗2, asks H3 query in order to
generate all the required proofs. Eventually, B sends the generated ciphertext
(gb, gSinx·a, Z, gSinx·b, gr
∗
2 ,m ⊕ h∗2,SPK, {c}, {z},RPK, {̂c}, {̂z}, {pf }) to A as
the challenge ciphertext. Then B adds the message tuple ((mc, gSinx , ga, gb,
gSinx·a, Z, gSinx·b), r∗2, Z · gb·r
∗
2 , h∗2) as a new row to the H
table table.
• Sender extraction queries phase 2: In this phase,A can still ask sender extraction
queries with the only constraint that A cannot use the challenge ciphertext
as one of his queried messages. B interacts with A in the same manner as we
described in the decryption queries phase 2 of the previous security proof.
• Guess phase: After finishing the sender extraction phase 2, A would make a
random index guess inx′ from the indexes of the chosen subset about inx,
and sends his guess to B. Algorithm B outputs 1 if and only if inx = inx′,
otherwise, it outputs 0.
Analysis. Let’s consider the probability that our algorithm B would output 1, that
is, A succeeds in the previous game. We analyze this probability under the following
two different cases:
1. When Z 6= gab, the probability Pr[inx = inx′] in this case should be 1|SPK| for
the reason that the challenger ciphertext is random from the view of A, A
cannot get any useful information from it, the best choice for him is to make
a random guess.
2. When Z = gab and also the intended receiver’s identity is IDj, we can find that
the challenge ciphertext produced by B is valid. According to our previous
analysis, our simulator would reject valid given ciphertext(s) with probability
at most qse
2k
during simulating the sender extraction process, which means that
with probability at least 1 − qse
2k
, B would do a perfect simulation during the
previous game played by A and B. Also, with probability 1
n
, A would choose
pkj as the receiver’s public key. As A can break our scheme with non-negligible
probability ε, the challenge ciphertext is valid when the given tuple is a DDH
tuple and the receiver’s public key is pkj, in this condition, the probability






As ε is non-negligible, B can determine whether the given tuple is a valid DDH tuple




)ε. Here we finish our proof. 
Theorem 4.3 Our scheme holds receiver privacy under the predefined security mo-
del assuming the DDH problem is hard in G when hash functions H1, H2, H3 are
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modeled as random oracles. That is, if there is an adversary A which can break our
scheme with non-negligible probability ε, assuming A asks qH1 , qH2 , qH3 queries to
H1, H2, H3 respectively and qre receiver extraction queries during the game, then we





)ε, where n is a constant.
Proof. The proof of theorem 3 is nearly identical to that of theorem 2 except that
we require that the sender of the challenge ciphertext should be the one with public
key ga. 
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we consider the user conditional privacy preservation problem, which
is stated clearly at the beginning of our thesis, in a more complex scenario. When
facing with the scenario where the authority can block the communication channels
among several users by publishing a blacklist as public parameter, we also need to
address the issue of proving the legitimation of the communication channel between
it and its communicator. To solve the aforementioned two problems, we propose a
group-based source-destination verifiable encryption scheme with blacklist checking.
In order to discuss the security of our scheme, we further define three security mod-
els to capture the message confidentiality, sender privacy preservation and receiver
privacy preservation properties accordingly, and then give three formal proofs under
the predefined models with the help of the random oracle.
The technique used to protect users’ privacy in our work may suffer from the
so called cross-comparison attack and the joint conspiracy attack mentioned in
[KBK+11] and [AMM99] respectively. Thus, our next work should focus on looking
for another advanced privacy preservation method to make our scheme more secure
under some specific attacks.
Chapter 5
Publicly Verifiable Secure
Communication with User and
Data Privacy
Security surveillance system plays an important role in the society. However, how
to securely send the sensitive information from the surveillance node to the server is
a critical issue which should be well addressed. In this chapter, to develop a secure
communication scheme applied between the surveillance camera and the server, we
propose the important and desirable security and privacy features that should be
achieved by such systems, and present a secure scheme that can achieve the security
goals. Our scheme ensures that encrypted datagrams not sent from the surveillance
cameras can be filtrated by a public message filter while data and sender privacy is
still well preserved for encrypted data sent from legitimated cameras. Furthermore,
the server in our scheme is the only entity who can reveal the real sender given
a ciphertext produced by it and give a proof to convince others the origination
of that ciphertext without leaking its content. Such property enables the server
to build a searchable database using the camera’s identifier as index and also the
message auditor to check the ciphertext and its origination stored in the database
without any dispute. We provide the formal security models to define these security
requirements and give formal security proofs in the random oracle model.
5.1 Introduction
Background. Security surveillance system is pervasively applied in many do-
mains. For example, the transportation cameras are installed in intersections or
along the highways to monitor whether a deriver is over-speeding or violating some
other traffic regulations. Another example is the home security surveillance system
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where cameras are installed to detect whether your home is invaded by someone who
does not have the authorization. In a security surveillance system, a surveillance
node records sensitive information of its monitored area at a specific frequency or
when misbehavior is detected in that area, then it sends the information to a central
server. The server processes those information using automated programs, stores
them in a searchable database in case of any dispute and triggers further actions
under certain condition. For example, the server in the transportation surveillance
system would send a speeding ticket to a driver, and in the home security surveil-
lance system, the server would send an alert to the householder when the camera
in that house detects an intrusion behavior. Due to the sensitivity of information
captured by security surveillance cameras, the problem of how to securely send the
sensitive information from the surveillance node to the server is critical and needs to
be treated and addressed seriously. In this chapter, we are focusing on designing a
secure communication scheme applied between the surveillance node and the server
in the security surveillance system.
Our System Model. Before discussing the aforementioned problem in detail, we
first give a brief description of our security surveillance system model. Specifically,
our surveillance system model consists of a surveillance server, a message auditor, a
message filter and a number of surveillance nodes located in different areas.
As illustrated in Fig.5.1., the surveillance nodes in different locations are re-
sponsible for capturing sensitive information and sending them to the surveillance
server via the public network. To reduce the server’s cost on analyzing meaningless
information, a message filter is enforced to ensure only information sent from the
surveillance nodes can bypass it and be received by the server. The surveillance
server takes the role of analyzing the information and triggering further actions de-
pending on the analyzed result. After the information is processed, it needs to be
stored in a searchable database in case of any dispute happened in the future. A
message auditor is also necessary to ascertain that the original data sent by a camera
is intact when it is retrieved latter.
System Security Requirements. Basing on the surveillance model described
above, we summarize the security requirements in this system. Those requirements
include:
• Message confidentiality. Obviously, when a surveillance node captures a
misbehavior, it needs to send the sensitive information to the server without
leaking its content.
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Figure 5.1: The security surveillance system model
• Message public verifiability. The message filter should be able verify
whether one encrypted message is sent from a legitimated surveillance node
without requiring any extra information, which means that the encrypted mes-
sage should be publicly verifiable before it is processed by the surveillance
server.
• Node privacy. The exact location of the surveillance node is also a crucial
information to that node and then can be viewed as the unique identifier of
it. We require that this information should be included in the transmitted
encrypted message and cannot be discovered by any other users except the
server. The server can reveal the identity of one certain node and build the
searchable database using the node’s location as index. Since the encrypted
message are transmitted over the public network, there may exist misbehaved
nodes which have the capability to intercept the encrypted message sent from
specific surveillance nodes when the origination of that encrypted message is
known, this is another reason why camera privacy is necessary.
• Node authentication. Since the message filter is empowered with the capa-
bility to filtrate messages not sent from surveillance nodes, each node should
be able to authenticate its legitimization to the message filter.
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• Node non-repudiation. The property node non-repudiation states that if
a surveillance node have sent a message to the server, it cannot deny this
behavior latter. It appears that defining this requirement in our model is
not that straight-forward, so we divide it into three sub-requirements, namely,
the outsider impersonation resistance, the insider impersonation resistance
and receiver cheating resistance. Intuitively, if all the three requirements are
satisfied in our scheme, then the non-repudiation requirement is also satisfied.
• Data Privacy. Given an encrypted message and its corresponding proof
produced by the server, the message auditor and other users can verify the node
non-repudiation property of that encrypted message, while the verification
would not leak anything about the content of the sensitive information.
Potential solution and its insufficiencies. It seems that the signcryption scheme
is promising to provide some of those aforementioned security requirements.
The primitive signcryption, first proposed in the seminal work [Zhe97], is a cryp-
tographic tool which combines the functionalities of both the public key encryption
scheme and signature scheme in a logical single step. When trying to provide de-
sirable properties such as message confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and
authentication simultaneously, the signcryption scheme enjoys extra benefits with
respect to computational costs and communication overheads comparing to the tra-
ditional sign-then-encrypt approach. The security of signcryption scheme had never
been discussed in detail until a formal security model in the multi-user setting was
given by Baek et al. in [BSZ02], and since then, many efficient signcryption schemes
which are proven secure have been proposed in [MM03, LYW+07, HRS14, EZ15].
However, we find that existing signcryption schemes are insufficient to address all
the security goals above.
Specifically, the verification of the ciphertext in existing signcryption schemes
such as [BD98, GLZ99, Ma06, SVR10] still requires extra information, which is given
after the ciphertext is processed by its receiver. For example in [SVR10], the public
keys of the sender and intended receiver of the given ciphertext are the required extra
information. The ciphertext in signcryption schemes such as [LYW+07, HRS14] can
be publicly verified to ascertain whether it is generated by one specific user, so the
user’s privacy cannot be properly preserved. In existing signcryption schemes such
as [LQ04, LHZM10], the assurance of non-repudiation needs the involvement of the
ciphertext and its corresponding plaintext, which causes the compromise of message
privacy.
Related work. The problem how to publicly verify the ciphertext of a signcryp-
tion have been discussed decades ago. In [BD98], Bao et. al. proposed the first
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signcryption scheme with public verifiability. However, in their scheme the cipher-
text cannot be verified until its corresponding plaintext is given, which incurs the
lost of the data privacy, this problem also exists in [Ma06]. Gamage et. al. pre-
sented a publicly verifiable signcryption used in firewalls in [GLZ99], while their
scheme only consider single-user setting and the verification of the ciphertext still
needs the signcrypter’s public key, which incurs the lost of the user privacy, the
scheme in [SVR10] and [Aim11] also has the same drawback as that in [GLZ99].
The primitive ring signature [RST01], group signature [CvH91] and ring sign-
cryption [HSMZ05a] all provide the user with the capability to authenticate its legiti-
mation among a group of users including itself, that is, those primitives all guarantee
the user privacy during the authentication. However, each of them has insufficiency
in revealing the anonymity of the user who produces a given signature or cipher-
text. Specifically, in ring signatures schemes such as [FS07, ALSY06, ALSY13],
one signer’s anonymity can be revoked by everyone unless it issues signatures twice
or more, such anonymity revocation would not work when the user is not always
well-behaved. In the ring signature proposed in [LLM+07], only a set of trusted
authorities is allowed to revoke the anonymity of the real signer, in group signature
schemes, the group manager is the only authority which can revoke the anonymity
of the signer of a given signature, the revocation of the anonymity of the signer in
those schemes need the participation of the trusted authority, and it is costly to
maintain its availability. The problem how to revoke the anonymity of the sign-
crypter of a ciphertext in ring signcryption schemes is seldom considered so far, the
only two work [ZYZZ08, LST08] present a ring signcryption scheme in which the
actual signcrypter can prove to others that a ciphertext is generated by itself when
such proof is needed, that is, only the signcrypter itself of a ciphertext can revoke
its own anonymity.
Our Contribution. Motivated by the insufficiencies of existing signcryption sche-
mes and the user and data privacy requirements in the security surveillance system,
we present our publicly verifiable secure communication scheme with user and data
privacy. This work contributes to the development of secure communication in the
security surveillance system in the following two aspects.
1. The integrity and authentication of the ciphertext in our secure communi-
cation scheme are publicly verifiable and the verification does not need any
extra information except the public parameters. This property benefits our
scheme in enabling the message filter to filtrate information sent not from the
surveillance nodes without requiring any secret.
2. Since the surveillance node in our secure communication scheme is authenti-
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cated as a member of a group of legitimated nodes rather than a specific one,
the node’s privacy is still preserved while its legitimation is authenticated.
Besides, the surveillance server in our scheme can reveal the identity of the
node given a ciphertext produced by it and also give a proof to convince others
about the origin of that ciphertext, and this proof would not leak any infor-
mation about the plaintext, namely, the data privacy is also preserved. With
this property, only the surveillance server can build the searchable database
using the nodes’ location as index, which is desirable in the surveillance sys-
tem. Also, the message auditor and other users can retrieve the ciphertexts
stored in the searchable database conveniently and verify the non-repudiation
property of a ciphertext latter without requiring any secret or learning the
underlying plaintext.
5.2 Scheme Definition and Security Models
5.2.1 Defining the Scheme
Our scheme is applicable among a group of users and a trusted group authority
denoted by TGA. It can be defined with the following polynomial-time algorithms:
• Setup: The Setup algorithm is executed by the group authority TGA. On input
the security parameter, the algorithm outputs the group public parameter PM.
PM should include a user certificate repository CR which is initially empty.
• Registration: This Registration algorithm is executed between one group user
Ui ∈ {U} and the TGA. When Ui wants to join a group managed by the TGA,
the algorithm works as following;
– Ui first produces its own signcrypiton key and unsigncryption key pair
(siki, unski), then Ui commits to the key pair (siki, unski) and produces
the commitment (pki, comski). Ui further generates a zero knowledge
proof zkpki showing it knowledge of (siki, unski) with respect to the
commitment comski.
– Ui sends rmi = (pki, comski, zkpki) to TGA.
– Upon receiving the message tuple rmi sent from Ui, TGA first verifies
zkpki to check whether Ui satisfies certain group qualification qul defined
in PM, if yes, TGA computes Ui’s unique certificate ui from rmi and
updates CR to include pki, ui as this user Ui’s personal certificate, then
it sends ui back to Ui. Otherwise, TGA rejects such registration request
and responds Ui with a message saying “REGISTRATION REJECT ”.
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• Signcrypt: To send a message m to Uj on behalf of a group, Ui executes this
Signcrypt algorithm, which takes (siki, ui, pkj,m) as inputs, and outputs a
ciphertext σi. For simplicity, we say Ui is the signcrypter of σi.
• Verify: Given a ciphertext σi and the public parameter PM, this Verify algo-
rithm outputs “1” if the signcrypter of σi satisfies the group qualification qul
stated in PM, otherwise, it outputs “0”. This algorithm can be executed by
anyone possessing PM and a ciphertext, it enables one party to check whether
a given ciphertext is generated by a registered user of the legitimated group
without revealing this user’s privacy.
• Unsigncrypt: When Uj receives a ciphertext σi, it executes the Unsigncrypt
algorithm with inputs (σi, unskj) to recover the plaintext m when Uj is the
intended receiver of σi, otherwise, the algorithm outputs a symbol ⊥.
• Open: Given a ciphertext σi, the intended receiver Uj of σi can also trace the
real signcrypter of σi using algorithm Open when Unsigncrypt(σi, unskj) 6= ⊥.
Taking (σi, unskj) as inputs, Open outputs the personal certificate u
′
i of the
signcrypter of σi and also a zero-knowledge proof pkidj showing that Uj does
not cheat when executing this algorithm. Here, this algorithm enables the
intended receiver of σi to not only disclose the privacy of the signcrypter of
σi but also convince other users that it acts honest during finding the actual
signcrypter of σi.
• Justify: On input the tuple (σi, u′i, pkidj), this Justify algorithm would output
the symbol “1” if the user with certificate u′i is the actual signcrypter of σi,
otherwise, it outputs “0”.
5.2.2 Formal Security Notions
Definition 5.1 (Message Confidentiality) To define the security of our scheme
with respect to message confidentiality, we refer to the standard definition of indis-
tinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) for public key
encryption scheme[CS03c, BDPR98b], and present the following m-IND-CCA2 game
played between a challenger C and an adversary A.
• Setup: The challenger C takes the security parameter λ as input and runs
the Setup, Registration algorithms of our scheme to generate the group public
parameter PM and t users’ keys. C sends PM, {U}, CR to the adversary A,
where {U} is the collection of all the t users and CR is the user certificate
repository including all t registered users’ personal certificate.
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• Query phase 1: In this phase, A can perform a number of queries bounded by
a polynomial in an adaptive way, that is, each query can be depended on the
responses to the previous queries. There are five types of queries which can be
asked and each of them can be described as below.
– Signcryption key query: A can select a user Ui from {U}, C needs to find
its corresponding signcryption key siki and sends it back to A.
– Unsigncryption key query: A can select a user Ui from {U}, C needs to
find its corresponding unsigncryption key unski and sends it back to A.
– Signcrypt query: A chooses a message m and two users Ui, Uj ∈ {U} such
that (pki, ui), (pkj, uj) ∈ CR as the message sender and receiver respec-
tively, then A sends them to C. C computes σi = Signcrypt(siki, ui, pkj,m)
and sends σi back to A.
– Unsigncrypt query: A chooses a ciphertext σi and a user Uj ∈ {U}, then
it sends (σi, Uj) to C. By first executing Verify(σi,PM) and then
Unisigncrypt(σi, unskj), C responds A with the resulting plaintext of σi if
σi is a valid ciphertext and Uj is the intended receiver of σi, otherwise C
returns nothing to A.
– Open query: A chooses a ciphertext σi and a user Uj ∈ {U}, then it
sends (σi, Uj) to C. If σi is a valid ciphertext and Uj is the intended
receiver of σi, C responds A with ui, which is the unique certificate of the
signcrypter of σi, as well as a proof pkidj, which convinces others that Uj
behaves honest when executing Open algorithm. otherwise C responds A
with nothing.
• Challenge: After A decides to end the Query phase 1, it outputs two plaintexts
m0,m1 satisfying |m0| = |m1| and two users Ui, Uj ∈ {U} as the message
sender and receiver respectively. It requires that Uj should not appear in any
unsigncryption key queries in the Query phase 1, then it sends the chosen tuple
(m0,m1, Ui, Uj) to C. Upon receiving the tuple, C picks a random bit b from
{0, 1} and computes σ = Signcrypt(siki, ui, pkj.mb) and returns this challenge
ciphertext to A.
• Query phase 2: In this phase, A can still ask a polynomially bounded number
of queries adaptively again, and C acts the same as in the above Query phase
1. Here, the restriction is that it cannot make unsigncryption key query on Uj
and also cannot make an Unsigncrypt query on the tuple (σ, Uj) where σ is the
challenge ciphertext and Uj is its intended receiver.
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• Guess: After A decides to end the Query phase 2, it has to output a guess b′.
It wins the aforementioned game if b′ = b.
Let Pr[b = b′] denote the probability that A wins the game and Advm−IND−CCA2A the
advantage of A when it wins the game, then
Advm−IND−CCA2A = 2|Pr[b = b′]− 1|.
We say our scheme is m-IND-CCA2 secure if Advm−IND−CCA2A ≤ negl(λ) for any PPT
adversary A where negl(λ) is a negligible function in λ.
Definition 5.2 (Sender Anonymity) To define the security of our scheme with
respect to sender anonymity, we present the following an-CCA2 game, which is very
similar to the previously defined m-IND-CCA2 one, played between a challenger C
and an adversary A,
• Setup: The challenger C takes the security parameter λ as input and runs the
Setup, Registration algorithms of our scheme to generate the public parameter
PM and t users’ keys. C sends PM, {U}, CR to the adversary A, where {U} is
the collection of all the t users and CR is a user certificate repository including
all t registered users’ personal certificate.
• Query phase 1: In this phase A interacts the same with C as what they do in
the Query phase 1 of the previous message confidentiality security model.
• Challenge: After A decides to end the Query phase 1, it outputs one message
m and one user Uj ∈ {U} as the intended receiver. It requires that Uj should
not appear in any unsigncryption key queries in the Query phase 1, then it
sends the chosen tuple (m,Uj) to C. Upon receiving the tuple, C chooses one
index b ∈ [t] and sets user Ub ∈ {U} as the signcrypter, then it computes
σ = Signcrypt(sikb, ub, pkj,m) and returns this challenge ciphertext to A.
• Query phase 2: In this phase, A can still ask a polynomially bounded number
of queries adaptively again, and C acts identical to what it does in the above
Query phase 1. Here, the only restriction is that it cannot make unsigncryption
key query on Uj and also cannot make an Unsigncrypt query on the tuple (σ, Uj)
where σ is the challenge ciphertext and Uj is its intended receiver.
• Guess: After A decides to end the Query phase 2, it has to output a guess
b′ ∈ [t]. It wins the aforementioned game if b′ = b.
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Let Pr[b = b′] denote the probability that A wins the game and Advan−IND−CCA2A the
advantage of A when it wins the game, then




We say our scheme is an-CCA2 secure if Advan−IND−CCA2A ≤ negl(λ) for any PPT A
where negl(λ) is a negligible function in λ.
Definition 5.3 (Outside User Impersonation Resistance) To define the se-
curity of our scheme with respect to the property that one user outside the system
cannot impersonate a legitimated user successfully, we adapt the standard security
definition of existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attack (UF-
CMA)[GMR88, PS96] for signature schemes to our scheme setting and present the
following O-UF-CMA game played between a challenger C and an adversary A,
• Setup: The challenger C takes the security parameter λ as input and runs
the Setup, Registration algorithms of our scheme to generate the group public
parameter PM and t users’ keys. C sends PM, {U} to the adversary A, where
{U} is the collection of all the t users. Here, as an outsider, A should not
have CR.
• Query phase: In this phase, A can perform a number of queries bounded by a
polynomial in an adaptive way. As an outsider, A can ask all types of query
mentioned in previous models except the signcryption key query.
• Forgery: After A decides to end the Query phase, it tries to forge a ciphertext
σ with Uj as the message receiver, it requires that Uj ∈ {U}, then it sends the
forgery (σ, Uj) to C. A wins the game if Verify(σ,PM) = 1.
Let Pr[A wins] denote the probability that A wins the above game and AdvO−UF−CMAA
the advantage of A when it wins the game, then
AdvO−UF−CMAA = Pr[A wins].
We say our scheme is O-UF-CMA secure if AdvO−UF−CMAA ≤ negl(λ) for any PPT A
where negl(λ) is a negligible function in λ.
Definition 5.4 (Inside User Impersonation Resistance) To define the secu-
rity of our scheme with respect to the property that a legitimated user in the system
cannot impersonate another one successfully, we adapt the standard definition of ex-
istential unforgeability under adaptive chosen message attack (UF-CMA) for signa-
ture scheme to our scheme setting and present the following I-UF-CMA game played
between a challenger C and an adversary A,
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• Setup: The challenger C takes the security parameter λ as input and runs
the Setup, Registration algorithms of our scheme to generate the group public
parameter PM and t users’ keys. C sends PM, {U}, CR to the adversary
A, where {U} is the collection of all the t users and CR is a user certificate
repository including all t registered users’ personal certificate. In this phase,
A needs to choose one user Ui ∈ {U} as the user it wants to challenge before
the Forgery phase and sends it back to C.
• Query phase: The types of queries can be asked in this phase is identical to that
in the Query phase 1 of the previous message confidentiality security model.
• Forgery: After A decides to end the Query phase, it tries to forge a ciphertext
σ with Uj as its receiver, it requires that Uj ∈ {U}, then it sends the forgery
(σ, Ui, Uj) to C. A wins the game if Verify(σ,PM) = 1,Unsigncrypt(σ, unskj) 6=
⊥ and the signcryption key of Ui is never queried in Query phase:.
Let Pr[A wins] denote the probability that A wins the game and AdvI−UF−CMAA the
advantage of A when it wins the game, then
AdvI−UF−CMAA = Pr[A wins].
We say our scheme is I-UF-CMA secure with respect to the sender impersonation
resistance property if AdvI−UF−CMAA ≤ negl(λ) for any PPT A where negl(λ) is a
negligible function in λ.
Definition 5.5 (Receiver Cheating Resistance) To define the security of our
scheme relating to receiver cheating resistance property, we present the following (R-
UF-CMA) game, which is similar to the predefined (I-UF-CMA) game, played between
a challenger C and an adversary A,
• Setup: The challenger C takes the security parameter λ as input and runs
the Setup, Registration algorithms of our scheme to generate the group public
parameter PM and t users’ keys. C sends PM, {U}, CR to the adversary
A, where {U} is the collection of all the t users and CR is a user certificate
repository including all t registered users’ personal certificate.
• Query phase: This phase shares no difference with the Query phase 1 of the
previous message confidentiality security model.
• Challenge: After A decides to end the Query phase, it chooses a message m,
one users Uj as the intended receiver and then sends them to C. Upon receiving
the tuple (m,Uj), C chooses a user Ui satisfying Ui ∈ {U} and i 6= j, then it
computes σ = Signcrypt(siki, ui, pkj,m). C sends (σ, Uj) back to A.
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• Forgery: When A receives σ, it is asked to forge a tuple (σ, ul, zkidj), We say
A wins the game if Justify(σ, ul, zkidj) = 1 ∧ ul 6= ui.
Notice. In the challenge and forgery phase, we do not put any restriction on Ui, Uj,
Ul, that is, the signcryption and unsigncryption key queries on those users are all
allowed in our model.
Let Pr[A wins] denote the probability that A wins the game and AdvR−UF−CMAA the
advantage of A when it wins the game, then
AdvR−UF−CMAA = Pr[A wins].
We say our scheme is R-UF-CMA secure with respect to the receiver cheating resis-
tance property if AdvR−UF−CMAA ≤ negl(λ) for any PPT adversary A where negl(λ)
is a negligible function in λ.
5.3 Our Concrete Construction
In this section we give a concrete construction of our proposed scheme. Consisting
of the following algorithms (Setup,Registration, Signcrypt,Verify,Unsigncrypt,Open,
Justify), our scheme can be described in detail as;
• Setup: Assuming there exists a trusted group authority TGA which takes the
security parameter λ = (δ, ˆ̀, `1, `2, k) satisfying δ > 1, `2 < `1, `2  `1 −
ˆ̀+`1
4
as input, it requires that any user who wants to register as a legitimated group
member should choose its secret in such a manner that the chosen secret should
be a prime which lies in {2`1 , · · · , 2`1+2`2−1}, and TGA values this requirement
as the group membership qualification qul. TGA also initiate a user certificate
repository CR to include all registered users’ personal certificates which can
be used to uniquely identify them. TGA also chooses two large enough prime
numbers p, q such that p ≡ q ≡ 3(mod 4), and then produces a multiplicative
group Z∗n and one quadratic-residue g of that group such that n = pq, |g| = `g,
TGA also gets a cyclic group G =< g >, it is required that |n| = `n > `1.
TGA further chooses a random element z ∈ Z∗n and two hash functions H1 :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k,H2 : G→ {0, 1}`. It define the message space M := {0, 1}`
and ciphertext space CT := G6×{0, 1}`×{0, 1}k×{0, 1}δ(`2+k)×{0, 1}δ(`g+`1+k),
and then sets PM = (λ, qul, CR, n, g, z,M, CT ,H1,H2).
• Registration: When a user, denoted by Ui, wishes to be a group member, it
interacts with the TGA to complete the following registration procedures;
– Ui first chooses xi ∈ [n] and two prime numbers ei, êi ∈ {2`1 , · · · , 2`1 +
2`2 − 1} randomly such that ei, êi 6≡ 1 (mod 8) and ei 6≡ êi( mod 8). Ui
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computes z̃i = z
êi ,ẽi = eiêi, pki = g
xi where |z̃i| = ˜̀, and then generates
the following two zero-knowledge proofs
p1 = ZPK{(ei, êi, xi) : zẽi = z̃iei ∧ z̃i = zêi ∧ pki = gxi ∧
(2`1 − 2δ(`2+k)+1) < ei < (2`1 − 2δ(`2+k)+1) ∧
(2`1 − 2δ(`2+k)+1) < êi < (2`1 − 2δ(`2+k)+1)},
p2 = ZPK{(ei, êi) : ẽi = eiêi ∧ ei ∈ primes(λ) ∧ êi ∈ primes(λ)}.
Here the details about how to produce the proof values p1, p2 are given in
[CM99], so we omit the description.Then, Ui then sends (z̃i, ẽi, pki, p1, p2)
to TGA.
– Upon receiving the message tuple sent from Ui, TGA first verifies the two
proof value p1, p2 by executing the corresponding verification algorithm
described in [CM99] to check whether the secrets chosen by Ui satisfies
the requirement defined in qul, that is, to check whether ei, êi are prime
numbers and also ei, êi ∈ {2`1 , · · · , 2`1 + 2`2 − 1}.
– If the both verification algorithms output “1”, TGA computes ui = z̃
1
ẽ
and sets ui as Ui’s unique certificate, then TGA sends ui back to Ui.
Otherwise, TGA ends the registration procedures and returns a symbol
saying “REGISTRATION REJECT.”
– After receiving ui from TGA, Ui checks whether the equation (ui)
ei = z
holds, if yes, Ui keeps it as its unique certificate and finishes this regis-
tration algorithm.
– Each time when a new user register itself as a legitimated group member
successfully, this user Ui stores two keys, its signcryption key siki = ei
and unsigncryption key unski = xi, secretly. After that, TGA updates the
certificate repository CR to include this new user’s personal information
(pki, ui).
• Signcrypt: To signcrypt a message m ∈ {0, 1}` on the group’s behalf and send
the ciphertext to user Uj, Ui does the following procedures;
– It chooses w1, w3 ∈R {0, 1}`g and computes
w2 = H1(g||z||yjeiw1w3||m),
c1 = g
w2w3 , c2 = g
w1w2w3 , c3 = yj
w2w3 ,
c4 = uiyj
w1w2w3 , c5 = g
eiw1w3 , c6 = g
eiw1w2w3 ,
c7 = m⊕H2(yjeiw1w2w3),
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where ei, ui is Ui’s signcryption key and unique certificate respectively, yj
is Uj’s public key.
– It chooses r1, r3 ∈R {0, 1}δ(`2+k), r2, r4 ∈R









, t3 = (c1)
r4 , t4 = (c2)
r3 .
– It computes c0 = H1(g||z||t1||t2||t3||t4||c5||c6||c7).
– It computes s1 = r1−c0(ei−2`1), s2 = r2−c0eiw1, s3 = r3−c0(ei−2`1), s4 =
r4 − c0eiw1.
In fact, the tuple (c0, s1, s2, s3, s4) is the proof values of a zero-knowledge proof,
that is,









∧ c6 = (c1)β ∧ c6 = (c2)α ∧
(2`1 − 2δ(`2+k)+1) < α < (2`1 − 2δ(`2+k)+1)},
where α = ei, β = eiw1. The resulting ciphertext is CT = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6,
c7, c0, s1, s2, s3, s4).
• Verify: CT = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c0, s1, s2, s3, s4) can be publicly verified by
anyone holding the public parameter PM through the execution of this Verify



















– If c′0 = c0, then CT is valid, otherwise, it is invalid.
• Unsigncrypt: When CT is sent to Uj which is its intended receiver or unsign-
crypter, it does as following to recover the message m using its unsigncryption
key xj;
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– Uj first executes the Verify algorithm to check whether CT is valid, if not,
Uj rejects it, otherwise, it continues.




– Uj recomputes w
′
2 = H1(g||z||(c5)xj ||m′) and checks whether the equation
c6 = (c5)
w′2 holds.
– If yes, Uj outputs m
′ as the plaintext, otherwise, it rejects CT .
• Open: One user Uj can reveal the unique certificate of the original signcrypter
of CT as long as Uj is its intended receiver. Besides, Uj also has the capability
to convince anyone else that it cannot cheat when recovering the certificate.
It does as following;





xj and sets u
′
i as the certificate of the signcrypter
of CT .





xj}. Namely, Uj first chooses a random element
w0 ∈R {0, 1}`g , then it computes c′ = H1((c1)w0 ||(c2)w0||CT ), s′ = w0 −
c′xj. So ZPK{(xj) : c3 = (c1)xj ∧ c4u′i = (c2)
xj} = (c′, s′), Uj publishes the
tuple (CT, u′i, c
′, s′).
• Justify: When there exists any dispute about the signcrypter of CT given
the tuple (CT, u′i, c
′, s′), one user can easily check whether Uj is cheating by
executing this Justify algorithm. Justify(CT, u′i, c












holds. Anyone can be convinced that Uj is not cheating when Justify outputs
“1”.
5.4 Security Proofs
Theorem 5.1 Our secure communication scheme is m-IND-CCA2 secure with re-
spect to the message confidentiality property under our predefined model assuming the
Computational Diffie-Hellman problem in composite group(CDHCG) is hard in the
chosen group system (G, g, n) when the hash functions H1,H2 are modeled as random
oracles. Concretely, if there is an adversary A which can break m-IND-CCA2 secu-
rity with non-negligible probability ε, supposing A makes at most qH2,qis, qo queries
to the H2 oracle, Unsigncryption key oracle and Open oracle respectively, then we can
construct another algorithm C solving the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem in
composite group (CDHCG) with probability 2ε
tqH2
, where t is an integer.
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Proof. Assuming there exists an adversary A which can break the m-IND-CCA2
security of our group signcryption scheme with non-negligible probability ε, then we
show how to construct another algorithm C solving the CDHCG problem from A, C
and A interacts as below.
• Setup: C is first given a group system (G, g, n), where n = pq, p, q are large
safe primes, G =< g >, (g|n) = 1, `g = |g| ≤ ` = |n|, and also a CDHCG
problem instance (g, ga, gb). C then executes the Setup algorithm and sends
the public parameter PM to A. Assuming there exists t users in the user group
{U}, C chooses one user Uj ∈ {U} and sets its signcryption key as sikj = ej
and its certificate tuple as (uj = z
1
ej , pkj = g
a), the unsigncryption key unskj
is unknown. For the rest of users in {U}/Uj, their keys and identifiers are
generated correctly following the Registration algorithm. Notice that after the
t users are all registered, the certificate repository CR should include all the t
users’ personal certificate, the user group set {U} should also be sent to A.
• Query phase 1: In this phase, A can ask C a polynomially bounded umber of
queries in an adaptive way, there are several types of query can be asked during
this phase and each type of them can be answered by C using the following
way.
– H1 query: At any time, A can query the random oracle OH1 and C
maintains a list LH1 , which is empty initially, to answer such kind of
queries. When A asks the oracle OH1 with a queried message denoted
by mH1 ∈ {0, 1}∗, C would first check whether this queried message has
already been asked before;
∗ If so, C retrieves the tuple (mH1 , hH1), which entry is the queried
message, in list LH1 and responds A with hH1 .
∗ Otherwise, C chooses a element hH1 randomly from {0, 1}k and sends
it back to C as the response, then C adds this new tuple (mH1 , hH1)
to LH1 .
– H2 query: A is also allowed to ask the hash oracle OH2 as it wants, the
technique A used to respond such hash query is similar to that described
in the H1 query. That is, C maintains a initially empty list LH2 and
checks whether a query with queried message mH2 has been asked before;
∗ If so, C retrieves the tuple (mH2 , hH2) in list LH1 and responds A
with hH2 .
∗ Otherwise, C chooses a element hH2 randomly from {0, 1}` and sends
it back to C as the response, then C adds this new tuple (mH2 , hH2)
to LH2 .
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– Signcryption key query: A can get the signcryption keys of several users
in {U}] by issuing such Signcryption key query. As C has the knowledge
of all the signcryption keys of users in {U}, when A chooses a user Ui ∈
{U} and sends it as the queried message to C, C can easily find the
corresponding signcryption key ei and sends ei as the response to this
query.
– Unsigncryption key query: A can also get the unsigncryption keys of several
users in {U} by issuing this Signcryption key query. WhenA chooses a user
Ui ∈ {U} as the queried user, C answers this query with his knowledge
of all the unsigncryption keys of users in {U} excepts the chosen user Uj.
That is, before deciding how to respond the query, C checks whether the
queried user Ui is the chosen user Uj;
∗ If so, C aborts and outputs a symbol ⊥.
∗ Otherwise, C responds A with the corresponding unsigncryption key
xi of Ui.
– Signcrypt query: A can ask C to signcrypt a message by issuing this Sign-
crypt query with the queried message denoted by (m,Ui, Ul) where m ∈M
and Ui, Ul ∈ {U} are acting as the signcryper and intended unsigncrypter
respectively. To signcrypt m on behalf of Ui and let the resulted message
be feasible to be unsigncrypted by Ul, C finds the signcryption key ei, user
identifier ui of Ui and the public key yl of Ul, then it executes the Signcrypt
algorithm of our scheme with inputs (ei, ui, yl.m) and sends the resulted
ciphertext CT = Signcrypt(ei, ui, yl.m) back to A as the response.
– Unsigncrypt query: A can ask C to unsigncrypt a ciphertext for it by issu-
ing this Unsigncrypt query with the queried message denoted by (CT,Ul)
where Ul is the unsigncrypter of CT . Basing on the given specific queried
message (CT,Ul) in each query, C uses the following two different ways
to answer it;
∗ When the given unsigncrypter of CT is not the chosen user Uj, that is,
Ul 6= Uj, C first executes the Verify algorithm of our scheme to check
whether CT is a valid ciphertext, C continues if CT is valid, otherwise
it rejects it and returns nothing to A. Then C would executes the
Unsigncryt algorithm to retrieve the encrypted message m′ from CT
because C knows the unsigncryption key of Ul in this case. Finally,
C sends m′ as the response back to A.
∗ When the given unsigncrypter of CT is the chosen user Uj, that
is, Ul = Uj, because the corresponding unsigncryption key of Uj is
unknown, C simulates the Unsigncrypt algorithm as follows;
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· When given a ciphertext CT = (c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c0, s1, s2,
s3, s4), C also first executes the Verify algorithm to check whether
CT is a valid ciphertext, C continues to the next step if CT is
valid, otherwise, C rejects CT and returns noting to A.
· C searches the hash list LH1 thoroughly to check whether there
exists a tuple (mH1 , hH1) in LH1 such that c6 = (c5)hH1 , if C
cannot find such a tuple, it rejects CT and returns noting to A.
Otherwise, it turns to the next step.
· For such a tuple (mH1 , hH1), the entry mH1 can be valued as
mH1 = g||z||yj ′||m′, then C extracts yj ′ and m′ from mH1 . C
latter searches the hash list LH1 thoroughly to find whether there
exists a tuple (mH2 , hH2) in LH2 such that (y′j)
hH1
= mH2 , if there does not exist such a tuple, then C rejects CT
and returns noting to A. Otherwise, it turns to the next step.
· For the qualified tuple (mH2 , hH2), C computes a element m′′ =
c7 ⊕ hH2 and checks whether the equation m′ = m′′ holds.
· C responds A with m′ if the above equation holds, otherwise it
rejects CT and returns noting to A.
We argue that the above simulation of the unsigncryption process
is identical to executing the Unsigncrypt algorithm from the view of
the adversary A. The simulation takes use of all the elements in
CT during finding the plaintext m′ and employs nearly the same
technique to check the integrity of CT after retrieving m′ from CT .
– Open query: A is allowed to issue this Open query at any time during this
Query phase 1 with the queried message denoted by (CT,Ul), C responds
such query in the following manner when receiving the tuple (CT,Ul);
∗ When the intended receiver Ul of CT is not the chosen user Uj,
namely, Ul 6= Uj, as C knows the unsigncryption keys of all users in
{U} except the user Uj, it can execute the Open algorithm of our
scheme given the tuple (CT,Ul) and sends back the result denoted
by the tuple (u′i, c
′, s′) as the response where u′i is the identifier of
the signcrypter of CT and (c′, s′) is the proof value which proves the
above statement about u′i.
∗ When the intended receiver Ul of CT is also the chosen user Uj, that
is, Ul = Uj, C aborts the game.
• Challenge: When A decides to end the Query phase 1, it chooses two messages
m0,m1 fromM such that |m0| = |m1| and two users Ui, Ul ∈ {U} as the sender
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and intended receiver respectively, then it sends the tuple (m0,m1, Ui, Ul) to
C. When the intended receiver in the given tuple is not the user Uj, C aborts
the game. Otherwise, C chooses mb ∈ {m0,m1} and generates the challenge
ciphertext CT ∗ using the signcryption key ei of Ui and public key g
a of Uj as
follows;
– C chooses w1 ∈ {0, 1}`g , w2 ∈ {0, 1}k and computes
c∗1 = (g
b)w2 , c∗2 = (g
b)w1w2 , c∗3 = (g
a)w2 ,
c∗4 = ui(g
a)w1w2 , c∗5 = (g
b)eiw1 , c∗6 = (g
b)eiw1w2 .
– As C knows ei, w1, it can produce the proof value (c∗0, s∗1, s∗2, s∗3, s∗4) easily
following the Signcrypt algorithm of our scheme.
– C chooses Z∗ ∈ {0, 1}` and sets c∗7 = Z∗
C sends CT ∗ = (c∗1, c∗2, c∗3, c∗4, c∗5, c∗6, c∗7, c∗0, s∗1, s∗2, s∗3, s∗4) back to A as the chal-
lenge ciphertext.
• Query phase 2: After receiving the challenge ciphertext CT ∗, A can also issue
queries in this Query phase 2, the types of query allowed in this phase is the
same as that in the Query phase 1 and C answers them identical to what we
have described above. Here, the extra restriction comparing to the Query phase
1 is that Uj cannot appear in any unsigncryption key queries and (CT
∗, Uj)
cannot appear in any unsigncryption queries in this phase where CT ∗ is the
challenge ciphertext and Uj is the intended receiver of CT
∗. Assuming the
total number of Unsigncryption key query and that of open query issued by A
in Query phase 1 and Query phase 2 is qis and qo respectively.
• Guess: After completing the Query Phase 2, A makes a guess b′ from {0, 1}
and sends b′ to C.
Analysis. As analyzed in many other papers [LQ04, LYW+10], it is easy to show
that A will not able to realize that CT ∗, in fact, is not a valid signcryption for the
sender’s signcryption key ei and the intended receiver’s public key g
a unless it asks
for the hash value H2(gabeiw1w2). In that case, the value gabeiw1w2 would have been
inserted in the hash list L2 exactly as one of its entry, furthermore, it does not matter
if the simulation of A’s view is no longer perfect now. Because C knows ei, w1, w2,
the solution gab to the CDHCG problem instance (g, ga, gb) in the composite group
Z∗n can be computed from that entry. At the end of the game, assuming there are
qH2 entries in L2, C randomly chooses one from L2, then with probability 1qH2 , C will
find the solution correctly.
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Let E be the event that the value gabeiw1w2 is queried to H2 and Ẽ denotes
the event that the value gabeiw1w2 is not queried, we find that C solves the given
problem instance in event E with probability 1
qH2
. We denote Pr[b = b′] = 1
2
+ ε the








= Pr[b = b′|E] Pr[E] + Pr[b = b′|Ẽ] Pr[Ẽ]









So, Pr[E] ≥ 2ε. Let Pr[abort] denote that probability that C would not abort during
the simulation, then we have Pr[abort] = 1
t
where |{U}| = t Let AdvCDHCGC denote
that advantage that C can solves the given CDHCG problem instance, then we have
AdvCDHCGC = Pr[E ∧ abort]
1
qH2




Obviously, if ε is non-negligible, then AdvCDHCGC is non-negligible. That is, if A can
break the m-IND-CCA2 game with non-negligible probability ε, then C can solve the
CDHCG problem with non-negligible probability 2ε
tqH2
, here, we finish our proof. 
Theorem 5.2 Our secure communication scheme is an-CCA2 secure under our pre-
defined model assuming the Diffie-Hellman Decision (DHD) problem in composite
group is hard in the chosen group system (G, g, n) when the hash functionsH1,H2 are
modeled as random oracles. Concretely, if there is an adversary A which can break
the an-CCA2 security with non-negligible probability ε, supposing A makes at most
qis, qo queries to Unsigncryption key oracle and Open oracle respectively, then we can
construct another algorithm C solving the Diffie-Hellman Decision problem(DHD)
problem with probability at least 1
t
ε, where t is an integer.
Proof. Assuming there exists an adversary A which can break the an-CCA2 security
of our group signcryption scheme with non-negligible probability ε, then we can show
how to construct another algorithm C solving the DHD problem from A, C and A
interacts as below.
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• Setup: C is first given a group system (G, g, n), where n = pq, p, q are large
safe primes, G =< g >, (g|n) = 1, `g = |g| ≤ ` = |n|, and also a CDHCG
problem instance (g, ga, gb). C then executes the Setup algorithm and sends
the public parameter PM to A. Assuming there exists t users in the user group
{U}, C chooses one user Uj ∈ {U} and sets its signcryption key as sikj = ej
and its certificate tuple as (uj = z
1
ej , pkj = g
a), the unsigncryption key unskj
is unknown. For the rest of users in {U}/Uj, their keys and identifiers are
generated correctly following the Registration algorithm. Notice that after the
t users are all registered, the certificate repository CR should include all the t
users’ personal certificate, the user group set {U} should also be sent to A.
• Query phase 1: In this phase, A can ask a polynomially bounded umber of
queries in an adaptive way. As the types of queries allowed in this phase and
the strategy used by C to answer each of those queries are all the same as that
mentioned in the Query phase 1 of the previous security proof, we omit the
description here.
• Challenge: When A decides to end the Query phase 1, it chooses one message
m from M and one user Ul ∈ {U} as the intended receiver, then it sends the
tuple (m,Ul) to C. If the intended receiver in the given tuple is not the user
Uj, C aborts the game. Otherwise, C chooses an index b ∈ [t] and generates
the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ using the signcryption key eb of Ub and public
key ga of Uj as follows;
– C chooses w∗3 ∈R {0, 1}`g and asks the H1 oracle with message
g||z||Sebw∗3 ||m to get w∗2 = H1(g||z||Sebw
∗
3 ||m). As C controls H1 oracle,
it does the same as what we have described in the Query phase 1 of the





3 , c∗2 = s
w∗2w
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3 , c∗5 = s
ebw
∗











Here, the H2 oracle is also controlled by C, the strategy used by C to




3 during generating the challenge
ciphertext is also identical to that described in the previous security proof.
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∧ c∗6 = (c∗1)
β ∧ c∗6 = (c∗2)
α ∧
(2`1 − 2δ(`2+k)+1) < α < (2`1 − 2δ(`2+k)+1)}.
To do it, C first chooses c∗0 ∈R {0, 1}`, s∗1, s∗3 ∈R {0, 1}δ(`2+k), s∗2, s∗4 ∈R























C programs H1 in such a way that it sets
c∗0 = H1(g||z||t∗1||t∗2||t∗3||t∗4||c∗5||c∗6||c∗7)
and then adds this tuple (g||z||t∗1||t∗2||t∗3||t∗4||c∗5||c∗6||c∗7, c∗0) to the hash list
LH1 .
– After finishing the above procedures, C sets the challenge ciphertext































4) is valid from the view of the adversary A because C con-
trols H1 oracle.
• Query phase 2: After receiving the challenge ciphertext CT ∗, A can also issue
queries in this Query phase 2, the types of query allowed in this phase is the
same as that in the Query phase 1 and C answers them identical to what we have
described above. Here, the extra restriction comparing to the Query phase 1 is
that Uj cannot appear in any unsigncryption key query and (CT
∗, Uj) cannot
appear in any unsigncryption query and open query in this phase where CT ∗
is the challenge ciphertext and Uj is the intended receiver of CT
∗. Assuming
the total number of Unsigncryption key query and that of open query issued by
A in Query phase 1 and Query phase 2 is qis and qo.
• Guess: After completing the Query Phase 2, A makes a guess b′ from [t] and
sends b′ to C.
Analysis. Let Pr[b = b′] denote the probability that A wins the game, we consider
this probability in the following two different scenes,
• When (g, s, ga, S) ∈ Q(G), that is, logg ga 6= logs S, the challenge ciphertext
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CT ∗ can be valued as an one-time pad indeed and it would not reveal any
information about the choice b of C. In that case, A gains no help from this
challenge ciphertext and it has no choice but to make a random choice b′ about
b, so the probability Pr[b = b′] = 1
t
.
• When (g, s, ga, S) ∈ DH(G), that is, logg ga = logs S, the challenge ciphertext
CT ∗, in fact, is a valid ciphertext which encrypts m and ub. In this case, let
Pr[abort] denote the probability that the above simulation would not abort,
then Pr[abort] = 1
t
, if A can break the an-CCA2 security of our scheme with












Namely, if A can break the an-CCA2 security of our scheme with non-negligible
probability ε, then C can break the DHD problem with non-negligible probability
1
t
ε. Here, we finish our proof. 
Theorem 5.3 Our secure communication scheme is O-UF-CMA secure under our
predefined model assuming the Strong RSA problem is hard in the chosen group
system (G, g, n) when the hash functions H1,H2 are modeled as random oracles.
Concretely, if there is an adversary A which can break the O-UF-CMA security with
non-negligible probability ε, supposing A makes at most qH1 , qH2 , qs queries to the H1,
H2 oracle and Signcrypt oracle respectively, then we can construct another algorithm




where |G| = v.
Proof. Assuming there exists an adversary A which can break the O-UF-CMA
security of our scheme with non-negligible probability ε, then we can show how to
construct another algorithm C solving the Strong RSA problem from A, C and A
interacts as below.
• Setup: C is first given a group system (G, g, n) and an element z ∈ G, where
n = pq, p, q are large safe primes, G =< g >, |G| = v, (g|n) = 1, `g = |g| ≤
` = |n|. C then executes the Setup algorithm and sends the public parameter
PM to A. Assuming there exists t users in the user group {U}. For each user
Ui ∈ {U}, C executes the Registration algorithm of our scheme and generates
Ui’s public key pki, user certificate ui, signcryption key siki and unsigncryption
key unski correctly. After all t users are properly registered, C also sends the
user group set {U} to A.
• Query phase: In this phase, A can ask a polynomially bounded umber of
queries in an adaptive way. However, to imitate the behavior of the adversary
CHAPTER 5. PVSCUDP 97
A which is neither a registered user nor colluding with any registered user in
the system, we only allow A to ask the H1 query, H2 query, Signcrypt query,
Unisgncrypt query and Open query. As the description of the types of queries
allowed in this phase and the strategy used by C when answering each of those
queries are all the same as that aforementioned in the Query phase 1 of the
previous message confidentiality security proof, we omit it here.
• Forgery: In this phase, A itself chooses a message m ∈ M and also one user
Uj as the intended message receiver, then it asks the H1, H2 oracles and tries























Analysis. In fact, the given forgery CT ′ can be represented as a variant of the













h′ = c′0, δ






4). The adversary A wins the above game when A can pro-
duce a valid ciphertext (m′, h′, δ′) such that Verify(m′, h′, δ′) = 1, let Pr[A wins]
denote the probability of the event that A wins the game. According to the Forking
Lemma[PS00], we can treat this adversary A as a turning machine with a random
tape R′, if Pr[A wins] = ε is non-negligible, that is, A can produce a valid message
signature pair (m′, h′, δ′) successfully with non-negligible probability, then C can con-
trolA and execute a replay attack with the same random tape R′, and would produce





, where |G| denotes the order of G and Q is the total number of
hash and signing queries asked during the game.
Basing on the above result, when C gets CT ′ = (m′, h′, δ′) and CT ′′ = (m′,















xj as it knows the unsigncryption key xj of the



















s′1 = r1 − c′0(e′ − 2`1), s′2 = r2 − c′0e′w1,
s′3 = r3 − c′0(e′ − 2`1), s′4 = r4 − c′0e′w1,
s′′1 = r1 − c′′0(e′ − 2`1), s′′2 = r2 − c′′0e′w1,
s′′3 = r3 − c′′0(e′ − 2`1), s′′4 = r4 − c′′0e′w1.













According to the Verify algorithm of our scheme, if Verify(CT ′) = Verify(CT ′′)







= z. That is, if there exist an adversary A which
can win our O-UF-CMA game with negligible probability ε, then we can use it to
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find a pair of value (u′, e′) such that (u′)e
′
= z to break the Strong RSA problem




where |G| = v. Here we finish our proof. 
Theorem 5.4 Our secure communication scheme is I-UF-CMA secure under our
predefined model assuming the Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem is hard in the com-
posite group system (G, g, n) when the hash functions H1,H2 are modeled as random
oracles. Concretely, if there is an adversary A which can break the I-UF-CMA se-
curity with non-negligible probability ε, supposing A makes at most qH1 , qH2 , qsk, qs
queries to the H1, H2 oracle, Signcryption key oracle and Signcrypt oracle respec-
tively, then we can construct another algorithm C that solves the DL problem with




where |G| = v.
Proof. Assuming there exists an adversary A which can break the I-UF-CMA se-
curity of our scheme with non-negligible probability ε, then we can show how to
construct another algorithm C solving the DL problem from A, C and A interacts
as below.
• Setup: C is first given a group system (G, g, n) and a DL problem instance
(u′, z) where (u′, z) ∈ G2, where n = pq, p, q are large safe primes, G =< g >
, |G| = v, (g|n) = 1, `g = |g| ≤ ` = |n|. C then executes the Setup algorithm
and sends the public parameter PM to A. Assuming there exists t users which
consist of the user group {U}. C randomly chooses one user Ui ∈ {U} as the
user which it wants A to impersonate. For each user Uj ∈ {U}/Ui, C executes
the Registration algorithm of our scheme for that user and generates Uj’s public
key pkj, user certificate uj, signcryption key sikj and unsigncryption key unskj
correctly. For the specific user Ui, C sets its certificate ui = u′, C further
random chooses xi ∈ Zv, then sets Ui’s public key pki = gxi and unsigncryption
key unski = xi. Assuming there exists a user certificate repository CR which
includes all the t users’ certificate, after all t users are properly registered, C
also sends the user group set {U} and also CR to A.
• Query phase: In this phase, A can ask a polynomially bounded umber of queries
in an adaptive way and is allowed to ask all types of query described previously.
However, if A make signcryption key query on user Ui and make Signcrypt query
with queried message (m,Ul, Uj) where Ul = Ui, C would abort the game. As
the description of the types of query allowed in this phase and the strategy
used by C when answering each of those queries are all the same as that afore-
mentioned in the Query phase 1 of the previous message confidentiality security
proof, we omit it here. Assuming A makes at most qH1 , qH2 , qsk, qs queries to
the H1, H2 oracle, Signcryption key oracle and Signcrypt oracle respectively in
this phase.
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• Forgery: In this phase, A itself chooses a message m ∈ M and also one user
Uj as the intended message receiver, then it asks the H1, H2 oracles and tries






















4) on behalf of
Ui.
Analysis. In fact, the given forgery CT ′ can be represented as a variant of the













h′ = c′0, δ






4). The adversary A wins the above game when A can pro-
duce a valid ciphertext (m′, h′, δ′) such that Verify(m′, h′, δ′) = 1 and
Open(m′, h′, δ′, unskj) = u
′, let Pr[A wins] denote the probability of the event that A
wins the game. According to the Forking Lemma [PS00], we can treat this adversary
A as a turning machine with a random tape R′, if Pr[A wins] = ε is non-negligible,
that is, A produces a valid message signature pair (m′, h′, δ′) successfully, then C can
control A and execute a replay attack with the same random tape R′, and would pro-






, where |G| = v and Q is the total number of hash and signing
queries asked during the game.
Basing on the above result, when C gets CT ′ = (m′, h′, δ′) and CT ′′ = (m′, h′′, δ′′)


















s′1 = r1 − c′0(e′ − 2`1), s′3 = r3 − c′0(e′ − 2`1),
s′′1 = r1 − c′′0(e′ − 2`1), s′′3 = r3 − c′′0(e′ − 2`1).







According to the Verify algorithm of our scheme, if Verify(CT ′) = Verify(CT ′′) =







= z. Let Pr[abort] denote the probability that our
simulation would not abort and AdvDLC denote the probability that C would break



















t(qH1 + qH2 + qs)
Namely, if there exist an adversary A which can win our I-UF-CMA game with





, where t is an integer. Here we finish our proof. 
Theorem 5.5 Our secure communication scheme is R-UF-CMA secure under our
predefined model assuming the Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem is hard in the com-
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posite group system (G, g, n) when the hash functions H1,H2 are modeled as random
oracles. Concretely, if there is an adversary A which can break the R-UF-CMA se-
curity with non-negligible probability ε, supposing A makes at most qH1 , qo times of
queries to the H1 and Open oracle respectively, then we can construct another algo-




where |G| = v.
Proof. Assuming there exists an adversary A which can break the I-UF-CMA se-
curity of our scheme with non-negligible probability ε, then we can show how to
construct another algorithm C solving the DL problem from A, C and A interacts
as below.
• Setup: C is first given a group system (G, g, n) and an element z ∈ G, where
n = pq, p, q are large safe primes, G =< g >, |G| = v, (g|n) = 1, `g = |g| ≤
` = |n|. C then executes the Setup algorithm and sends the public parameter
PM to A. Assuming there exists t users in the user group {U}. For each user
Ui ∈ {U}, C executes the Registration algorithm of our scheme and generates
Ui’s public key pki, user certificate ui, signcryption key siki and unsigncryption
key unski correctly. Assuming C has a user certificate repository CR which
includes all users’ personal certificate. After all t users are properly registered,
C also sends the user group set {U} and also the certificate repository CR to
A.
• Query phase: In this phase, A can ask a polynomially bounded umber of
queries in an adaptive way. As the types of queries allowed in this phase and
the strategy used by C when answering each of those queries are all the same
as that aforementioned in the Query phase 1 of the previous security proof, we
omit the description here. Assuming A makes at most qH1 , qo times of queries
to the H1 and Open oracle respectively
• Challenge: In this phase, A chooses one message m ∈ M and one user
Uj ∈ {U} as the intended receiver of the chosen message, then A sends
the tuple (m,Uj) to C. After receiving it, C chooses one user Ui such that
Ui 6= Uj as the signcrypter of m and generates the challenge ciphertext as

























C sends this tuple (CT ′, Uj) back to A.
• Forgery: Upon receiving (CT ′, Uj), A tries to give a tuple (CT ′, u′, c′, s′) such
that u′ ∈ CR to convince others that the signcrypter of CT ′ is the user with
personal certificate u′.
Analysis. A wins the above game when Justify(CT ′, u′, c′, s′) = 1 ∧ u′ 6= ui. Let
Pr[A wins] denote the probability of the event that A wins the above game. In
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fact, the forged tuple (CT ′, u′, c′, s′) can be valued as a variant of the Schnorr sig-
nature (m′, h′, δ′) where m′ = (CT ′, u′), h′ = c′, δ′ = s′. According to the Forking
Lemma[PS00], we can treat this adversary A as a turning machine with a random
tape R′, if Pr[A wins] = ε is non-negligible, that is, A produces a valid message
signature pair (m′, h′, δ′) successfully, then C can control A and execute a replay
attack with the same random tape R′, and would produce another valid signature






where |G| = v and Q is the total number of hash and signing queries asked during
the game.
When C gets two message signature pairs (m′, h′, δ′) and (m′, h′, δ′) such that
Justify(m′, h′, δ′) = Justify(m′, h′′, δ′′) = 1, it can find the following relationship
between the four values in our scheme;
s′ = w0 − c′x′, s′′ = w0 − c′′x′,
where w0, x
′ are unknown, we derive the value x′ = s
′−s′′
c′′−c′ from them.





Namely, if A can win the above game with non-negligible probability ε, then we





. Here we finish the proof. 
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, to securely send the sensitive information from the surveillance
node to the server in the security surveillance system, we present a publicly verifi-
able secure communication scheme with user and data privacy. With our scheme,
the message filter can filtrate information sent not from the surveillance nodes with-
out requiring any secret and compromising the nodes’ privacy. In our scheme, the
anonymity of one node can only be revoked by the server, which enables only the
server to build the searchable database using the node’s location as index. Besides,
given a ciphertext, the surveillance server can also give a proof to convince anyone
the origination of it without leaking the data privacy. Such property enables the
message auditor and others to check the origination of a ciphertext latter without
knowing the underlying plaintext. We give formal security models and proofs to





ACE with compact ciphertext size
and decentralized sanitizers
We present an access control encryption (ACE) scheme which enjoys advantages over
previous works in several aspects. Our scheme ensures not only compact ciphertext
size but also small size of keys installed in each user in the ACE system. Besides,
our scheme is believed to be the first implementation of ACE with decentralized
sanitizers. Comparing to ACE constructions with only one sanitizer, our scheme is
more secure and reliable since it does not suffer from the so called single point failure.
To discuss the security of our scheme in detail, we present two models catering to
the no-read rule and no-write rule security requirements respectively. Additionally,
our extended no-write rule model allows the corruption of some sanitizers in the
ACE system and thus is more stronger than the one proposed in schemes with only
one sanitizer. We prove the security of our scheme under the two models.
6.1 Introduction
Background. The recently proposed primitive Access Control Encryption(ACE)
[DHO16] gives the first cryptographic realization of the classical Bell-Lapudala ac-
cess control model [BL96]. By giving different roles to different users, it enables
fine-grained access control in terms of which messages are allowed to be received
and sent respectively by one specific user, which properties are also defined as the
read rule and write rule of the ACE. In [DHO16], Damgard et. al. assume that there
must exist one special party named sanitizer in ACE to fully control the communi-
cation channel, which means all outgoing messages must pass through the sanitizer,
otherwise, the desirable access control strategies, no-read-up and the no-write down
exactly, can never be enforced successfully. In fact, such assumption is also held in
subsequent papers related to the ACE [FGKO17][TZMT17]. Furthermore, the ACE
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enjoys extra benefit with the existence of the sanitizer, that is, the sanitizer can
prohibit communications between even corrupted senders and corrupted receivers,
and it is this property that had seldom be considered by previous cryptographic
primitives.
Since the role played by the sanitizer is of vital importance in ACE, the se-
curity concerns on it should be considered carefully and thoroughly. According to
the previous works, the minimum requirement of the sanitizer is that it should be
semi-trusted. Explicitly, the sanitizer is trusted to follow the protocol specification
honestly but may try to learn additional information by utilizing other attacks such
as collusion. However, we argue that the sanitizer should also be extremely reli-
able, namely, the so called single point failure should never happen. Literally, if the
sanitizer cannot work properly in some instances, such as out-of-power or off-line,
none of the security properties, the no-read-rule and no-write-rule indeed, of the
ACE scheme would be guaranteed further. In this chapter, we show our interest on
the problem how to increase the reliability of the sanitizer in ACE and therefore
increase the robustness of the whole ACE scheme.
Existing ACEs. In [DHO16], Damgard et. al. aims to construct the ACE scheme
in such a way that the functionality of the sanitizer is simplified as much as possible
and the knowledge it learns is minimal. Namely, the sanitizer must process every
incoming ciphertexts in an easy way, and the processing depends neither on the
original message of the ciphertext nor on the access policies in the system. Even
the resulted ACE scheme satisfies the requirements mentioned above properly, the
sanitizer in the scheme still learns too much. Explicitly, in Damgard’s work, the
sanitizer utilizes keyed-sanitation algorithm to process received ciphertexts, which
requires the sanitizer to be installed with a set of sanitizing keys which are indeed
the additive inverse of all uses’ encryption keys in the ACE. This fact implies that
the sanitizer can create new access polices and then manipulate the communication
in the system when collusion attack is allowed. More precisely, the sanitizer can
collude with one user and allocate several encryption keys, which are not owned by
this user before, to it, the sanitizer therefore empowers this user with the capability
to send messages to users who it cannot communicate with previously. In this case,
the sanitizer actually creates new access policies. To solve such problem, Fuchsbauer
et. al. [FGKO17] gives new construction of the ACE in which the sanitizer does not
need sanitizing keys to do sanitation.
The newly constructed ACE scheme in [FGKO17] improved Damgard’s scheme
in two aspects. To begin with, the complexity, in terms of key and ciphertext size,
of the proposed scheme in [FGKO17] is polylogarithmic in terms of the numbers
of identities n in the system under standard cryptographic assumptions, while that
of the scheme in [DHO16] is exponential in n under the same kind of assumptions.
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Most importantly, the constructions in [DHO16] need the sanitizer to store some
secret information, such requirement could cause several security issues mentioned
above and then incur the proposed ACE scheme insecure. In contrast, the scheme
proposed in [FGKO17] does not need secret keys to do sanitation and therefore does
not have such problem. As a result, it significantly reduces the probability of break-
ing the security of the scheme. Also, benefiting from the non-keyed sanitation, the
sanitizing algorithm of the sanitizer in [FGKO17] is oblivious to the keys of the pos-
sible receivers of a incoming ciphertext. However, the sanitizer in [DHO16] has to
sanitize each component of the incoming ciphertext using a receiver-dependent pro-
cedure. Literally, the scheme in [FGKO17] also has advantage over that in [DHO16]
with respect to the efficiency of the sanitizing algorithm.
Motivations. Since the proposing of the primal work in [DHO16], one successive
work is primarily on improving the efficiency of the construction from standard
cryptographic assumptions [FGKO17]. There also exists a work giving new con-
structions from non-standard ones such as cryptographic obfuscation or learning
with error(LWE) assumption [TZMT17]. It has been declared in [FGKO17] that it
is still unclear whether there exists ACE scheme with compact size ciphertext under
standard assumptions. Considering there is no compact size ciphertext ACE scheme
under non-standard assumptions found in previous works, in this chapter, we are
trying to give such a ACE construction. Besides, as we have discussed before, the
ACE scheme with only one sanitizer empowers the sanitizer with the capability of
producing new access policies. Furthermore, such scheme also encounters single-
point-failure problem. Either of those problems would incur the insecurity of the
ACE system. Since such problems in ACE systems has seldom been considered or
addressed before, we treat it as one of our concern in this chapter.
Contributions. In this chapter, our contribution focuses on the following two as-
pects; We give the first ACE scheme construction with compact size ciphertext.
Our construction borrows idea from the primitive anonymous broadcast encryption
[LPQ12], the resulted scheme keeps not only the ciphertext size compact but also
the key size of each users in the ACE compact. Literally, the key size of our ACE
scheme is polylogarithmic in terms of the number of layers in the ACE, while that
in [DHO16] and [FGKO17] is exponential and polylogarithmic respectively in terms
of the number of users. As the number of layers should be at least smaller than that
of users in the ACE, the key size of our construction should be more compact than
that in previous construction mentioned before.
Our more significant contribution of this chapter is giving a decentralized im-
plementation of the sanitizer in the ACE to restrain its capability and also increase
its reliability. In this chapter, we use secret sharing technique to allow the sanitizing
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key to be shared among n sanitizers, and only exact t of them can collaboratively
transform a ciphertext into a valid sanitized ciphertext. Which can then be correctly
decrypted by its receivers. In our construction, each of the n sanitizers is installed
with an unique sanitizing key and would execute the same sanitizing algorithm on
the ciphertexts, which are either not sanitized or partially sanitized. One ciphertext
can only be viewed as a partially sanitized ciphertext and cannot be decrypted by
its intended receivers until it is processed by t sanitizers. Unlike previous scheme
with only one sanitizer, our construction distributes the sanitizing functionality of
the origin ACE among n sanitizers. It is impossible for one of sanitizers in our
construction to produce a new access policy, so our construction imposes restric-
tion on the capability of the sanitizer. Besides, aone message sender in our ACE
construction can choose the t sanitizers itself to collaboratively produce a valid san-
itized ciphertext. Even some of the n sanitizers cannot provide service or off-line,
the whole ACE system can never encounter the single-point-failure and still work
as normal. Our construction improves the reliability of the sanitizer and even the
robustness of the whole ACE system.
6.1.1 Chapter Organization
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we first formalize
useful notations and primitives, then we give a definition of our ACE scheme. We
also present two security models to cover the no-read rule and no-write rule prop-
erty in this part. In Section 6.3, in order to make the description of our scheme
more understandable, we first present a new notion of ”sanitizing pipeline”, then
we present a concrete construction of our ACE with compact size ciphertext and
decentralized sanitizers. We give security proofs in Section 6.4 and conclude this
chapter in Section 6.5.
6.2 Primitives and Definitions
Notations. Here, for the benefit of consistency, we give the notations used through-
out the whole chapter. There are always three types of users involved in the ACE
scheme, we denote them the message sender Se, the message sanitizer San and the
message receiver Re separately. For a specific user, he can play the role of both
Se and Re. We use ke, kd to represent this user’s encryption and decryption key
respectively. Assuming there are l layers in the ACE system, when a user in layer
α ∈ [l] can send messages to a receiver in layer β ∈ [l], we use the notation α×β → 1
to denote such access policy, otherwise α × β → 0. We use the access policy set
P : [l] × [l] → {0, 1} to cover the collection of all the access polices defined in the
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ACE system. When there exist n message sanitizers in our ACE definition, we
assume each of them hold a unique secret sanitizing key ks. In order to keep the
consistency of the description of our ACE system, we use [u+1,u+n] to denote the
list {u + 1, u + 2, · · · , u + n} and to represent identities of the n sanitizers. For
simplicity, we use the notation [u+ n] to represent all identities of users involved in
the ACE definition.
6.2.1 Primitives
Broadcast Encryption. The cryptographic primitive Broadcast Encryption(BE)
was first introduced by Fiat et. al. in [FN93], it ensures that a message sender can
choose a group of users and send encrypted messages to them, also, only users in
the chosen group can decrypt such ciphertext using their private keys. According
to [BGW05], a broadcast encryption system, without lose of generality, consists of
the following four algorithms:
• Setup(λ, n, `). Takes as input the security parameter λ, the number of receivers
n and the maximal size ` ≤ n of a broadcast recipient group, it outputs the
master public and secret key mpk,msk.
• KeyGen(i,msk). On inputs an index i ∈ {1, · · · , n} and the master secret key
msk, this algorithm outputs a decryption key di for that user.
• Enc(S,mpk). On input a subset S ⊂ {1, ·, n} and the master public key mpk,
when |S| ≤ `, this algorithm outputs a pair (Hdr,K) where Hdr is called
the herder and K ∈ K is a message encryption key. Where K is the key
space of one symmetric encryption scheme Esym. Let SymEnc and SymDec
be the encryption and decryption algorithm of Esym respectively. Let M be
the message to be broadcast to the users in set S and CM ← SymEnc(K,M)
be the encryption of M under the symmetric key K. The broadcast message
to users in S consists of (S,Hdr, CM).
• Dec(S, i, di, Hdr,mpk). Takes as input a subset S ⊂ {0, · · · , n}, a user with
identity i ∈ {1, · · · , n} and the decryption key di, if i ∈ S, then the algorithm
outputs a symmetric key K ∈ K. K then can be used to decrypt CM to obtain
M .
Since its invention in [FN93], many BE systems have been proposed and enjoy vari-
ous flavors; some of BE schemes [BH08, KSAS15] may follow the traditional public
key encryption construction while most of them [BGW05, Del07, DPP07, GW09,
BWZ14, PPSS13] apply the hybrid encryption methodology, with such technique,
the whole ciphertext of the BE system can be represented as a tuple with two
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parts (Hdr,Csk,m) where Hdr is an encryption of a symmetric key sk and Csk,m is a
symmetric encryption of the broadcast contents using the sk. The chosen receiver
group in the BE schemes could be static [FN93, ZWM13] or dynamic [DPP07], if
the receiver group can be changed by the broadcaster freely, we say it is dynamic,
otherwise static. In some BE schemes, the receivers’ keys can even be revoked
[SCG+16, LMG+17] to achieve forward-secrecy. One fundamental security property
of the BE is collision resistance, a broadcast encryption is said to be (t, n)−collusion
secure if for any subset R, where R ⊂ U , |R| = r, r ≤ t, |U| = n, users in R can by
no means infer information about the broadcast messages, the broadcast encryption
with (n, n)−collusion secure is said to be fully collusion resistance, BE schemes of
such kind can be found in [BGW05, DPP07].
Considering providing key-privacy, or receiver anonymity [BBDP01], in BE
schemes, Libert et. al. [LPQ12] proposed the anonymous broadcast encryption,
the two constructions given in that paper are generic and take one IND-CCA se-
cure PKE as their basis. To hide the real intended receivers of a broadcast content,
the schemes are constructed in such a manner that the resulted ciphertext size is
linear with the number of users in the BE system. This paper also declared that it
should be impossible to construct anonymous broadcast encryption with compact
size ciphertext. Latter, [FP12] gives the first anonymous broadcast encryption with
sublinear ciphertexts, however, the proposed schemes is based the anonymous IBE
and such requirement is stronger than that in [LPQ12], besides, the security of the
schemes is analyzed under the so-called subset cover framework, which is seldom
used before. It seems feasible to give anonymous broadcast encryption when the
intended receiver is static, and the construction in [ZWM13] gives evidence to this
statement.
Secreting Sharing. The secret sharing scheme has been invented decades ago and
usually acts as a very important ingredient in many cryptographic protocols such as
secure multi-party computation, threshold cryptography, access control, attribute-
based encrypiton and generalized oblivious transfer [Tas11].
Generally, one secret sharing scheme involves a dealer who holds the whole secret
s, a set of n parties, each of whom holds a share of the secret of the dealer, and a
collection AS of subsets of users from the n parties called the access structure. The
secret sharing scheme can be defined using the following algorithms;
• Setup(λ, n). Given the security parameter λ and the whole n parties involved
in the scheme, the dealer produces a secret s it wants to share as well as an
access structure AS. The dealer keeps s and sends AS to all the n parties.
Note that if AS is the collection of all possible subsets of at least t users from
the n parties, then such scheme is called the specific t out of n threshold secret
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sharing.
• ShDis(AS, s, i). Given AS, s and one user’s identity i, the dealer distributes
one secret share vi to that user.
• SeCon(AS, {vi}). For one user with identity i, if he has received a set of secret
shares {vi} from other users and those users can form at least one subset in
AS, then this user can reconstruct the whole secret s from {vi}
The scheme ensures that any subset in the access structure AS can reconstruct the
secret from shares of users in that subset collaboratively and any subset not in AS
can reveal nothing even partial information about the secret. Despite the fact that
there exist many different types of secret sharing schemes at present such as the
threshold kind in [Sha79], the undirected s − t connectivity kind in [BI92] and the
monotone formulae construction kind in [BL88], we give a secret sharing scheme
which is similar to the classical shamir one but does not inherit the threshold char-
acteristic. Explicitly, our scheme demands that each subset of the access structure
contains only t users and only the exact t users in one specific subset of the access
structure can reconstruct the secret collaboratively.
6.2.2 Defining Our ACE
An ACE scheme with decentralized sanitizers is defined by the following polynomial
time algorithms:
• Setup(P, λ). On input the security parameter λ and a access policy set P :
[u] × [u] → {0, 1}, the Setup algorithm outputs a master secret key msk and
the public parameter pp, which include the description of the message space
M, the ciphertext space C and the sanitized ciphertext space C ′.
• KeyGen(msk, i, t). On input msk, an identity i ∈ [u + n] and a user type
t ∈ {Se,Re, San}, the key generation algorithm KeyGen produces the following
different types of keys accordingly:
– kei = KeyGen(msk, i, Se) when the user with identity i is a message
sender, t = Se, and kei is called the encryption key for that user.
– kdi = KeyGen(msk, i, Re) when the user with identity i acts as a message
receiver, t = Re, and kdi is called the decryption key for that user.
– ksi = KeyGen(msk, i, San) when the user with identity i plays the role
of a message sanitizer, t = San, and ksi is called the sanitizing key for
that user.
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• Enc(kei,m). The encryption algorithm Enc, on input an encryption key kei
and a message m ∈M, outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C.
• Sanit(c, SPl). For one incoming ciphertext c ∈ C, a sanitizer in one chosen
sanitizing pipeline SPl would process it using this sanitation algorithm Sanit
with its own sanitizing key, and then relay the result to another sanitizer in the
same path, and the next sanitizer would do the same as its predecessor. Our
ACE scheme with decentralized sanitizers requires that c should be processed
by all t sanitizers in the sanitizing pipeline SPl collaboratively before becoming
a valid sanitized ciphertext c′ ∈ C ′.
• Dec(c′, kdj). On input a sanitized ciphertext c′ ∈ C ′ and a decryption key kdj,
the decryption algorithm Dec recovers the message m′ ∈M∪ {⊥}.
6.2.3 Security Notions for Our ACE
Our ACE scheme must satisfy requirements formalized below:
Definition 6.1 (Correctness) For all m ∈M, i, j ∈ [u] such that P (i, j) = 1:
Pr[Dec(kdj, Sanit(kst, · · · , Sanit(ksl,Enc(kei,m)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
) 6= m] ≤ negl(λ)
with (pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, P ), kei ← KeyGen(msk, i, Se),kdj ← KeyGen(msk, j,
Re) and ksl ← KeyGen(msk, l, San), where l ∈ [u + 1, u + n]. The above notation
denotes that the encrypted message should be processed by exact t different sanitizers
in the same sanitizing pipeline before becoming a valid sanitized ciphertext and then
being decrypted to a valid plaintext, otherwise, the probability of a correct decryption
should be negligible. The probability is taken over the random coins of all involved
algorithms.
Definition 6.2 (No-Read Rule) To define the No-Read Rule in our ACE sch-
eme, we consider the game, which is played between a challenger C and an adversary
A, described in Table 6.1.
Where P : [u]× [u]→ {0, 1} is the given access policy set and t ∈ {Se,Re, San},
|m0| = |m1|, i ∈ [u] and for all queries to OG with q = (j, Re), the equation
P (i, j) = 0 always hold. we say that the adversary A wins the No-Read game if its
output b′ = b.
Let Pr[A wins the No-Read game] denote the probability the A wins the pre-
defined game and AdvNo-ReadA (ACE) its advantage to win the game, then an ACE
scheme is said to satisfy the No-Read Rule if for all probabilistic polynomial time
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Table 6.1: The No-Read Rule
Game Definition Oracle Definition
1. (pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, P ); OG(i, t) :
2. (m0,m1, i)← AOG(·),OE(·)(pp); 1. ki ← KeyGen(msk, i, t)
3. b← {0, 1}
4. c← Enc(KeyGen(msk, i, Se),mb) OE(i,m) :
5. c′ ← SanitOG()(· · · ,SanitOG()(ks1, c))︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
1. kei ← KeyGen(msk, i, Se);
6. b′ ← AOG(·),OE(·)(c′) 2. c← Enc(kei,m)
3. c′ ← SanitOG()(· · · ,SanitOG()(ks1, c))︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
(PPT) algorithm A




Remark. The No-Read Rule model in [DHO16] also covers the sender anonymity, or
key-privacy, property when the second, fourth step of our game definition is changed
to
(m0,m1, i0, i1)← AOG(·),OE(·)(pp), c← Enc(KeyGen(msk, ib, Se),mb)
accordingly and the requirement P (i, j) = 0 is changed to
m0 = m1, P (i0, j) = P (i1, j).
It is easy to find that our model can be extended to guarantee the sender anonymity
with the above minimal modification, and the corresponding security proof would
not be changed a lot indeed. Here, for simplicity , we first concentrate on the basic
No-Read property.
Definition 6.3 (No-Write Rule) To define the No-Write Rule in our ACE sch-
eme, we consider the game, which is played between a challenger C and a stateful
adversary A, described in Table 6.2.
Let QS (resp. Q) be the set of queries issued by A to OS (resp. both OS and OR).
Let IS be all the identities i ∈ [u] such that (i, Se) ∈ QS and let J be the set of all
identities j ∈ [u] such that (j, Re) ∈ Q. When (l, San) /∈ Q, i′ ∈ IS ∪ {0} and ∀i ∈
IS, j ∈ J, P (i, j) = 0, if the adversary’s final output b′ = b, we say that A wins the
No-Write game defined above.
Let Pr[A wins the No-Write game] denote the probability when the event b′ = b
happens and AdvNo-WriteA (ACE) denote A’s advantage when A wins this game, then
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Table 6.2: The No-Write Rule
Game Definition Oracle Definition
1. (pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, P ); OS(j, Se) :
2. (i′, c,m)← AOS(·),OE(·)(pp); 1. k ← KeyGen(msk, j, Se)
3. kei′ ← KeyGen(msk, i′, Se);
4. ksl ← KeyGen(msk, l, San), · · · , kst︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
;
5. b← {0, 1}; OR(j, Re) :
if b = 0, c′ ← Sanit(· · · ,Sanit(ks1,Enc(kei′ ,m)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
; 1.k ← KeyGen(msk, j,Re)
if b = 1, c′ ← Sanit(· · · ,Sanit(ks1, c))︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
OE(i, r) :
6. b′ ← AOS(·),OR(·)(c′) 1. kei ← KeyGen(msk, i, Se);
2. c← Enc(kei, r)
3. c′ ← Sanit(· · · , Sanit(ks1, c))︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
we say an ACE scheme satisfies the No-Write Rule if for all PPT A




Remark. The No-Write security model here also ensures that any set of senders,
even corrupted, cannot transfer any information to any set of receivers unless at
least one of the senders is allowed to communicate with at least one of the receivers
by the access policy P . In fact, the above model does not consider whether the
sanitizers could be corrupted and thus is valued as the Simplified No-Write Rule.
However, in our ACE scheme with decentralized sanitizers, such corruption is per-
mitted, moreover, our scheme even allows the A to corrupt more than t sanitizers
as long as the corrupted sanitizers cannot form a valid ”sanitizing pipeline”. We
give another security model, the extended no-write rule model, to formalize such
property.
Before defining a security model allowing the corruption of the decentralized
sanitizers in our ACE, we would like to present a simple analysis about the security
goal of the adversary captured by such model. According to what we have discussed
previously, the sanitizer in [DHO16], in fact, can produce new access policies using
the sanitizing key held by itself, which actually violate the No-Write Rule security
requirement of the ACE scheme and should be forbidden, while our ACE with
decentralize sanitizers gives a promising way to prevent such behavior. In order to
produce a valid sanitized ciphertext, our scheme enforces t sanitizers in one specific
”sanitizing pipeline” to execute the sanitizing algorithm collaboratively rather than
only one single sanitizer. The result is that, if one new access policy is produced,
there should be at least t nodes in one specific pipeline colluded together. So, when
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Table 6.3: The Extended No-Write Rule
Extended No-Write Rule
Game Definition Oracle Definition
1. (pp,msk)← Setup(1λ, P ); OS(i, Se) :
2. (m0,m1, j)← AOS(·),OE(·)(pp); 1. kei ← KeyGen(msk, i, Se)
3. kdj ← KeyGen(msk, j, Re)
4. ke
′
i ← AOSan(·),OS(·)(pp) OR(j, Re) :
5. b← {0, 1} 1. kdj ← KeyGen(msk, j, Re)
6. c← Enc(kei′,mb) OSan(l, San) :
7. c′ ← Sanit(· · · , Sanit(ks1, c))︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
1. ksl ← KeyGen(msk, l, San)
8. b′ ← AOSan(·),OE(·)(c′) OE(i,msg) :
1. kei ← KeyGen(msk, i, Se);
2. c← Enc(kei,msg)
defining security model with respect to the sanitizer in our scheme, the goal of the
adversary is to produce a new access policy without corrupting all t users in one
specific ”sanitizing pipeline” .
Definition 6.4 (Extended No-Write Rule) To define a model capturing the se-
curity of the sanitizers, we consider the game, which is played between a challenger
C and an adversary A, described in Table 6.3.
Let QS, QR and QSan be the set of queries issued by A to OS, OR and OSan
respectively. Let IS be all the identities i ∈ [u] such that (i, Se) ∈ QS, JR be
the set of all identities j ∈ [u] such that (j, Re) ∈ QR and LSan be all identities
l ∈ [u+ 1, u+ n] such that (l, San) ∈ QSan respectively. We have
• ∀i ∈ IS, j ∈ J, P (i, j) = 0,
• There exists no ”sanitizing pipeline” whose users are all included in LSan.
If the adversary’s final output b′ = b, we say that A wins the Extended No-Write
Rule game defined above. Let Pr[A wins the game] denote the probability that b′ = b
and AdvEx-No-WriteA (ACE) denote A’s advantage when A wins this game, then we say
an ACE scheme satisfies the Extended No-Write Rule if for all PPT A




In fact, we find the above two security models, the simplified no-write rule and the
extended no-write rule, are considering the same security issue with only minimal
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differences. Namely, the former model defines one user i’s no-write property in such
a manner that i cannot send messages to another user j when the access policy
P (i, j) = 0 even i, j are all corrupted or i gets help from users who also cannot send
messages to j, while in the extended no-write rule model, user i’s no-write property
is defined similarly but with the exception that i can also gets help from at most t−1
sanitizers in one sanitizing pipeline rather than just from other users. Intuitively, the
extended no-write rule model defined here should have already covered the simplified
no-write rule model and is thus stronger than it.
6.3 The ACE with Decentralized Sanitizers
In this section, we first illustrate how to construct a sanitizing cluster and how a new
”sanitizing pipeline” with t sanitizers is formed when there are n sanitizers existed
in the cluster, we also show you that the whole number of sanitizing pipelines and
sanitizers in the sanitizing cluster can be increased in an on-demand manner. After
that, we give a description of our ACE scheme with compact ciphertext size and
decentralized sanitizers in detail.
6.3.1 The Sanitizing Cluster and Sanitizing Pipelines
We assume all sanitizers in our ACE system constitute a sanitizing clusters. Our
ACE with decentralized sanitizers requires that only t sanitizers can collaboratively
fulfill the sanitizing algorithm properly and converts one incoming ciphertext into a
valid sanitized ciphertext which can then be decrypted by the intended receiver. To
save the computational cost of the sanitizers in the sanitizing cluster when they do
sanitization, we introduce the notion sanitizing pipeline. A sanitizing pipeline can
be valued as a path predefined by the system authority containing a collection of
exact t sanitizers chosen by it from the sanitizer cluster. one ciphertext can never
be transformed into a valid sanitized ciphertext until it is processed by every nodes
in the pipeline chosen in advance by the message sender. The system authority can
actually produce as many sanitizing pipelines as it wants, and the collection of all
the pipelines is represented as {SP} which should be known by all the nodes in
the ACE system. Given a polynomial F (x) with degree t − 1 such that F (0) = y,
which is the secret to be shared. When one user with identity j wants to join the
sanitizing cluster as a sanitizer, the system authority chooses xj ∈ Zp and computes
yj = F (xj), then yj is allocated to this user as one of its secret, then the system
authority would also produce a new sanitizing pipeline spl and add this user as one
member of this pipeline. Furthermore, as the authority knows all the t sanitizers





xi−xj is computed by the authority in
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advance and then distributed to that sanitizer j. When one user with identifier j
gets its own secret share (yj, fj) and the sanitizing pipeline identifier spl, it can work
as a valid sanitizer member in the sanitizer cluster.
6.3.2 Our ACE Scheme With Compact Ciphertext Size and
Decentralized Sanitizers
Our ACE scheme with compact ciphertext size and decentralized sanitizers (AC-
CDS) is defined by the following algorithms;
• Setup(λ): This ACE system setup algorithm is executed by the system au-
thority. Given the security parameter λ, a bilinear map group system BM =
(p, g,G,G1, e : G × G → G1) is generated such that |p| = λ, g, h ∈ G are
two randomly selected generators of G and a secret value γ ∈ Zp is cho-
sen, sets w = gγ. The authority also chooses a cryptographic hash function
H : {0, 1}λ → Zp which will be viewed as the random oracle in the security
analysis. The authority also initializes the sanitizing clusters and sanitizing
pipelines using the initialization algorithm defined above, after that, assum-
ing there are n sanitizers and |{SP}| sanitizing pipelines in the ACE system,
notice that each element in {SP} contains a list of sanitizers’ identities and
represents a unique sanitizing pipeline. Assuming there are u users which can
play the role of the message sender and the message receiver, and each of them
lays in one specific layer, supposing there are µ layers at most in the ACE sys-
tem, let SLβ denote the collection of identities of users laying in the β-th layer
where 1 ≤ β ≤ µ, only the authority knows AC = (SL1 , SL2 , · · · , SLα , ·, SLµ),
that is, only the authority has the knowledge of which user lays in which layer
for all the u users. The authority also knows the whole sanitizing key y ∈ Z∗p.
The authority defines the key space KM = G1,the ciphertext space C = G6,
the sanitized ciphertext space C ′ = G6 respectively. The public parameter
pp = (BM, w,H, {SP},KM, C, C ′), the master secret key msk = (AC, γ, y).
• KeyGen(msk, pp, i, Lβ, ty): When given pp,msk, one specific users’ identity i,
the layer Lβ this user lays in and its user type ty ∈ {Se,Re, San}, the key
generation algorithm is executed by the authority as follows;
– When ty = Se, that is, the authority needs to generate an encryption
key kei for the user with identity i. The authority chooses xi
R← Z∗p for












, g−xiγ, e(g, h)xi , gy)
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– When ty = Re, that is, the authority needs to generate a decryption key
kdi for that user. When user with identity i lays in layer Lβ, he can
receiver messages sent from layers below its own, that is, his decryption
key should be able to decrypt messages sent from layers from L1 to Lβ.
Here the authority construct the decryption key of this user in such a
manner that kdi contains β components and each component is response
for decrypting ciphertexts from one specific layer. kdi can be represented
as;
kdi = (kdi0 = g
1
















– When ty = San, that is, the authority needs to generate a sanitizing
key ksi for that user. To do this, the authority chooses a m − 1 degree
function F (x) such that F (0) = y. For each sanitizer j in the specific
sanitizing pipeline, denoted by spl, the authority allocate a xj
R← Z∗p to
it and computes yj = F (xj), the sanitizing key ksi of the sanitizer with







• Enc(m, kei, pp): Our ACE scheme borrows idea from the hybrid encryption
scheme, that is, the asymmetric encryption scheme actually encrypts a sym-
metric encryption key, the real ciphertext is an encryption of the origin message
using a symmetric key encryption scheme with the symmetric key encrypted
by the previous asymmetric encryption scheme. Here, we only focus on the
asymmetric part of our whole ACE and just use SEsk(m) to represent the
symmetric encryption part. When given a message m ∈ M, one message
sender with identity i in layer Lβ encrypts it as follows;
k0 , k1, rs
R← Z∗p
C1 = g





















C5 = e(g, h)
xik1 , C6 = e(g, h)
xik1rs
The symmetric key should be sk = e(g, h)k0 , the real ciphertext should be
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C7 = SEsk(m). So , the whole ciphertext of our ACE is the tuple CT =
(Lβ, C1, C2, C3, C4,
C5, C6, C7). The message sender then chooses one sanitizing pipeline SPl from
all pipelines which are hard-wired with this sender.
• Sanit(CT v, pp, kslv+1): Given a ciphertext CT v = (Lβ, Cv1 , Cv2 , Cv3 , Cv4 , Cv5 , Cv6 ,
Civ), no matter whether it is received from the message sender or from a
sanitizer’s predecessor, this sanitizer does as follows;
rv+1






















Cv+15 = e(g, h)
xik1 , Cv+16 = e(g, h)
xik1rs(Cv5 )
rv+1 , Cv+17 = C
v
7
After this sanitizer proceeds the incoming ciphertext as above properly, it
would relay the partially sanitized ciphertext to the next sanitizer laying in
the same sanitizing pipeline as itself if it is not the final sanitizer in this
pipeline, otherwise, this sanitizer would relay the sanitized ciphertext to the
intended receiver.
Notice that all sanitizers in SPl will do the same as what we described above.
When one ciphertext tuple CT = (Lβ, C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6) goes through the
sanitizing pipeline SPl and is processed by each of the t sanitizers in SPl, the
finally sanitized ciphertext should be represent as:
Ct1 = C1 = g
−xiγk1 , Ct2 = g
−xiγk1rsg−k0γgy(C1)
r1+r2+···+rtksl1ksl2 · · · kslt,





















Ct5 = C5 = e(g, h)
xik1 , Ct6 = e(g, h)
xik1rs(C5)
r1+···+rt , Ct7 = C7
As we can see,
















= g−F (0) = g−y
When the last sanitizer in SPl has executed its sanitizing algorithm on one
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C ′4) to the intended receivers, where




r1+r2+···+rtksl1ksl2 · · · kslt
= g−(xik1(rs+r1+···+rt)+k0)γ






















C ′3 = C
t
6 = e(g, h)
xik1(rs+r1+r2+···+rt)
C ′4 = SEsk(m) where sk = e(g, h)
k0
and Lβ denotes the layer this message sender lays in.
• Dec(kdj, CT ′, pp): When given a properly sanitized ciphertext CT ′ and one
user’s decryption key kdj, this user would first judge whether he is able to
recover the origin message of the received ciphertext by checking whether the
layer the receiver lays in is higher than that of the message sender. If the










































Theorem 6.1 Our ACE scheme holds the No-Read Rule property assuming the
(f, g, F )−GDDHE problem is hard in the group system BM = (p, g0, h0,G1,GT ,
e(·, ·)) when the hash function H is modeled as random oracle. Concretely, if there
is an adversary A which can break our scheme with non-negligible probability ε,
supposing A makes at most qH , qke, qkd queries to the H hash oracle,encryption key
query oracle and decryption key query oracle respectively, then we can construct
another algorithm B that solves the (f, g, F )-GDDHE problem in the given group







· ε, where qH , qkd are defined above.
Proof. Assuming the adversary A can break our ACE scheme with non-negligible
probability ε, we show how to construct another algorithm B solving the (f, g, F )-
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GDDHE problem from A, B and A interacts as below.
• Setup. The algorithm B is first given a (f, g, F )−GDDHE problem instance
BM = (p,G1,GT , e(·, ·)), (g0, gγ0 , g
γ2















0 ) ∈ G1 and T ∈ GT
where p is a reasonably large prime number and also the order of G1 and GT .
Given the bilinear map group system BM = (p, g0, h0,G1,GT , e : G1 ×G1 →
GT ) from the problem instance, where |p| = λ, g0, h0 ∈ G1 are generators
of G1, B then executes the setup algorithm of our ACE scheme. B also ini-
tializes the sanitizing clusters and sanitizing pipelines using the initialization
algorithm defined in our ACE scheme, assuming there are s sanitizers and
|{SP}| sanitizing pipelines in the ACE system after the execution, notice
that each element in {SP} contains a list of sanitizers’ identities and repre-
sents a unique sanitizing pipeline. Assuming there are u users in the user
set {IDu} = {ID1, ID2, · · · , IDu}, where u < n, each of them lays in one
specific layer, supposing there are µ layers at most in the ACE system, let
SLβ denote the collection of identities of users laying in the β-th layer where
1 ≤ β ≤ µ, only B knows AC = (SL1 , SL2 , · · · , SLβ , ·, SLµ), that is, only B
has the knowledge of which user lays in which layer for all the u users. B
also chooses one element y ∈ Z∗p as the system sanitizing key. B defines the
key space KM = G1,the ciphertext space C = G6, the sanitized ciphertext
space C ′ = G6 respectively. B also chooses a cryptographic hash function
H : {0, 1}λ → Zp which will be viewed as the random oracle in the security
analysis.
To enable B to answer the three different types of queries, it randomly chooses
{I1, I2, · · · , IqH} from Zp, where qH ≤ t is the number of queries asked to the
H oracle. It also picks a random index i∗ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , qH}. B defines one




(x+ Ii) = FqH−1x
qH−1 + · · ·+ F2x2 + F1x1 + F (0)
B then sets g = gf(γ)0 .













B can also compute the tuple (h, hγ, · · · , hγn) from the given instance and the




1 , h1, h
γ
1 , · · · , h
γn−1
1 ).
B gives the public parameter pp = (BM, {IDu}, {SP},KM, C, C ′), B itself
knows y.
• Hash query phase. At any time, A can query the random oracle H, the total
number of distinct query to H is qH . In order to answer such query, B main-
tains a list LH and responds the query as follows.
For one query with input ID to the oracle H, B first checks whether there
already has been one tuple (ID, I) in the LH .
– If yes, B responds with H(ID) = I to the adversary.
– Otherwise, let ID be the i-th distinct query to H, B responds with
H(ID) = Ii to the adversary. B then add this new tuple (ID, Ii) to
the LH .
• Encryption key query phase. A can also ask encryption key queries to B at any
time. When A wants to get the encryption key of user with identity ID, B
answers such key query as follows.
– As B knows the access policy AC, it would first check which layer the
user with identity ID lays in.
– Supposing the user lays in the layer Lδ, B would then find all users
laying in or above this layer, that is, all users’ identities in the set SLδ ∪
SLδ+1, · · · , SLµ .
– B issues multiple hash queries toH for each identity in the aforementioned
set. B computes the coefficients of FLδ(x) =
∏
ID∈SLδ∪SLδ+1,··· ,SLµ (x +
H(ID))















ke4ID = e(g, h1)
xi = e(g0, h0)
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Obviously, all the above values are computable by using the given chal-
lenge problem instance, the defined function f(x),FLβ(x) and FLδ(x) .
– B gives keID = (ke0ID, ke1ID, ke2ID, ke3ID, ke4ID, ke5ID) as the respond to A.
• Decryption key query phase. A can query the decryption keys of users in the
ACE system at any time. When A sends the decryption key query with
identity ID as the queried message to A, B answers it using the following
steps.
– B first checks whether H(ID) = Ii∗ , if yes, B aborts the simulation.
Otherwise, B turns to the next step.
– B then identifies the layer this user lays in, say Lδ. If β < δ, B aborts
the simulation too. That is, A cannot answer decryption key queries for
users who can decrypt the challenge ciphertext.
– Otherwise, let the symbol QLδ denote IDi 6= ID and IDi ∈ SLδ ∪
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kd2ID = h
∏






































































As we can see, all the above values can be computed from the given
problem instance and the defined functions.
– B sends kdID = (kd0ID, kd1ID, · · · , kd
β
ID) as the respond to A.
• Challenge phase. In this phase, B randomly chooses two messages m0,m1 from
the message space M and the identity ID∗ he wishes to challenge, then it
sends (m0,m1, ID
∗) to B. Upon receiving this tuple, B does as following.
– B would first check whether H(ID∗) = Ii∗ , if not, B aborts the simulation.
Otherwise, B continues.
– Let SLβµ denote the set SLβ ∪ SLβ+1, · · · , SLµ , B chooses a random bit
b ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts mb using the encryption key of the user with
identity ID∗, the generated sanitized ciphertext C ′ is;

































– B then sends (C ′1, C ′2, C ′3, C ′4) to A as the challenger ciphertext.
• Guess. Finally, the adversaryA outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} about the encrypted
message mb, if b = b
′, then A wins the game.
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Analysis. Here, we finished the simulation part of our proof. Let Pr[b = b′] be the
probability A wins the above game, let AdvB(f,g,F )−gddhe denote the advantage of B
in solving the given (f, g, F )-GDDHE problem instance and ε denote the probability
A breaks our ACE scheme, to complete the proof, we give the following probability
analysis;
• When T is a random element in GT , it is easy to verify that the challenge






4) is like a one-time-pad, so A cannot get any
useful information from CT ′. In this case Pr[b = b′] = 1
2





0 ) = e(g, h)
k, we have
C ′1 = g
−k·γ·f(γ)
0 = g



















































, C ′4 = SEsk(mb)






4) is valid and can be
viewed as an encryption of mb from the point ofA. In this case, we first analyze
the probability of the event our simulation would not abort. Here, let Pr[NA]
be the probability of such event, then Pr[NA] = ( qH−1
qH
)
qkd , where qH , qkd is
the number of queries to the H oracle and the decryption key query oracle
respectively. As A can choose the target identity with probability 1
qH
and can








Form what we have analyzed, we have
AdvB











Here, we finish our proof. 
Theorem 6.2 Our ACE scheme holds the Extended No-Write Rule property assum-
ing the (f, g, F )−GDDHE problem is hard in the group system BM = (p, g0, h0,G1,
GT , e(·, ·)) when the hash function H is modeled as random oracle. Concretely, if
CHAPTER 6. ACE 124
there is an adversary A which can break our scheme with non-negligible probability
ε, supposing A makes at most qH , qke queries to the H hash oracle,encryption key
query oracle respectively, then we can construct another algorithm S that solves the





where qH , qkd are defined above.
Proof. Assuming the adversary A can break our ACE scheme with non-negligible
probability ε, we show how to construct another algorithm S solving the (f, g, F )-
GDDHE problem from A, S and A interacts as below.
• Init. In this phase, A first outputs the user j with identity IDj as the user it
wants to send messages to.
• Setup. In this phase, S does the same as B in the setup phase of the previous
security proof. Eventually, S gives the public parameter pp = (BM, {IDu},
{SP},KM, C, C ′) to A and keeps y as the secret.
• Hash query phase. What S does in this phase is also identical to B in the hash
query phase of the previous security proof, so we omit the description.
• Decryption key query phase. In this phase, A can only ask the decryption key
of the user j he wants to sends messages to. Literally, when A queries the
decryption key of a user whose identity is not IDj, S aborts the simulation.
Otherwise, S answers the decryption key query the same as B does in the
corresponding phase of the previous security proof.
• Encryption key query phase. In this phase, A can query as many as users’
encryption keys with the only retraction that P (i, j) = 0 holds for each i of
those users. To answer such encryption key queries, S does identical to B in
the corresponding phase of the last security proof.
• Sanitizing key query phase. In this phase, A can query the sanitizing key of
multiple sanitizers. The restriction here is that some of the sanitizers queried
in this phase cannot form a ”sanitizing pipeline ”. Because S knows the system
sanitizing key y, he can answer such query using the sanitizing key generation
algorithm described in the concrete construction of the ACE scheme.
• Challenge phase. Let SLβµ denote the set SLβ ∪ SLβ+1, · · · , SLµ . In this phase,
A chooses two message m0,m1 ∈ M, then it sends them to S. S chooses
a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}, then it generates the sanitized ciphertext C ′ =









































S then sends (C ′1, C ′2, C ′3, C ′4) to A as the challenger ciphertext.
• Guess phase. Finally, the adversary A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} about the
encrypted message mb, if b = b
′, then A wins the game.
Analysis. Let Pr[b = b′] be the probability A wins the above game, let
AdvC
(f,g,F )−gddhe denote the advantage of S in solving the given (f, g, F )-GDDHE
problem instance and ε denote the probability A breaks our ACE scheme, to com-
plete the proof, we give the following probability analysis;
• When T is a random element in GT , it is easy to verify that the challenge






4) is like a one-time-pad, so A cannot get any
useful information from CT ′. In this case Pr[b = b′] = 1
2





0 ) = e(g, h)
k, we have
C ′1 = g
−k·γ·f(γ)
0 = g



















































C ′4 = SEsk(mb)






4) is valid and can be
viewed as an encryption of mb from the point of A. In this case, we first
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analyze the probability of the event our simulation would not abort. Here, let
Pr[NA] be the probability of such event, then Pr[NA] = 1
qH
, where qH is the
number of queries to the H oracle. As A can break our ACE with probability





Form what we have analyzed, we have
AdvS







Here, we finish our proof. 
6.5 A Further Discussion
We propose a pure cryptographic solution in this chapter to resist cyberattacks on
centralized ACE systems. In practice, giant IT companies, such as IBM and Google,
would prefer to use the traditional fault tolerance solutions with replicated servers
to protect their centralized systems from being compromised.
While it seems that traditional replica-based solutions are more attractive, we
argue that our solution has advantages over them because of the following reasons:
First, since our software solution does not involve high expenses to buy and maintain
expensive servers comparing to conventional replica-based solutions, it is more cost
effective. Which makes our solution more suitable for startups and small size organi-
zations. Second, our software solution can be deployed over either ASIC (application
specified integrated circuit) or FPGA (field programmable gate array)or personal
computers, while a replica-based solution may have to be deployed on servers with
X86 architecture. That is, the deployment of our solution enjoys high flexibility
than conventional hardware-based solutions. Last, our solution doesn’t require ex-
tra system level management procedures to guarantee the security of it. Namely,
the security of our software solution is based on the intractability of well studied
computational assumptions and thus can be quantitive analysis, while that of the
replica-based solutions lie in the trustiness level of the system manager, which could
be a person or a department. Which means that, when applying the replica-based
solutions, there must exist extra and strict management procedures to ensure that
the system manager always works honest and is highly trusted.
We should also admit that our solution has constraints comparing to the replica-
based solutions. Firstly, since our solution, in fact, shifts certain amount of com-
putational task from the server to the end nodes, the users in our system need to
spend more computational power and time on generating required ciphertexts. So,
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our solution imposes more burden on end users comparing to replica-based solutions.
Secondly, as a software-based solution, our scheme can hardly be more efficient than
the traditional hardware-based solutions with replicated servers. And when com-
paring the system throughput provided by the two types of solutions, our solution
also cannot earn any advantage over the traditional fault tolerance solutions with
replicated servers.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we present an access control encryption(ACE) with compact size
ciphertext and decentralized sanitizers. Our construction is also believed to be
the first one considering using multiple sanitizers rather than one. Our extended
no-write rule model and the given corresponding proof show that our ACE is more
secure and reliable because of the utilization of decentralized sanitizers. The security
of our scheme is proven under non-standard assumptions with the help of the random
oracle. Our next work focuses on presenting ACE which can be proven secure
without random oracle and under standard assumptions.
Chapter 7
Thesis Conclusion
In this chapter, we summarize the work presented in this thesis and list some research
directions for future work.
7.1 Conclusion
7.1.1 Communication Schemes with User and Data Privacy
In our first work, we formalize the notion user conditional privacy preservation
and then propose a privacy preserving source-verifiable encryption scheme which
maintains message confidentiality and sender conditional privacy. We also give a
short discussion of constructing a server-aided variant of our scheme.
In the second work, we consider a more complex scenario where the user and
data privacy should be preserved. In that scenario, a user is required to be able to
prove the legitimation of the communication channel between it and its communi-
cator without leaking their privacy. We find such scenario is realistic when there
exists a authority in the system which maintains a publicly published blacklist to
block communication channels between specific message senders and receivers. We
present a group-based source-destination verifiable encryption scheme with blacklist
checking which can address the issues in the scenario properly. Our construction uti-
lizes the zero-knowledge proof of membership and also zero-knowledge of inequality
technique.
Our two aforementioned works all give answers to the problem how to preserve
the user conditional privacy. However, those two solutions have the same insuffi-
ciency. Namely, since the receiver in the proposed schemes is the only parity which
can revoke the anonymity of the sender of a given ciphertext, and no one else in
the system has the capability to verify whether the receiver behaves honestly during
identifying the actual sender, it can manipulate the origination of one ciphertext
successfully. To tackle this problem, we develop a secure communication scheme
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applied between the surveillance camera and the server in the camera surveillance
system. With our scheme, the server can give a proof to convince others the origi-
nation of a ciphertext without leaking its content. Such property enables the server
to build a searchable database using the camera’s identifier as index and also the
message auditor to check the ciphertext and its origination stored in the database
without any dispute.
7.1.2 Access Control Encryption
In our fourth work, we give the first ACE scheme construction with decentralized
sanitizers. The resulted scheme keeps not only the ciphertext size but also the
key size of each users compact. Our more significant contribution to the ACE is
giving a decentralized implementation of the sanitizer. Unlike previous ACE schemes
with only one sanitizer, our construction distributes the sanitizing functionality of
the origin ACE among n sanitizers. It is impossible for one of sanitizers in our
construction to produce a new access policy, so our construction imposes restriction
on the capability of the sanitizer. Besides, as one message sender in our ACE
scheme can choose the t sanitizers itself to collaboratively produce a valid sanitized
ciphertext, even some of the n sanitizers cannot provide service or are off-line, the
whole ACE system can still work as normal. So our construction improves the
reliability of the sanitizer and even the robustness of the whole ACE system.
7.2 Future Work
We put forward the following research directions as our future work.
1. The realization of the user conditional privacy preservation property in our
first three works cannot avoid the usage of zero-knowledge proof, which makes
the resulted schemes rather inefficient. We are still working on finding more
efficient cryptographic tools to construct encryption schemes which preserve
the user conditional privacy.
2. The access control encryption is a cryptographic realization of the classical
Bell-LaPadula model. However, this primitive only realize a partial of the
functionalities of that model. Besides, there still exists another useful access
control model, the Chinese wall model concretely, which has never been well
studied and realized using cryptographic tools. We cannot, at present, ascer-
tain whether the whole functionalities of the Bell-LaPadula model and Chinese
wall model can be implemented using cryptographic tools. So we leave it as
one of our future work.
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Science, ETH Zürich, 260, 1997.
[KBK+11] Emile J. C. Kelkboom, Jeroen Breebaart, Tom A. M. Kevenaar, Ileana
Buhan, and Raymond N. J. Veldhuis. Preventing the decodability at-
tack based cross-matching in a fuzzy commitment scheme. IEEE Trans.
Information Forensics and Security, 6(1):107–121, 2011.
[KPW97] Seungjoo Kim, Sangjoon Park, and Dongho Won. Group signatures for
hierarchical multigroups. In Information Security, First International
Workshop, pages 273–281. Springer, 1997.
[KSAS15] Jongkil Kim, Willy Susilo, Man Ho Au, and Jennifer Seberry. Adap-
tively secure identity-based broadcast encryption with a constant-
sized ciphertext. IEEE Trans. Information Forensics and Security,
10(3):679–693, 2015.
[LASZ14] Joseph K Liu, Man Ho Au, Willy Susilo, and Jianying Zhou. Linkable
ring signature with unconditional anonymity. IEEE Transactions on
Knowledge and Data Engineering, 26(1):157–165, 2014.
[LHZM10] Zhenhua Liu, Yupu Hu, Xiangsong Zhang, and Hua Ma. Certificateless
signcryption scheme in the standard model. Inf. Sci., 180(3):452–464,
2010.
[LK14] Yehuda Lindell and Jonathan Katz. Introduction to modern cryptogra-
phy. Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2014.
[LLM+07] Dennis Y. W. Liu, Joseph K. Liu, Yi Mu, Willy Susilo, and Duncan S.
Wong. Revocable ring signature. J. Comput. Sci. Technol., 22(6):785–
794, 2007.
[LLZ+08] Rongxing Lu, Xiaodong Lin, Haojin Zhu, Pin-Han Ho, and Xuemin
Shen. ECPP: efficient conditional privacy preservation protocol for se-
cure vehicular communications. In INFOCOM 2008. 27th IEEE In-
ternational Conference on Computer Communications, Joint Confer-
ence of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies, 13-18 April
2008, Phoenix, AZ, USA, pages 1229–1237, 2008.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 140
[LMG+17] Jianchang Lai, Yi Mu, Fuchun Guo, Willy Susilo, and Rongmao Chen.
Fully privacy-preserving and revocable id-based broadcast encryption
for data access control in smart city. Personal and Ubiquitous Comput-
ing, 21(5):855–868, 2017.
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